Y4.F76/1:Af3/2

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

COMPLETED
132

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 1, 1986

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

ORIGINAL

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-692 O WASHINGTON : 1986

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

CDD

I

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, *Chairman*

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
DON BONKER, Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
DAN MICA, Florida
MICHAEL D. BARNES, Maryland
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan
GEO. W. CROCKETT, Jr., Michigan
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California
TOM LANTOS, California
PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, Florida
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
HARRY REID, Nevada
MEL LEVINE, California
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
TED WEISS, New York
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
BUDDY MacKAY, Florida
MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona
ROBERT GARCIA, New York

WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
JIM LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
GERALD B.H. SOLOMON, New York
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
MARK D. SILJANDER, Michigan
ED ZSCHAU, California
ROBERT K. DORNAN, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida
MICHAEL DeWINE, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona

John J. Brady, Jr., *Chief of Staff*
Teresa M. Curran, *Staff Assistant*

Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York, *Chairman*

MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona
MICHAEL D. BARNES, Maryland
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

JIM LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
GERALD B.H. SOLOMON, New York
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

Stanley Roth, *Subcommittee Staff Director*
Cynthia D. Sprunger, *Minority Staff Consultant*
Richard Bush, *Subcommittee Staff Consultant*
David Frank, *Subcommittee Staff Consultant*

CONTENTS

WITNESSES

Page

Hon. Gordon Humphrey, a Senator in Congress from the State of New Hampshire 3
Hon. Robert J. Lagomarsino, a Representative in Congress from the State of California 5
Robert A. Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 19
Charles W. Greenleaf, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and Near East, Agency for International Development 38
Barnett R. Rubin, assistant professor of political science, Yale University 74
Louis Dupree, visiting senior research associate, Islamic and Arabic Development Studies, Duke University 99

APPENDIXES

1. U.N. Resolution 40/137, "Question of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Afghanistan" 120
2. "The Soviet War in Afghanistan," submitted by Jim Phillips, Heritage Foundation 123
3. "Toward Afghanistan Peace," submitted by Selig S. Harrison, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 128

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

THURSDAY, MAY 1, 1986

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 1:45 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen Solarz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Solarz. The subcommittee will come to order. The audience will kindly take their seats.

Today, the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs will focus on one of the great tragedies of our time. I refer to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the increasingly brutal war of occupation which is being waged by the Red army in Afghanistan in a so far futile effort to subdue the Afghan people.

The world's press today is full of accounts of the terrible impact of the nuclear reactor fire at Chernobyl in the U.S.S.R. and the deaths caused by this most unfortunate disaster. The United States and other responsible governments have offered their sympathies to the victims of this tragedy and volunteered their assistance to the Soviets, particularly to reduce the risks of radiation damage to the civilian population of the Soviet Union and Eastern and Western Europe.

But while the world bemoans this latest disaster in the Soviet Union, relatively little attention has been paid to the massive scale of human rights abuses that has occurred in Afghanistan since 1979. Literally tens of thousands of Afghans have been slaughtered. Thousands more have disappeared as the Soviet backed Babrak Karmal regime attempted to stamp out all opposition and to destroy the resistance forces.

One-third of the population of Afghanistan has been forced to go into exile in order to escape the persecution and campaign of terror being waged by the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. Famine gripped much of rural Afghanistan last year as military units systematically destroyed crops and irrigation systems. Thousands more of the Afghan people were forced to flee into the hills and eventually seek refuge abroad. Private voluntary medical teams operating in Afghanistan estimated that 85 percent of Afghan infants died in 1984–85 due to the famine and the disruption of village life in the countryside.

Despite the presence of over 120,000 Soviet troops including the Soviet crack special forces, Spetsnaz, the brave Afghan mujahedin have continued their armed resistance to the illegal Soviet occupation of their country. I doubt in the history of national resistance movements that there has ever been a more determined or more valiant resistance movement than the one which is now underway in Afghanistan.

The willingness of the Afghan people to put their lives on the line for the independence of their nation is a source of inspiration to men and women of good will throughout the world who care deeply about the cause of freedom.

In our hearing today we will look at the current human rights situation in Afghanistan and the state of the over 2.5 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and what more the United States should be doing to aid these brave, but unfortunate people. We will also be looking at the status of the U.N.-sponsored talks between the Karmal regime and Pakistan and the Soviet Union in an effort to determine if any real progress has been made in seeking an equitable solution that would allow the Afghan people to determine their own destiny and which would also facilitate the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from that country.

We are privileged to have with us today some outstanding Members of the Congress who have made the plight of the Afghan people their very particular and special concern. Senator Gordon Humphrey from New Hampshire and Congressman Robert Lagomarsino of California have worked together for over 2 years on the congressional task force on Afghanistan. We appreciate their willingness to appear before us this afternoon.

I have personally been privileged to work with Congressman Lagomarsino with whom I serve on the Foreign Affairs Committee on behalf of this very worthy cause, and I know of no Member of the House who has done more to keep Afghanistan in the forefront of congressional attention and concern than my very good friend from California.

Our other witnesses will be Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Robert Peck, who recently returned from a visit to Pakistan; and Mr. Charles Greenleaf, the Administrator of the Asia Bureau of the Agency for International Development. Two final witnesses we will be hearing from today are well known for their activities in publicizing the systematic slaughter and persecution of the Afghanistan people and for urging greater international efforts to resolve this crisis.

Professor Barnette Rubin is the coauthor of the 1985 Helsinki Report, "To Die in Afghanistan" and a professor of political science at Yale University. Professor Louis Dupree is a visiting scholar in the Department of Islamic and Arab studies at Duke University, who has been a frequent visitor to the region and has written extensively on Afghanistan.

We will hear first from our two congressional witnesses. Have you gentlemen decided who will go first? I see there is more agreement among the witnesses than the mujahedin. Let us hope that is a harbinger of the unity to come in the ranks of the resistance. Senator Humphrey.

STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON HUMPHREY, A SENATOR IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Senator **Humphrey**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Whenever I appear before a House panel and its members are sitting high on the dais, I am tempted to refer to them not as Mr. Chairman, but as Your Highness.

Mr. **Solarz**. Please proceed.

Senator **Humphrey**. It is quite an impressive and intimidating arrangement.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very kindly for permitting me to testify and to offer my thoughts and opinions and thank you for holding this important hearing at a most crucial juncture. As you know, the U.N.-sponsored peace talks on Afghanistan are about to resume, and I am greatly worried about the nature of these talks and the terms of the agreements already worked out according to the press.

Mr. Chairman, what is the nature of these talks? The most important point to be made about the nature of these talks is that they exclude legitimate representatives of the Afghan people. Here are talks which could decide the fate of the people of Afghanistan, which are intended in large measure, to decide the fate of the people of Afghanistan, and who is there representing Afghanistan? The puppet regime set up in Kabul by the Soviets after their invasion in 1979, this illegitimate regime that would fall in a matter of days without the protection of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Afghanistan is being represented by officials of the so-called Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The DRA regime is not democratic, and it does not represent the people of Afghanistan, yet the fact is the DRA is there in Geneva deciding the fate of the people of that nation of Afghanistan. In testimony yesterday before the congressional task force on Afghanistan, former U.N. Ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick, reminded us that President Reagan, in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly last year outlined some basic standards which apply to negotiations such as these.

The President said direct negotiations between warring parties in the regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and Ethiopia were a "starting point" of a peace process which could lead to internal reconciliation with democracy and human rights for all. I emphasize that President Reagan said the starting point is negotiations between the warring factions, and as Ambassador Kirkpatrick reiterated, this is the U.S. position as articulated by the President.

Direct negotiations between parties is the starting point. A peace process ending in internal reconciliation with human rights and democracy for all is the goal of the U.S. Government and represents our acceptable terms for a settlement. Yet the U.N. negotiations, Mr. Chairman, do not include one of the principle warring parties; namely, the mujahedin who have valiantly waged, as you have noted, a 6-year war against Soviet forces and who have sacrificed monumentally in their effort to rid their nation of an invader and the puppet government set up by that invader.

An important principle is violated when the United States sanctions dishonestly structured talks such as these. Further, to encourage talks which don't meet the minimum standards set by the President, makes it sound like the President is not serious in what he says. Mr. Chairman, I believe the President has been badly served by the State Department which has acquiesced in U.N. talks in which the stakes are exceedingly high, the fate of Afghanistan, and which do not meet the criteria laid down by President Reagan in his speech to the United Nations. In fact we have more than acquiesced in such talks.

In December of last year, the State Department reversed its position and agreed to act as a guarantor of a settlement. Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, I was told by a high-ranking State Department official that the offer to guarantee was not cleared with the President. In my view, our active encouragement of talks which exclude legitimate representatives of the Afghan people is high handed, it's arrogant, and it's immoral. One is reminded of Yalta. One is reminded of the fate of nations being decided in their absence. One is reminded of arrogance and the bitter fruit which it can bear.

It is past time that our Government insist that the U.N. talks on Afghanistan include legitimate representatives of the Afghan people, the mujahedin, the freedom fighters. So much for the nature of the talks. As for the terms so far agreed upon, they are a trap, in my view. We understand, again, from press reports that aid to the Afghan freedom fighters would be cut off immediately. In addition, Pakistan would immediately extend official recognition to the DRA regime in Kabul.

Then at some point when the Soviets are satisfied that all aid to the freedom fighters has been cut off, they would withdraw their forces in stages. Mr. Chairman, it takes no vivid imagination to see how things would play out. We and others would cut off our aid to the freedom fighters. Pakistan would recognize Moscow's puppet government in Kabul. The Soviets would withdraw enough forces to make a good show, but the Kabul regime, still under fire from the freedom fighters with weapons stored for such an eventuality would claim that outside aid had resumed and would invite the Soviets to remain.

And what would we do? What could we do? Once Pakistan has legitimized the DRA regime through official recognition what could we do? As a practical matter, once the aid program is cut off it will be very difficult to resume, and for the Pakistanis, probably politically impossible. As a result, the Soviets would have succeeded in incorporating Afghanistan into the Soviet empire. As a result, more than 6 years of bloody sacrifice and unspeakable suffering by the people of Afghanistan would have been thrown away by outside powers.

At the very least, the United States must insist upon the inclusion of the freedom fighters in the U.N. talks. At the very least, the United States must insist upon simultaneity in the cutoff of assistance to the mujahedin and the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Finally, with respect to the terms of the agreement so far approved by the parties, it is vitally important to note that none of the documents addresses the matter of self-determination for the Afghan people, nor, according to press reports, is there any intention of addressing this central issue at the U.N. talks.

Apparently that is a matter to be dealt with in some as yet undetermined way. Withdrawal of Soviet forces, return of Afghan refugees and self-determination are supposed to be the bedrock criteria of the United States in any settlement of the Afghan war. Yet we have increasingly associated ourselves with a process which does not in any way address self-determination. So I implore the administration to insist that a mechanism of self-determination, with the appropriate safeguards of international supervision be included in any settlement for which we are to act as guarantor.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you and and the committee for this timely hearing. A very great deal is at stake, and in my view the administration has gotten us and the Afghan people into a very tight spot by giving the State Department bureaucracy free reign. It is time the White House got involved; got involved in directing our activities associated with the U.N. talks. I hope this hearing will hasten that event.

The objective is not just to achieve any old settlement. Indeed, it isn't even to achieve any old peace, because real peace isn't just the absence of war, it is also the absence of oppression. Peace without freedom is hardly worth achieving, and no people on the face of this Earth cling to that belief more tenaciously than the brave people of Afghanistan that have suffered over these past years. Even so, they say they will still fight to the very last man to regain their country and their freedom. They are defending their frontier of freedom practically with bare hands, and they are defending it not just for themselves, but for all of the peoples of the world who love freedom.

I think America sells out herself as well as the Afghans if we give them anything less than a fair shot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Solarz. Thank you very much, Senator.

We will now hear from Congressman Lagomarsino.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. Lagomarsino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for this opportunity allowing me to speak on the situation in Afghanistan. In my capacity as cochairman of the congressional task force on Afghanistan with Senator Humphrey, I have been closely monitoring the tragic events of the past 6 years, as I know you have.

I think it is very important that these hearings are being held, and I commend you for them, Mr. Chairman. It is extremely vital that we keep this issue in the forefront, and sometimes I have the impression that no matter what we try to do, it is difficult to do that. For some reason this issue does not receive the kind of attention that I, at least, think it should.

Mr. Chairman, as you know and have pointed out, the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, following a series of unpopular Communist coups. Although it is interesting—some of us were in Pakistan northwest frontier in August 1979 before the invasion and there were refugees then, and they said they were fleeing from Soviet aggression. So this is not something that happened with that over invasion. It started long before that.

Their apparent goal, though, in December was to support their puppet regime of Babrak Karmal and formally transfer Afghanistan into another Soviet satellite. One of the results of that invasion, though, that was probably unforeseen by them was the mass resistance to this illegal Soviet occupation. The struggle by the Afghan people against some 120,000 Soviet troops has been very costly.

As you pointed out, millions of Afghans have been forced to flee their homes and have become refugees in Pakistan and Iran. Thousands of others have been indiscriminately killed and maimed. The Soviets have followed a scorch earth policy in Afghanistan, resulting in the destruction of entire villages, crops, herds of livestock and even the earth itself, irrigation systems and things of that kind. Because of this inhuman policy, many Afghans are facing starvation.

In addition, their Soviets and their unpopular Afghan puppets use torture, indiscriminate arrests and hostage taking to subjugate the Afghan people, all well-documented in many places, including the Irma Kora report to the United Nations. Last January, I visited Pakistan, and my view was reinforced that despite these hardships, the Afghan people are determined to liberate their country at any cost. Leading that struggle, of course, are the mujahedin.

The seven main groups of the mujahedin operate under a unified command and have the loyal support of most Afghans. The mujahedin are welcomed and provided for by the Afghan populace in all parts of the land. In fact, even in cities like Kabul and Herat that the Soviets claim to control, the mujahedin are active and popular. It is therefore not surprising that one journalist who traveled with the freedom fighters in Kabul equated them to the freedom fighters of the French resistance in World War II.

They even have support within the Afghan Armed Forces. This is evident, I think, by the extremely high desertion rates. Sometime entire units go over to the mujahedin. Because of that questionable loyalty of the Afghan Army, the Soviets often do not entrust it with sensitive tasks. Despite this heroic resistance, we must not forget the size or power of the Soviet force the mujahedin opposes.

The Soviet Red army is one of the world's largest and best equipped, and whole reports indicated that there are 120,000 Soviets in Afghanistan, there are thousands more, probably at least 30,000 readily available across the border with all kinds of equipment and support. Against the lightly armored mujahedin, the Soviets deploy tanks, guided missiles, rockets, and artillery. In the sky they use the MI-24 Hind helicopter gunship, and attack jets against the mujahedin and innocent Afghan villages.

The Soviets, as we know, are using special forces called Spetsnaz who are very formidable and are causing great problems for the mujahedin. There also have been credible reports of chemical warfare being using against these defenseless tribesmen. Afghanistan has become the proving ground for Soviet tactics and weapons. According to the Department of Defense, the new Soviet SU-25 frogfoot close support aircraft and later models of the hind gunships have been combat tested on the Afghan people.

Senator HUMPHREY. Pardon me for the interruption, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Leach. As you might have heard, we have a vote underway, and I am going to have to excuse myself with apologies for the interruption, and to you.

Mr. SOLARZ. Are you planning to return, Senator?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, I very much would like to come back. I intend to.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. The Soviets have also tested and now use butterfly bombs against young Afghan children. Thousands of children have been killed or maimed as a result of playing with these inhuman Soviet toys. And I, like both of you, have seen pictures of children minus hands, minus fingers as a result of this inhuman practice.

During my recent visit with mujahedin leaders in Pakistan, I was struck by the determination of the people to regain their nation as I was, incidentally in August 1979. Whether they receive external assistance, they will fight. This isn't one of the examples that some people bring up once in a while saying, "Well, there wouldn't be a fight if we weren't promoting it, if we weren't supplying the people with arms."

These people, I am convinced, would fight with rocks if they had to in order to carry out what they want to do. Fortunately, they do have more than rocks to fight with. However, they are still underequipped and underpowered. They need weapons that will enable them to fight back against Soviet tanks and more importantly against Soviet air power. They need to be able to protect their farms and families from indiscriminate aerial bombing, and they need, above all, the weapons necessary to present a strong credible resistance against the well-armed Soviets.

While arms and military supplies are necessary to continue the struggle against the Red army, we must not forget the human aspect of the plight of the Afghan people. An amendment to the fiscal year 1986 foreign assistance bill by Senator Gordon Humphrey and I, with your vital help, Mr. Chairman and the ranking minority leader, Mr. Leach, authorized $15 million in overt humanitarian aid directly to the Afghan people.

I recently learned from AID that this money will be used to continue ongoing activities and fund projects in education, health, livestock, and commodity support. I know this aid is effective, and I think there are two reasons for the aid in the way that we did it. One is the aid itself. It is important it helps. Second, it is one way that we can openly talk about this issue and show the world what is going on there.

In January, I visited the training clinic of the International Medical Corps, and there I saw dedicated young Afghans learning about medicine and surgery techniques that would help the entire Afghan population. I was astonished to learn in March, just 2 months later from the program's director, Dr. Robert Simon, that these same students who knew very little in January, were now performing emergency surgery successfully. These advanced surgical medics will return back inside Afghanistan to establish field hospitals to serve the mujahedin and civilians attacked by the Soviets.

For the first time, at least on a wider scale, the average Afghan will have access to medical care. This medical service alone should cut the mortality rate of wounded Afghans and increase the morale and strength of the mujahedin. One of my greatest concerns is that the Soviets are shipping thousands of young Afghan children to the Soviet Union for what they call education purposes. The real goal of this program apparently is to eradicate Afghan culture, religion, and values by brainwashing these Afghan children with Communist propaganda. The Soviets are seeking to consolidate their occupation and deny the mujahedin recruits.

The world should not allow Afghanistan to suffer the same fate as the Baltic States, the Ukraine, and we will hear more about the Ukraine today, of course, and Mongolia. Recently much attention has been given to the U.N.-sponsored proximity talks between Pakistan and the puppet regime in Afghanistan on resolving this terrible problem. Senator Humphrey has gone into this in some length. I won't do that, but I would like to make a few comments.

The seventh, and according to some observers the final round, of these talks will begin on May 5. While negotiations are part of the process needed to help the Afghans regain their nation, these proximity talks are very detrimental to the future of an independent Afghanistan I have great concerns about them. First, as the Senator pointed out, they are between Pakistan and the DRA, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Incidentally, this Soviet puppet state is neither democratic nor republican as is the case with most countries that have that kind of a title in the first place.

In fact, it is not even Afghan. Nowhere in these talks are the Afghan people themselves represented. They have the right to self-determination. That's what the fight is all about, and we should not allow a sellout of their efforts. As part of a negotiated agreement, the puppet government in Kabul is demanding that all aid to the mujahedin cease. Afterwards the Soviets will begin a phased withdrawal. In addition, the Pakistanis would recognize the Afghan puppet government.

While the aim of these talks is to resettle the Afghan refugees, establish a timetable for Soviet troop withdrawals, and create a neutral Afghanistan, I am concerned about the apparent lack of provisions for Afghanistan's self-determination. We cannot allow the unpopular, Soviet-imposed puppet government in Afghanistan to be legitimized as a representative of the Afghan people. We don't know, I think, what kind of government the mujahedin would establish in a liberated Afghanistan, and our goal is not to dictate that as the Soviets do.

I have been informed by the mujahedin leaders that they are striving for an Islamic neutral Afghanistan aligned with neither the West nor the East that is based on the popular desires of the Afghan people. I think, Mr. Chairman, that we must continue to support the Afghan's valiant efforts to liberate their land from the brutal Soviet occupiers. Again, I want to thank you for holding this hearing and inviting me to testify here today.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Lagomarsino, for some very helpful testimony as always on this issue.

Are you suggesting that the United States should take the position that it opposes a continuation of the U.N.-sponsored negotiations in the absence of the direct participation in those talks of representatives of the mujahedin?

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. I don't know if I would go so far as to use the word, "direct." I think we certainly should not go along with the talks unless in some way the wishes of the mujahedin are taken into consideration, and they buy off, at least for most of them, on whatever the solution is. Unless that happens, there will be no settlement anyway.

Mr. **Solarz**. I think the conclusion is absolutely correct, but I think there are two separate points here. The first is whether the negotiations should proceed without their participation. Second question is, should there be an agreement of which they don't approve?

Clearly with respect to the latter, any agreement which isn't acceptable to the mujahedin is an agreement not worth the paper it is printed on. In fact, my impression is that the Pakistanis, who would have to be party to an agreement, are very conscious of this fact. Based on my discussions with Pakistani leaders, I find it hard to believe that they would agree to any arrangements which were not acceptable to the Afghan people.

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. Common sense would indicate that, because either the Afghans will not agree; they will go on fighting, and that continues the problem, or they will remain refugees in Pakistan.

Mr. **Solarz**. My impression has been that our own administration has been reasonably confident that that was the spirit in which Pakistan was entering into these talks and that we believed that they in fact would not agree to a cosmetic settlement simply for the sake of saying they got a settlement if it didn't reflect the wishes and will of the Afghan people. I think the more important issue is whether we should change our position vis-a-vis the negotiations.

As I understand it, the administration has basically supported these negotiations and has said that it would be prepared to guarantee a settlement which emerged from the negotiations, assuming that it was compatible with the objectives which we seek. But the administration has very clearly refrained from opposing the negotiations on the grounds that the representatives of the mujahedin are not themselves involved in the negotiations. I have perhaps somewhat greater confidence in the capacity of the captain of the ship of State to manage the behavior of the crew than Senator Humphrey seems to have.

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. I must say that I have a little more confidence than he does, too, on that. I think it is extremely important, however, that the impression not be given to the mujahedin that they are not going to be consulted, because there is a feeling—you know, how strongly they feel it, I can't say, but I know that they have expressed to me when we were in Pakistan in January that they were concerned that they would be sold out.

Mr. **Solarz**. But you are not suggesting that the President is some kind of naive dupe who has permitted the bureaucrats in the State Department to pull the wool over his eyes and to conduct an

Afghan policy on behalf of the United States of which he personally does not approve.

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. No; I wouldn't say that. I don't know that the President is made aware of each and every move that goes on, but certainly I can't foresee President Reagan saying, "Well, OK, we have been helping long enough. It is time to end this. If it is good enough with Russia and the Afghan Government and with Pakistan, it is good enough for me." I just don't think that is going to happen.

I have the impression that our willingness to support these proximity talks, this U.N.-sponsored negotiation, has been a critical factor in making it possible for the negotiations to continue. I could be wrong. I want to hear from the State Department on this, but my sense is that if we were to get up and say we will not support the results of any negotiation in which the mujahedin do not participate regardless of what comes out of them, that that would probably be a death sentence for the negotiations.

Mr. **Solarz**. I am not overly optimistic that the negotiations will produce a result, but what I do want to be clear about your position. You think it would be desirable for the mujahedin to participate in negotiations.

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. Yes, I do, and I think probably that is the view of the State Department, too. You can ask them.

Mr. **Solarz**. But you are not suggesting that we take the position that unless they participate we are opposed to the negotiations.

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. No. But I am very strongly taking the position that unless the Afghan people, especially in the form of the mujahedin leadership, approves whatever agreement is reached or tentatively reached, I hope nothing would be agreed on without their participation at that point.

Mr. **Solarz**. You have been in Pakistan on a number of occasions. Is it your view that the Government of Pakistan is seeking a settlement compatible with the concerns of the Afghan people?

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. I think so, because, as I say, if they don't they are wasting their time anyway, because the Afghans will do one of two things: either they will continue fighting, and that will continue problems between them and Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, or they will remain refugees and that is a problem for Pakistan right now with the millions of refugees inside the country.

Mr. **Solarz**. My impression is that Pakistan, under great pressure for several years, has conducted itself with great dignity and with great skill in these negotiations. If they were looking for some face-saving formula, some cosmetic agreement, they could have had that a long time ago. But they have held out for a firm, explicit commitment on the part of the Soviet Union to withdraw not some, but literally all of their forces by a certain date, and they have indicated to me, and I am sure to others that they envision a relatively narrow time frame in which that withdrawal would take place.

The fact that they have held to that position through a few years of negotiations and several years of brutal Soviet pressure seems to me to indicate that they are very sincere and very serious about seeking a settlement that is in fact compatible with the self-determination of the Afghan people and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the country.

Mr. Lagomarsino. That is certainly my impression of the present Pakistan Government. Now what would happen with a different one, I don't know, and that would be the case with any country in the world.

Mr. Solarz. May I ask you one final question? Is it your view based on your discussions with the mujahedin that because they have not participated in the U.N.-sponsored talks that they would like these talks brought to an end and suspended until they are invited to participate, or have they simply expressed concerns about what might emanate from the talks?

Mr. Lagomarsino. I think I would have to say the latter, although I don't recall that we discussed that so specifically that I could answer that very accurately. I think the latter is the case, but it may be that the truth is somewhat a little different.

Mr. Solarz. One final question. Supposing there were an agreement in which the Soviets committed themselves, say, within 6 months or 1 year, to withdraw all of their forces, and we were obligated and other countries were obligated to guarantee that we wouldn't provide arms to the resistance movement, and all of the refugees were given the opportunity to return with honor and dignity to their homeland. But nothing was said, as nothing seems to be said about the current government in the agreement. In other words, it presumably remains intact, but realistically I would imagine its prospects for survival once the last Soviet soldier leaves Kabul are not very good.

Would such a settlement in your view be an acceptable settlement in the expectation that the Babrak regime would be rapidly forced out, or do you think that an acceptable agreement would have to provide for a new government simultaneous with the withdrawal of the Soviets?

Mr. Lagomarsino. I think that unless the latter is the case that you probably would not get the acceptance by the mujahedin of the agreement, meaning that there would be no effective agreement. I think that we have to have more than a signed piece of paper. There has to be action. There has to be something that is simultaneous.

It is sort of like what Phil Habib is talking about with Contadora. He is not just saying that if the Sandinista signed a Contadora agreement that that is the end of the process. That is just the beginning. There has to be simultaneous carrying out of whatever the terms of that agreement are, and I think you have to have that here, not only because that is the right thing to do, but because it is the only practical thing that will work, that will be accepted.

Mr. Solarz. You would be opposed to any agreement that obligated us from providing assistance to the resistance on day 1, but which would not require the Soviets to withdraw all their forces until, say, day 185.

Mr. Lagomarsino. It might depend on the timetable. Obviously it will take the Soviets some time to withdraw even if they are in good faith set about trying to do it. It didn't take them very long to get in there, but I think it will take them a little longer to get out. It shouldn't take them that long.

I would be certainly opposed if it was going to be one of these open-ended things where it was going to be, say, a year, and in the meantime we would have stopped, or whoever is, if anybody is helping them from the outside—I guess we don't really know if anybody really is helping them or not, but if anybody is, if they were to stop, it would be very very difficult to ever start it up again. I do share Senator Humphrey's concern about that, and I don't know the answer—how you work that out exactly, but I think that has to be taken into full consideration.

Now part of that, I guess, can be done by trying to determine how long the mujahedin could operate with whatever they had after the agreement was signed if that was a figure that was compatible, then sure, maybe you could work something out, but certainly if it was very apparent that they were going to be out of materials, and there would be no prospect for getting further ones, and the Soviets would still be there, we don't have much of an agreement.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Let me say I apologize, Senator. I didn't hear your full statement. I did hear Bob's, and I just want to say that that was a wonderful overview of the situation. Maybe it needn't be said, but I think it should be repeated again and again that with respect to the foreign policy of the United States, there is great deal of disagreement among all sectors of American public opinion, but on this issue, both political parties and, I think, all elements within the parties are in virtually unanimous agreement on the awesomeness of the problem and the awfulness of Soviet policy.

If anything, for instance in the Congress, I think the momentum has been to give more assistance to the opposition than the administration at any given point in time has actually proposed, partly led by yourself, Bob, and partly led by other people in the Congress. So any comments, I think, we may have at any point have to have that as background.

In terms of an agreement, I think it is important that we understand what generally is perceived to be the prospect of what an agreement will look like and here Professor Rubin in his written statement—and he is about to testify—has written about three sentences. I would like to read them to see if there is any direct opposition to this.

Professor Rubin will testify apparently to this effect: "We can summarize the terms of the agreement as follows: Pakistan, the United States, and all other powers will cease all aid to the Afghan mujahedin as the Soviet Union withdraws all of its troops (not advisors) from Afghanistan. This agreement will go into force only if approved by the three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan or their representatives, but these representatives will not be the Islamic Unity of Afghan mujahedin, the coalition of the seven major Sunni Muslim resistance parties. The refugees will be free to return to their homes voluntarily without reprisals. Both the United States and the Soviet Union will publicly commit themselves not to intervene or interfere in Afghanistan and will guarantee respect for the agreement."

Now, presuming that is the outline of a potential agreement, is there anything in that you would differ with, Bob, and yourself, Senator Humphrey.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. If I heard you correctly, if the statement implies that the mujahedin would not have to accept the agreement, I certainly would——

Mr. LEACH. No, what the statement says is that the 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan or their representatives would have to agree, excluding one group of those refugees, the coalition of the seven Sunni Muslim resistance parties.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. If the seven resistance parties are the ones that I have in mind, that is the group that is opposing the Soviet invasion.

Mr. LEACH. They are one of a large group. The presumption is every single refugee opposes the Soviet invasion. In fact, my own assumption is that every single person in Afghanistan opposes it, with the possible exception of a puppet office holder or two.

What this agreement is simply stipulating is that there is one group that holds a little position that perhaps our Government doesn't totally agree with. The agreement spells out that it will not go into force unless it is approved by the majority of Afghan groups.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I'm speaking about that particular group, but you know you never have an agreement that 100 percent of the people support, but I would say if otherwise the agreement was verifiable and enforceable and everything else was fine, and the vast majority of the mujahedin supported it, yes, I would think that one small group should not be able to stop it. No one person or one small group should have the veto power.

Mr. LEACH. But does the outline of the agreement sound plausible to you?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Well, as I said earlier, I have some real problems with the way it would be done. I think you almost have to have a simultaneous thing of the Soviets getting out and enough proof that they are going to stay out before we get into a position where we agree that we are not going to support the mujahedin, because once you stop, I would agree with the Senator, it would be possible to start again as a practical matter. I don't know how Pakistan could allow us to do it.

Senator HUMPHREY. May I respond?

Mr. LEACH. Sure.

Senator HUMPHREY. I have already laid out my concerns with the terms of the agreement. I think it is unfortunate, let me say, that we are having to speculate about the terms and about what involvement, if any, the Afghan people will have in deciding their on fate. Unfortunately, it is breathtaking that we have to speculate about these matters before we are presented a fait accomplis. I'm glad that we are having this hearing and grateful that we are at least having some crack at peering into what is going on behind the scenes.

I'm not sure on what Professor Rubin bases that particular testimony. I am sure it is well-founded. He is a respected man, but let me say that there is a vast difference between being a party to negotiations, which the Afghan people are not today and should be in determining the fate of their nation—a vast difference between being a party to the negotiations and having a chance later on through referendum or whatever is implied here to vote up or down, and I would be very worried if a referendum is what is being contemplated, because here are these 3 or 4 million refugees living under miserable circumstances, dying to get back home, not probably well-informed. What news media can there be among them except maybe word of mouth?

Voting in referendum—I don't think that certainly would be the best way to settle it and the way to deal with it honestly and in accord with American principles. President Reagan's statement is that the warring factions should be parties to negotiations, and one of the principle warring factions has been excluded, and I think that is reprehensible.

Mr. LEACH. I think in terms of preferences you are quite right. In terms of other criteria, there might be a tempering. For example, I think one of the things one can assume from at least all of my contacts with the mujahedin is that there is a universal desire that the Soviets get out. And, if the United States participates in a negotiation aimed at that end, I think one can assume we are operating on behalf of the mujahedin.

Now, even if the mujahedin aren't party to it—and I think it would be preferable if they would be a party—it would be irrational to me to think that anything that leads to that goal wasn't on behalf of the mujahedin. So that leads us to the question: If we turn it around, is it your position that under no circumstances should the United States participate in any kind of negotiations aimed at getting the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan?

Senator HUMPHREY. No, that is not my position at all. My position is that we should comply with President Reagan's criterion, which is that the warring factions be parties to the negotiations.

Mr. LEACH. I think that is preferable, and I think we all should understand we are not direct parties to these talks ourselves.

Senator HUMPHREY. But we have offered to act as a guarantor, which makes us the closest thing there is to a cardinal party to the negotiations without actually being a party.

Let me just point out, with all due respect, Congressman, that I disagree with you that we can assume that the best interests of the Afghan people are being protected in this matter in which they are directly excluded.

Mr. LEACH. I am not saying in all matters. All I am saying is that they are on one principle, getting the Soviets out, which is 99 percent of any negotiation.

Senator HUMPHREY. I don't agree with that either, sir. I think that is 50 percent and the other 50 percent is a mechanism with international supervision to guarantee self-determination for the Afghan people.

Mr. LEACH. Well, speaking in terms of preferences, I am 100 percent with you. However, if you lay out two criteria, and if under no circumstances they can be a direct party, but under some circumstances we can get the Soviets out, it could be that you could have an intermediate criteria of allowing a referendum if it has the ultimate objective of getting the Soviets out. I don't want to put our Government in the moral dilemma of under no circumstances accepting an option that might end the war simply on the basis that a mujahedin leader didn't get the chance to sit down with a Soviet leader.

I think that is a moral problem of which we ought to all be aware, but in terms of preferences, I absolutely share your concerns that the mujahedin leadership ought to, by all means, sit down with the Soviet leadership. Anyone who would suggest otherwise, I think, lacks rationality. But if there is a chance the Soviets will back out without that occurring, that is a step in the right direction, too. So I don't think we ought to get locked in a logical box that there is no conceivable agreement that the United States might be a party to under any and all circumstances although, I think in terms of preference, I agree completely that it would be preferable the other way.

Mr. **SOLARZ**. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. **LEACH**. I would be delighted to yield.

Mr. **SOLARZ**. I thank the gentleman for yielding. It strikes me that it is not unlike the talks that went on some years ago between Israel and Egypt concerning the future of the West Bank and Gaza. I think we felt it would have been desirable if there had been some Palestinians who were willing to participate in those negotiations. In the absence of a willingness on the part of any Palestinians to participate, we nevertheless, supported the talks between Israel and Egypt in the hopes that they could reach an agreement which would ultimately be compatible with not only the interest of the Palestinians but which would have the support of the Palestinians. This is based on the theory that it is better to have some talks going on designed to help the Palestinians and to resolve the problem of the West Bank and Gaza even without the Palestinians participating, than to have no talks at all, although we would obviously have been pleased if the Palestinians had participated.

It seems to me that the situation here is somewhat analogous.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. If I may offer an observation, it would be interesting to note what efforts have been made by the administration to persuade the United Nations to include all of the warring parties as President Reagan has stated is among America's criteria for settlement of these regional conflicts.

Mr. **LEACH**. I think that is a fair inquiry, and I would be happy to present that on your behalf to the witnesses from the State Department who will be coming after you. In fact, I am sure that the chairman would welcome an extra Republican, even if he is from the other side, to sit with us. At least I would make that request on behalf of Senator Humphrey.

Let me just go on one step further. Now and again, I think all Americans have a difference with the foreign policy of the United States. My own personal sense is that when we differ, we should be cautious about not differentiating between departments; that is, the executive branch of the U.S. Government is the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, et cetera, and the President, even if he doesn't know everything that is going on, is basically accountable.

It is my understanding that you are suggesting that the State Department is doing things that the President isn't aware of and contrary to the President's beliefs. Could you——

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, that is my suggestion. That is my opinion, and with respect to the offering to act as a guarantor, as I said in my testimony, a ranking official of the State Department told me that this offer of a guaranty was not cleared by the President.

Yesterday at the hearing of the Task Force on Afghanistan, another of our witnesses, Dr. Edward Luttwak of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies compared what is going on, this means the negotiations going on as sort of a dark tunnel process, being handled out of the view of the public—even we don't know what is going on for sure, so we can agree with the dark part, and as for the tunnel, it is being handled by middle level bureaucrats, and when this product pops out at the end of the tunnel, I am afraid it is going to be disastrous.

My contention is that this is so vital and at such a critical juncture that the White House should be playing a direct role.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this time, but I would renew my request that Senator Humphrey be allowed to sit up here and perhaps direct a question or two to the representative of the State Department.

Mr. SOLARZ. We would be delighted to have the participation of Senator Humphrey or anybody else who serves in the Congress. I might even, one of these days, invite someone from the audience to come up also. It might add to the effectiveness of the hearing, and if he would like to do so, we would be happy to have him.

I just have a few more questions. Very briefly, do each of you think we should maintain our Embassy in Kabul, or should we close it down?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I think we should close it down while somebody can make a case that has not been made yet. The only reason I can think of that would make it, perhaps, desirable to keep it open, would be perhaps some Machiaevellian argument by the mujahedin that in order to show their distance from us, which they seem to want to do, that that might be helpful. But that is about the only reason I can think of. Reasons are given that we are able to get intelligence and so on, but I find that not very compelling.

Yes, I think we should close it down.

Mr. SOLARZ. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, it is ironic, isn't it—astounding that on the one hand we are aiding the freedom fighters. On the other hand, we still maintain an embassy with an American flag flying daily at the seat of the government against which we are helping the mujahedin to fight. And it seems to me it undercuts our moral argument. Incidentally, there is a DRA Embassy here in Washington, you know.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I didn't know that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, there is.

Mr. SOLARZ. That's interesting. So I gather you think we should close it down.

Senator HUMPHREY. I do. I have talked to the intelligence people. The users do not regard the intelligence as sufficient to warrant undercutting our moral position. Now the intelligence gatherers love it. They never want to give up a resource.

Mr. SOLARZ. So if you were consistent, I suppose you would both be in favor of closing down our Embassy in Managua as well.

Senator **Humphrey**. Let's not muddy the waters. I would, frankly, but I think it is important that we preserve as much unanimity at this point as possible.

Mr. **Solarz**. Because we seem to be helping the resistance in Nicaragua. There are obviously differences of opinion about whether we should, but the argument that Congressman Lagomarsino made, or you made—that both of you made——

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. But I did have the qualification about the mujahedin, and I would in the case of Nicaragua I would want to know, at least so it could be considered, what the viewpoint of not only the Contras was, but the viewpoint of the democratic nonarmed resistance inside of Nicaragua.

In other words, if I had to say yes or no, the 15 minutes was running and I had to vote yes or no, I would vote, yes, close both of them, but I would hope that we would have more than 15 minutes to consider it.

Mr. **Solarz**. Would you also close the Embassy in Addis Ababa?

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. Are we helping the resistance in Addis Ababa?

Mr. **Solarz**. Well, if you read the Washington Post, it says that we are aiding the rebels, though it wasn't clear which resistance we are helping. I hope it is not the Marxist Eritrean People's Liberation Front, which is more Marxist than the Provisional Military Administrative Council [PMAC] commonly referred to as the Dergue.

Mr. **Leach**. Just briefly, there always is a powerful case institutionally to keep all institutions open. I think, frankly, the moral case is something that is not often dealt with enough, and the purpose of representation is to have relations with duly recognized governments, and I have a very hard time thinking that the United States can consider this a duly recognized government.

Mr. **Solarz**. Assuming the mujahedin were invited to participate in the negotiations, which ones do you think should participate? How would that be determined?

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. Well, I would say the group of seven.

Senator **Humphrey**. The Islamic Unity of Afghan mujahedin.

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. Is that the seven?

Senator **Humphrey**. Not elected, but surely vastly more representative of the people of Afghanistan than this puppet regime cooperating in the genocide of its own people.

Mr. **Solarz**. Senator, if I understood you correctly, it seemed to me that with respect to policy of the administration to favor the inclusion of the mujahedin in the negotiations, supporting the negotiations even without their participation, in effect you were suggesting that the President was either ignorant or incompetent. I mean ignorant in the sense that he didn't know what his own State Department was doing, which is hard to believe, given his interest in Afghanistan, or incompetent in the sense that even though he knows that the State Department has said that we will be the guarantor of a settlement and has said we support the negotiations, he has been unable to somehow or other call the midlevel dogs in the State Department off the case.

So which of the two is it? Is he ignorant or incompetent or have I misinterpreted the question.

Senator Humphrey. Well, you know there is more to it than that. The President is very competent. You know, a year or so ago, a former national security adviser, Mr. Brzezinski, testified before the Task Force on Afghanistan and characterized the administration's performance as one of managerial neglect. I think the same charge still holds. This is such an important issue, and yet it is being dealt with on a back burner or maybe behind-the-stove basis.

Mr. Solarz. Senator, you know the President much better than I do. From what I read in the papers and see on television, I have the impression that the President is deeply disturbed by what goes on in Afghanistan

By the way, President Carter was just as deeply disturbed about it. That is why I find your argument difficult to understand or accept, because if he never spoke about it, then one could say, "Well, look, he has so many other issues to deal with"——

Senator Humphrey. That is precisely it. There are so many crises every day that the President, after uttering these inspiring statements on Afghanistan, can't really pay attention. Do you know in the entire executive branch there is not one high level official who spends full time on Afghanistan? Instead it is left to a—what is it called—a senior interagency group [SIG] and every once in a while they get together and shoot the breeze, and a committee can never—as you well know—can never act decisively.

It seems to me this effort of ours to which we are so deeply committed requires putting someone in charge full time.

Mr. Solarz. Senator, is it your impression that the mujahedin would favor a cessation of the U.N.-sponsored negotiations in the absence of an invitation to participate in them?

Senator Humphrey. I can't speak for them. I really don't know how to answer that question.

Mr. Solarz. What if it turned out that the position of the mujahedin, or most of them, was that while they would like to participate, they also believe it is better for the talks to continue even without them than to be called off completely.

Would that have any impact on your attitude?

Senator Humphrey. Some, yes. But it would depend upon the prognosis. As I see momentum building now for conditions that are essentially a sellout, I am not ready to issue a blank check on that point. Certainly we ought to ask them as a first step. It would be interesting to know if they have been asked.

Mr. Solarz. Do you think Pakistan would sell out the mujahedin in a settlement?

Senator Humphrey. I wouldn't use those terms. Pakistan is a sovereign nation, and has been doing an admirable job under very difficult circumstances, showing great courage in principle, but Pakistan, after all, is a sovereign nation with its own agenda, and Afghanistan, by necessity, I would assume, comes second. That would be my answer.

Mr. Solarz. Do you think Ronald Reagan would sell out the mujahedin?

Senator Humphrey. Not deliberately, but a process, and that is magic word these days, isn't it, the Contadora process, the Helsinki process, and what do they ever achieve? So far nothing, and there is this process, this magical process underway and momentum is building, in my view, toward some kind of a settlement, and if it is on the conditions reported by the press, it will be a sell out.

The President may not be in a position to turn us around by the time this thing pops out of the tunnel, as I have described.

Mr. **Solarz**. Well, I certainly hope, and I say this as a Democrat, that you are wrong in your assumption that it is possible because of the process or because of his preoccupation with other issues that President Reagan might end up approving an agreement which has the effect of selling out the Afghan people. I must say on this issue I have a lot of faith in the President. I cannot conceive of the possibility, under any circumstances, that he would approve of an agreement, let alone undertake to guarantee it, if it sold out the Afghan people and consigned them to perpetual political slavery under the domination of the Soviet Union or a Communist regime which they were opposed to in their own country.

But perhaps stranger things have happened, and you know the President much better than I do, so who am I to say it can't happen. You say it can. But let me say in conclusion I think we have benefited greatly from your appearance here today. I think you have put your finger on some very important issues. We want to raise these questions with the State Department witnesses who will be following in your wake, and then with the private witnesses who will be going after them.

I want to invite you, if you have the time, to join us over here and see what a freewheeling hearing in the House is like, and even participate in it. We have many Members who go from the House to the Senate. You can be among the few who comes from the Senate to the House.

Senator **Humphrey**. The pay is the same, as I understand it.

Mr. **Solarz**. Except for honoraria.

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. As a matter of fact it is not the same anymore.

Mr. **Solarz**. Thank you both very much. I think we will now here from Mr. Peck and Mr. Greenleaf.

Mr. **Solarz**. Mr. Peck, I don't know if you are a middle level bureaucrat or not. Maybe you are an upper middle level bureaucrat, but in any case, you are one of these people—are you wearing a pinstripe suit?

Mr. **Peck**. Vaguely so, I'm afraid, yes.

Mr. **Solarz**. Well, at least you are attired in the proper uniform, and we are pleased you could be here. You have heard some of the points that have been raised, and I gather you have a prepared statement. That will be included in the record if you would like to sum up briefly, and then we will hear from Mr. Greenleaf and then we will ask you some questions.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. PECK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. **Peck**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am in fact very pleased that this committee has provided the opportunity for a full review of the Afghanistan situation. This hearing is very timely one. The war and the attendant suffering in that country continues to intensify while new questions have been raised as to the trend line of that conflict and of the viability of the Afghan resistance over the longer term.

I will let my prepared statement stand for the record, but I would like briefly to supplement that statement with comments on two issues. First, our analysis of the significance of the fighting in Afghanistan so far this year, and secondly I would like to make a few brief comments on the course of the negotiations which the two previous witnesses have testified on. Public expectations have been raised, in our view, unrealistically by the optimistic talk of an imminent and successful conclusion of the Geneva Proximity talks on Afghanistan.

Senator Humphrey and Congressman Lagomarsino, whose personal contribution on this subject have been of immense importance, have raised very serious questions about the direction of these talks and about the willingness in principle of the United States to associate itself with the possible outcome, so I will address these concerns as well.

First, the fighting—the level of fighting in Afghanistan through the winter of 1985–86 has been at an unprecedented level of intensity. The resistance has once again demonstrated its countrywide capabilities with important offensive actions on the northern plains, in the Herat area, in and around Kandahar, and in the areas immediately adjacent to Pakistan from the Khyber Pass, south into Paktia Province.

There have been significant resistance successes, most notably in the overrunning of some six established regime border outposts in Nangarhar Province, south of Jalalabad. Much attention has rightfully been focused on the recently completed battle centered on the resistance logistics base at Zhawar Kili in Paktia. After 2 weeks of intense fighting, the base was overrun and large stores of materiel were lost. This must be considered a temporary setback for the resistance, at least.

But the longer term implications are not yet clear. Put in perspective, the willingness and the ability of the resistance to stand and fight a pitched battle of this magnitude would have been inconceivable only a couple of years ago. Three separate resistance organizations cooperated in the fighting revealing a new measure of military coordination among the resistance. Resistance moral was and remains high. Casualties were heavy, into the hundreds, but the resistance gave as well as it received in inflicting heavy casualties on regime forces. Some 12 aircraft were knocked down and destroyed.

I expect that the long-term significance of this battle will be judged much as was the Konar campaign of last summer, a costly and militarily indecisive venture. As in the Konar Valley, the resistance has already reoccupied the area and begun to rebuild its capabilities. The losses on the Soviet and regime side have yet to be fully calculated, but are undoubtedly heavy. Once again, the Soviets have demonstrated that with vastly superior fire power and mobility, they can strike anywhere in the country and prevail in a fixed battle, but the resistance has also demonstrated that they can inflict heavy casualties and that they can maintain their presence everywhere in Afghanistan when the Soviets are not present in force.

So I conclude that the rough stalemate of the past 6 years continues. Let me say now a brief word about the status of the negotiations. A great deal of progress appears to have been made in what we consider to be secondary issues relating to the Afghanistan conflict. These include pledges concerning mutual relations, that is, noninterference and nonintervention, arrangements for the return of the refugees and the so-called international guarantees.

The heart of the issue, however, appears hardly to have been touched. That is the arrangements for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Everything else depends on and flows from the willingness of the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops promptly from Afghanistan. We remain deeply skeptical of their intentions, but applaud and continue to support the efforts of the United Nations to find a formula which would bring this about. Let there be no doubt about the American role in this matter. We will not be a party to any sellout of the Afghan resistance.

The Afghan people have struggled bravely and sacrificed beyond all reasonable measure for their freedom. The Soviet Union must not be allowed to achieve at the negotiating table what they have been unable to wrest militarily from the brave Afghan freedom fighters.

The central goal of the United States has from the beginning been the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops. We have believed and acted on that belief that steadily increasing political and military pressure must be applied to induce the Soviets to effect such a withdrawal. We continue to stand by that policy.

We hope for the best in Geneva. All governments and all people would like nothing better than to see a peaceful settlement. We are prepared to support an outcome which restores freedom to Afghanistan But, Mr. Chairman, we are Missouri on this issue. Thank you.

[Mr. Peck's prepared statement follows:]

Statement of Robert A. Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Astan Affairs, Department of State

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on both the situation in Afghanistan and Administration policy toward that country. In my remarks today, I will discuss issues highlighted by the Chairman with particular emphasis on:

-- The situation in Afghanistan;

-- U.S. policy toward the UN-sponsored negotiating process; and

-- U.S. humanitarian assistance policies.

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

The Soviet Union has little to cheer about in Afghanistan. After more than six years of bloody fighting, they and their Afghan surrogates continue to struggle, with increasing brutality, to find a formula for breaking the back of the Afghan resistance, both militarily and politically. And there is every prospect that the Afghan resistance will continue to become more potent militarily and better able to wage political war against the Soviets, both inside Afghanistan and in the international arena.

The Soviet Union, however, gives little sign of being discouraged by its lack of success in Afghanistan; rather, Moscow is continuing to pursue vigorously a multi-faceted strategy apparently aimed at achieving the total subjugation of the Afghan people. The elements of this strategy are several:

> First, in military terms, the Soviets have increased the size of their Afghanistan garrison and upgraded the weaponry available. Soviet troops are bearing an increasing share of the fighting. The Soviets are also building a series of air-supplied strong points in key areas along the Pakistan frontier and major resistance supply routes. These efforts have failed to reduce the flow of supplies to the resistance, but they have made the

RESUPPLY EFFORT MORE DIFFICULT AND COSTLY. FINALLY, CROSS-BORDER BOMBING AND STRAFING RAIDS BY COMMUNIST AIRCRAFT, COUPLED WITH SABOTAGE ACTIVITY IN THE TRIBAL AREAS OF PAKISTAN, HAVE BECOME A ROUTINE, IF HEAVY-HANDED, PART OF SOVIETS EFFORTS AIMED AT INTIMIDATING PAKISTAN AND THE RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP.

SECOND, THE SOVIETS ARE DELIBERATELY CARRYING THE WAR TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION WITH THE EVIDENT INTENT OF ELIMINATING THE RESISTANCE BASE OF SUPPORT IN HEAVILY CONTESTED REGIONS. REPORTS OF SHOCKING ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF WARFARE CONTINUE TO ACCUMULATE. CIVILIANS ARE CONTINUING TO FLEE THEIR RURAL HOMES EITHER FOR PAKISTAN OR FOR THE RELATIVE SAFETY OF KABUL AND A FEW OTHER URBAN AREAS.

THIRD, THE DETERMINED EFFORT TO CREATE A NEW GENERATION OF AFGHAN COMMUNISTS CONTINUES. THERE ARE 10-15,000 AFGHANS IN THE SOVIET UNION FOR STUDY AT ANY ONE TIME, AND MOSCOW IS CONCENTRATING ON LONG-TERM TRAINING FOR THE VERY YOUNG. IN SOME CASES, THEY HAVE SPIRITED STUDENTS AWAY FROM THEIR SCHOOLS WITHOUT THEIR PARENTS' KNOWLEDGE OR PERMISSION. THE VAST MAJORITY OF AFGHANS, YOUNG AND OLD, REJECT THE SOVIETIZATION OF THEIR COUNTRY, BUT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THIS PROGRAM CANNOT YET BE ASSESSED.

FOURTH, THE SOVIETS HAVE EXPANDED THEIR EFFORTS TO SUBVERT THE RURAL POPULATION. USING THE AFGHAN SECRET POLICE, ARGUABLY THE ONLY EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT OF THE PDPA REGIME, THE SOVIETS ARE SEEKING TO BUY THE LOYALTIES OF TRADITIONAL TRIBAL OR FEUDAL LEADERS WHO HAVE FELT THEIR INFLUENCE WANE AS NEW RESISTANCE LEADERS COME TO THE FORE. LEADERS HAVE BEEN OFFERED HEAVY SUBSIDIES FOR ORGANIZING LOCAL MILITIAS; THE GOING PRICE FOR WHOSE LOYALTY IS A KALASHNIKOV AND $50 PER MONTH PER MAN. THE BENEFITS FOR MOSCOW HAVE BEEN LIMITED AND TRANSITORY, BUT THE RESISTANCE MUST SPEND MORE TIME DEALING WITH THESE ORGANIZED EFFORTS AT SUBVERSION.

FIFTH, THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO DRESS UP THE PDPA REGIME WITH A FIG LEAF OF LEGITIMACY. THE SECRET POLICE HAS BEEN MADE A MINISTRY AND THUS, OSTENSIBLY, RESPONSIBLE TO CIVILIAN AUTHORITY. THE REGIME HAS BEEN COSMETICALLY BROADENED WITH THE ADDITION OF A NUMBER OF NON-PARTY MINISTERS AND THE EXPANSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TO INCLUDE A NUMBER OF RETIRED CIVIL SERVANTS WHO ARE NOT PARTY MEMBERS. COMMUNIST-STYLE ELECTIONS AND TIGHTLY controlled meetings of tribal councils have been held to rubber stamp regime initiatives. These empty gestures have been accompanied by a barrage of propaganda about the alleged mistakes of the home-grown communists who managed the 1978 putsch and the now-familiar insistence that the so-called revolution is in a "national democratic" phase. It appears that Moscow may be preparing to dump Babrak Karmal, though the names in play for his successor indicate they have in mind any equally obsequious successor.

The Resistance

The steadily expanding use of Soviet combat troops testifies to the increased effectiveness of the Afghan resistance. During the past year, the resistance has employed larger and better organized units to take the offensive against regime and Soviet garrisons. In one operation, Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, the Panjsher Valley commander, overran the DRA's Peshghor garrison, one of the valley's five major bases. At roughly the same time, resistance forces in the Konar valley made the Soviets pay dearly for their effort to retake the besieged garrison at Barikot. The Soviets reached the garrison and temporarily lifted the siege, but they failed to restrict the resupply of resistance forces.

The recent Soviet/DRA offensive against the resistance base at Zhawar in Paktia province along the Pakistan border demonstrates mujahidin resilience in the face of overwhelming Soviet firepower. Although fighting at Zhawar destroyed a quantity of the supplies stored there, and may have preempted a planned resistance attack on Khost, the resistance all but destroyed an elite DRA combat unit and inflicted heavy casualties on the main assault force. The resistance also exacted a heavy toll against regime air power. Increased battlefield cooperation among resistance commanders was another important feature of this battle. Units from a number of parties worked closely to blunt the offensive and to counterattack. The resistance has reoccupied the Zhawar area, proving once more that the Kabul regime's authority extends no farther than the territory its troops physically occupy.

The resistance mounted its largest offensive operation of the war in September when several thousand freedom fighters, representing four of the seven major resistance parties, joined under the overall command of Jalaluddin Haqani to intensify the siege of Khost, a principal town in southeastern Paktia. Every armored relief column sent to break the siege failed to reach its destination; it finally took an airlift of Soviet

REINFORCEMENTS TO PREVENT THE CITY'S FALL. AND AS OF TODAY, THE SIEGE CONTINUES. A SIMILAR SITUATION PREVAILS IN THE WESTERN AND SOUTHERN CITIES OF HERAT AND KANDAHAR, WHERE THE RESISTANCE HAS CONTESTED CONTROL OF THE CITY AND KEPT THE REGIME ON THE POLITICAL DEFENSIVE FOR FIVE LONG YEARS.

THE RESISTANCE HAS ALSO BEGUN TO DEVELOP NATIONAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS TO MATCH ITS IMPRESSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES. THE FORMAL RESISTANCE ALLIANCE FORMED LAST SPRING EMBRACES THE SPECTRUM OF THE RESISTANCE EFFORT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE AUTONOMOUS HAZARAS WHO OCCUPY THE MOUNTAINOUS CENTRAL REGION. THE ALLIANCE IS CHAIRED BY A "SPOKESMAN," A POSITION WHICH ROTATES EVERY THREE MONTHS. ALLIANCE SPOKESMEN HAVE REPRESENTED THE RESISTANCE EFFECTIVELY AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY LAST FALL AND, MORE RECENTLY, AT MEETINGS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION FOREIGN MINISTERS IN FEZ, AND THE MEETING OF THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN GENEVA.

CLOSER TO HOME, THE RESISTANCE ALLIANCE HAS ORGANIZED SIX COMMITTEES TO ENCOMPASS THE FULL RANGE OF ACTIVITIES REQUIRED TO ADMINISTER THE TERRITORIES THEY CONTROL. THE ALLIANCE IS, ALSO TAKING STEPS WITH OUR SUPPORT, TO GET THE NEWS OF THIS "WAR IN THE SHADOWS" OUT TO THE WORLD BY DEVELOPING AN AFGHAN MEDIA SERVICE. THEIR AIM IS TO FACILITATE THE COLLECTION AND distribution of credible, objective, and timely news stores, photographs, and videotapes on resistance political and military activities.

The emergence of the resistance Alliance is a sign that a new Afghan nationalism, forged on the battlefields of Afghanistan, is coming of age. The war against communist tyranny in Afghanistan began in 1978 as a formless, spontaneous, and localized uprising of people who rejected the Soviet-style programs the leaders forced on them by the April 1978 coup. In December 1979, the Soviet Army intervened, but in the years since then, many observers have continued to view the war in these simple 1978-vintage terms, ignoring the emergence of a new generation of youthful Afghan military commanders and political activists who understand the principles on which a war of national liberation must be waged. Outsiders often divide the Afghans into so-called Islamic "fundamentalists" and "moderates." But these labels mislead; such distinctions blur the unity of purpose and the political sophistication of the country's new leaders. The resistance Alliance formed in 1985 is, in effect, a symbolic representation of an old war's new look.

The foregoing said, it is clear that the resistance is at

THE BEGINNING OF WHAT MAY BE A LONG ROAD LEADING TO INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE. THE AFGHANISTAN RESOLUTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS GATHERS OVERWHELMING AND GROWING MAJORITIES EACH YEAR, YET THE ALLIANCE HAS NO FORMAL STATUS IN ANY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, EVEN IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE FROM WHICH THE KABUL REGIME WAS SUSPENDED IN 1980. FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, THE TASK OF DISLODGING THIS REGIME, DESPITE ITS PALPABLE ILLEGITIMACY, HAS NOT BEEN EASY. STILL, THE OPENING SHOTS HAVE BEEN FIRED IN THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE TO RESTORE TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RIGHTS AND RECOGNITION THE SOVIET ARMY SEEKS TO DENY THEM.

THE CONTINUING MILITARY STANDOFF IN AFGHANISTAN REPRESENTS BOTH AN IMPRESSIVE SUCCESS FOR THE RESISTANCE AND A TELLING FAILURE FOR THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES. THE COST TO THE SOVIETS OF THEIR OCCUPATION CONTINUES TO RISE. POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURES MOUNT. MOST IMPORTANT, THE CRUCIBLE IN WHICH AFGHAN NATIONALISM IS BEING FORGED AND TESTED HAS STAYED HOT. THE RESULTS WILL BE INCREASINGLY FELT OVER COMING MONTHS AND YEARS.

U.S. POLICY

LET ME NOW TURN TO US POLICY TOWARD THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN. OUR POSITION IS BASED ON THE SIMPLE PREMISE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST LEAVE AFGHANISTAN. I MAKE THIS BASIC POINT BECAUSE IT TENDS TO GET LOST IN THE WELTER OF RUMORS AND SPECULATION THAT WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW ARE ON THE VERGE OF CUTTING A DEAL BEHIND THE BACKS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. THOSE IN THE RESISTANCE WHO MAY BE ALARMED BY SUCH RUMORS SHOULD NOT BE DISHEARTENED OR DISTRACTED. NO SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE IN AFGHANISTAN WITHOUT THE IRREVOCABLE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES.

SINCE THE WAR BEGAN, U.S. POLICY HAS FOLLOWED A STEADY AND CONSISTENT COURSE. WE SEEK A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE FOUR POINTS OF THE U.N.'S ANNUAL RESOLUTION, TO WIT: THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES WITHIN A FIXED AND REASONABLE PERIOD; SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE; RETURN OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEES IN SAFETY AND HONOR; AND RESTORATION OF AFGHANISTAN'S NON-ALIGNED STATUS.

THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT NECESSARILY FOCUSES ON THE UN-SPONSORED INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND THE KABUL AUTHORITIES, TO WHICH WE, OF COURSE, ARE NOT PARTIES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THESE TALKS HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN DEVISING A FORMULA FOR SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE ISSUE, AND OF THE SO-CALLED NON-INTERFERENCE QUESTION. A DRAFT "INSTRUMENT" has been prepared on the issue of international "guarantees." The Karmal regime and its Soviet mentors must now face up to the principal remaining topic -- and what is the heart of the negotiations: the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Mr. Gorbachev's recent remarks on Afghanistan (to the CPSU Party congress) seem to have been an attempt to suggest a willingness to deal with this key issue. We have noted his statement that the Soviet Union has agreed with the DRA regime on a schedule for a phased Soviet withdrawal; by our reckoning, it is the first public statement to this effect from the Soviets. Nonetheless, the significance of this statement will depend on the substance of any such agreement. Key criteria remain the length and terms of any withdrawal timetable, and the link between implementation of a withdrawal and the coming into effect of the overall political settlement (the principle of simultaneity). The United States has expressed its willingness to act as a guarantor of a comprehensive and balanced agreement including acceptable provisions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. But we will look closely at the fine print. The Soviets cannot expect to gain through negotiations what they have failed to achieve on the battlefield. We continue strongly to support the UN negotiating process, and hope that

SATISFACTORY SOVIET PROPOSALS WILL BE PUT FORWARD BY THEIR AFGHAN SURROGATES IN THE NEGOTIATING ROUND OPENING ON MAY 5.

TO CLEAR UP ANY MISUNDERSTANDING CREATED BY RECENT ERRONEOUS PRESS REPORTING, THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT BEEN ENGAGED IN SECRET NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON AFGHANISTAN. IN OUR OCCASIONAL DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS ON AFGHANISTAN, THEIR PRIVATE POSITIONS HAVE NOT VARIED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE UNACCEPTABLE POSITIONS THEY HAVE STAKED OUT IN PUBLIC. SOVIET ACTIONS ON THE GROUND IN AFGHANISTAN REINFORCE OUR ASSESSMENT THAT THEIR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE LARGELY TACTICAL, DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN THEIR MILITARY AND POLITICAL POSITION IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN THE EYES OF WORLD OPINION WHILE THEY CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO SUBJUGATE THE AFGHANS. WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO MONITOR CLOSELY SOVIET ACTIONS AND WORDS FOR GENUINE INDICATIONS OF INTEREST IN A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

MY COLLEAGUE, MR. GREENLEAF OF USAID, WILL PROVIDE A MORE DETAILED REPORT ON OUR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. I HAVE RECENTLY RETURNED FROM A SHORT VISIT TO PAKISTAN AND CAN ADDRESS THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THESE PROGRAMS.

Our humanitarian aid over the years to the Afghan refugees has made an important contribution to relieving human suffering, as well as constituting an important aspect of our support for Pakistan itself. The $491 million the U.S. has expended on refugee assistance since January 1980 -- roughly half the amount the Government of Pakistan estimates it has spent -- continues to bolster the impressive efforts of Pakistan's people and government. There are few if any parallels for the generosity and sense of responsibility with which Pakistan has shouldered the burden of hosting what is the largest refugee community in the world today. Their actions are in the best traditions of their culture and of Islam.

The Government of Pakistan has also worked with a number of relief organizations to include projects that address the longer-term needs of a population with no immediate prospect of voluntary repatriation. Thus, many refugee assistance projects in Pakistan now enhance self-reliance by providing both general education and vocational training. In addition, the Pakistanis have encouraged the World Bank and the UNHCR to launch a series of forestation, irrigation, and road-building projects designed to employ refugee labor in repairing environmental damage caused by the Afghans' presence. While the U.S. contribution

TO THESE EFFORTS IN FY-86 HAS NOT BEEN FULLY DETERMINED. WE HAVE SO FAR COMMITTED $18 MILLION TO THE UNHCR PROGRAM ALONG WITH A PLEDGE OF 160,000 METRIC TONS OF WHEAT TO THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM.

IN RESPONSE TO INCREASED SOVIET PRESSURES ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION INSIDE AFGHANISTAN, AND WITH THE STRONG SUPPORT OF THE CONGRESS, WE ARE DEVELOPING PROGRAMS WHICH WOULD FURTHER BENEFIT WAR-AFFECTED AFGHANS, INCLUDING THOSE REMAINING INSIDE AFGHANISTAN. THESE HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMS ALSO SERVE TO COUNTERACT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT'S BASE OF SUPPORT IN THE AFGHAN COUNTRYSIDE BY MAKING LIFE A LITTLE EASIER FOR THOSE AFGHANS WHO HAVE REMAINED BEHIND. WE SEEK IN PARTICULAR TO ENABLE THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE TO BETTER PROVIDE MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES. WE ARE ALSO EXAMINING POSSIBILITIES FOR RESISTANCE-RUN PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION (INCLUDING LIVESTOCK MANAGEMENT AND VETERINARY SERVICES) AND TO MEET DIRECT FOOD OR COMMODITY NEEDS AS THEY ARISE. USAID, WHICH ADMINISTERS THESE PROGRAMS FROM A FIVE-PERSON OFFICE AT OUR EMBASSY IN ISLAMABAD, INTENDS TO EXPEND $15 MILLION IN FY-87, AS WELL AS $14.355 MILLION THIS YEAR. THIS EFFORT IS GETTING UNDERWAY NOW, AND THE FINAL COSTS ARE NOT YET CLEAR. WE ARE CONCENTRATING ON PROGRAMS WITH IMMEDIATE IMPACT. DESIGN TEAMS HAVE FASHIONED detailed proposals for the long-term medical and education programs, while we continue our funding of selected programs operated by private voluntary groups from the U.S. and Europe.

Congress authorized $10 million in the current fiscal year for the transportation, for humanitarian relief purposes, of non-lethal, excess Defense Department property and of supplies donated from the private sector. Implementation of this program is fully under way; we have delivered over 140 tons of humanitarian supplies to the resistance Alliance and have established a monthly schedule of flights. The Director of Humanitarian Programs in the Defense Department has met with resistance leaders. They welcome this program and have agreed to cooperate with us.

This authority is playing an important role in our effort to strengthen international involvement in cross border humanitarian assistance. The McCollum amendment has allowed us to fund the transportation expenses of Afghan medical patients between Pakistan and Europe, as well as the U.S. To date, 15 patients have been flown to the U.S. and UK for medical treatment. We hope to expand this program to include additional countries and greater numbers of patients.

CONCLUSION

As you can see from my account, Mr. Chairman, our programs and policies are part of an overall effort to ease the burden borne by war-affected Afghans while at the same time sustaining the maximum pressure on the Soviets to negotiate a political settlement which would encompass the prompt withdrawal of their troops. While we hope for an early settlement, we remain deeply skeptical of Soviet intentions. We know that the Afghan people are prepared for an extended struggle. We are convinced that they will ultimately prevail. With the exception of the Soviet empire, the age of imperialism is over. The weight of history is on the side of the Afghans. And as President Reagan has said, as long as the Soviet Union continues to pursue a military option, we will support the Afghan cause.

Mr. Solarz. Thank you very much, Mr. Peck.

Mr. Greenleaf.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES GREENLEAF, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA AND NEAR EAST, AID

Mr. Greenleaf. I have a brief statement. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on AID's efforts to assist the Afghan people. The United States began its humanitarian program in 1984 when about $1 million of medical and related assistance was provided for the Afghans; $8 million was made available in fiscal year 1985, including disaster relief and emergency food and medical aid. Of that amount, $7.7 million has been obligated, and the balance will be obligated this month.

This money comprises our short-term aid program. Last year Congress also authorized not less than $15 million annually in humanitarian assistance for the Afghans beginning in fiscal year 1986. Design teams are being used to develop appropriate long-term projects using this money. Emphasis will be on health, education, livestock, and commodity support projects. My written testimony reviews the humanitarian needs of the Afghan people, and it outlines how we are responding to them. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.

[Mr. Greenleaf's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES W. GREENLEAF, JR., ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA AND NEAR EAST, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and discuss A.I.D.'s efforts to assist the Afghan people.

BACKGROUND

Since its invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Soviet Union has waged a relentless war against the Afghan people which has caused one of the world's most serious ongoing human crises. The international community has responded in a number of ways. From the beginning, the United States and many other countries, western and non-aligned, have made generous contributions of money and food for the Afghan refugees. We have also joined other countries in providing increasing amounts of humanitarian assistance to war-affected Afghans inside Afghanistan. I will review how we see the humanitarian needs of the Afghans inside Afghanistan, and how we are responding to those needs.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

General Destruction

The Soviet invasion and continued systematic efforts to subdue Afghanistan have resulted in the death and wounding of hundreds of thousands of Afghans. Nevertheless, the Afghan people and their resistance fighters, the "mujahidin," continue their valiant opposition to the Soviet invaders and their local collaborators. Still the loss of civilian life and destruction has been extensive, largely as a consequence of indiscriminate attacks in populated areas. This has been reported by Helsinki Watch, Amnesty International and the Ermacora Report, a United Nations Study.

Migration of People

The continuing conflict has forced more than 3.5 million Afghans to become refugees in Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere. The Government of Pakistan estimates that 2.7 million Afghan refugees are in Pakistan, constituting the world's largest refugee population. Many refugees continue to leave Afghanistan, and will do so as long as the Soviet occupation continues. Over half of the pre-war population of 14.5 million has probably relocated since the war began.

Between one-fourth and one-third of the pre-invasion population is estimated to have been driven out of the country, and another 25 percent have sought refuge in cities. Those driven from their homes, but still living in rural Afghanistan, are often forced to live in caves or under ledges in the mountains, crowded together and frequently lacking sufficient food.

Agricultural Production and Food Problems

We can only make rough estimates of the food and medical situation in Afghanistan. In a country where food supplies traditionally have been poor, and medical care marginal at best, the situation has greatly deteriorated. Bombings have disrupted cultivation and destroyed livestock. While this has not produced a general country-wide famine, there are regional food shortages. Food distribution is erratic, and the potential for catastrophe remains.

The ravages of war have seriously eroded the capacity of the ordinary Afghan farmer and herder to deal with unexpected shortages of snow or rain. Herds have deteriorated seriously through destruction and, because of the absence of even primitive veterinary services, through disease. Tens of thousands of people in the countryside already suffer from serious localized food shortages.

Health and Medical Problems

According to the recent Ermacora Report, since the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) government in April 1978, 500,000 Afghans have died, most of them civilians. Since the Soviet invasion, the frail network of rural health centers that existed prior to 1978 has mostly been destroyed, and few trained personnel are left to care for the 80 percent of Afghans living in liberated areas.

Most Afghans, civilian and mujahidin, have no access to even minimal kinds of modern medical care. While a variety of "medicines" are sold in the markets, local "pharmacists" and traditional healers are the sole source of medical care for most of the sick and wounded. The war has also decimated the country's limited public health services. Vaccinations and immunizations are seldom given even in provincial towns.

The most common causes of death among the general Afghan population -- measles, pneumonia, dysentery, malaria and other common diseases -- have returned with renewed strength and afflict many thousands. Illnesses still are the major cause of death, and over one-third of deaths are still among children under five years of age. Three to four children die for every mujahidin death. Periodic epidemics of measles and whooping cough have killed large numbers of children.

People displaced by the fighting suffer the worst. Soviet mines are a particular hazard, especially the "toy" or "butterfly" mines that injure and kill. Infected wounds and low resistance to disease due to poor diet kill many people who might otherwise have survived. Few of those with head or chest injuries ever reach Pakistan alive, due to the lack of surgical manpower and equipment.

Education and "Sovietization"

The war has also caused the destruction of most of the limited educational system and social services in Afghanistan. Most rural schools have been destroyed in the fighting. The Soviets/DRA regard the few surviving rural schools operated by the local religious leaders and the mujahidin as especially dangerous to their efforts to control the country, and make every attempt to destroy them.

The DRA has forced schools in the towns and cities to follow Soviet models of education in an attempt to indoctrinate a new generation of Afghan youths in an alien ideology. The Soviets have taken thousands of Afghan children, including primary school age children, to the USSR for education and indoctrination. Kabul University, now a mere facade reserved for the children of collaborators, functions to support Soviet goals.

THE AFGHAN RESPONSE

The Afghan people and their resistance fighters have shown extraordinary resourcefulness. Some people farm several very small plots on hillsides rather than more productive large fields in open spaces, where much of the fighting occurs. Others work larger fields between dusk and dawn. The rural people obtain food, medicine, clothing and agricultural supplies on the informal local markets. And the mujahidin bring their people supplies when they can. Many mujahidin leaders on their own and with traditional local leaders have established primitive "clinics," schools, and food distribution networks. These efforts exist in most provinces, albeit in very different forms.

THE PAKISTANI RESPONSE

Considerable admiration is due Pakistan's steadfast support for the Afghan cause in the face of direct and indirect Soviet pressures these past six years. Since the beginning of the conflict in Afghanistan, the government and people of Pakistan have shown remarkable hospitality to the large number of Afghans who have flooded into the country. The refugees in Pakistan have been allowed complete freedom of movement and employment.

The Government of Pakistan, with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Program (WFP), coordinates the relief effort which is staffed by Pakistani medical personnel, teachers, engineers, social workers, and civil servants. The United States and the international community have contributed much of the funds and food in-kind needed by the Afghans. Still, the Government of Pakistan estimates that it defrays up to one-half of the costs associated with caring for the refugees. For a developing country with substantial problems of its own, the Pakistani response has been exceptional.

WESTERN RESPONSE

As is traditionally the case in humanitarian crises, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was among the first to respond to the plight of the Afghans. It operates an evacuation chain for wounded and sick Afghans reaching the Pakistani frontier and treats them in ICRC hospitals in Peshawar and Quetta. It also operates a paraplegic clinic and runs first-aid training courses for Afghans who return to care for their people inside Afghanistan with ICRC-provided medical supplies. This ICRC effort along the frontier is the essential basis on which other related medical and humanitarian efforts can build.

Soon after the Soviet invasion in 1979, several European private voluntary organizations initiated humanitarian activities along the Pakistan-Afghan border as well as inside Afghanistan. Today several dozen PVOs are actively providing humanitarian assistance for war-affected Afghans. The best known are the French doctors whose medical teams often spend up to six months inside Afghanistan. Other French groups, along with British, Scandinavians, Belgians, and German groups, also have been providing medical care, food, and some education aid.

Private American groups have helped to raise funds for some of the Europeans and for local Afghan voluntary agencies. In addition, Europeans and Americans have helped to publicize the plight of the Afghans, arrange some special medical care in the West, when required, and assist in other ways. Although PVOs have been pioneers in the field, their coverage is still very limited and intermittent.

U.S. RESPONSE

Overview

The United States' contributions to the Afghan refugee relief program since 1980 exceeds $491 million, $30 million of which has come in the form of local currency generations from prior A.I.D. loans. In Fiscal Year 1985 alone, we provided about $69.3 million for the refugees, including over $38 million worth of commodities through the World Food Program (WFP). In FY 1986, the U.S. has pledged 160,000 MT of wheat to the WFP, an increase of 10,000 MT over our FY 1985 contribution and to date has pledged $18 million to the UNHCR.

The United States also is now well along in the development and implemention of programs of emergency humanitarian assistance for the Afghan people inside Afghanistan. As with the Europeans, our effort is in addition to our continued support for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

We began our humanitarian endeavor with Vice President Bush's trip to Pakistan in May 1984, when approximately $1 million of medical and related assistance was provided for the Afghans.

An estimated $8 million was made available in FY 1985, including disaster relief and medical and emergency food aid. The first $2 million of this sum, which the Congress earmarked in the FY 1985 Refugee Program Supplemental, was disbursed by A.I.D.'s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) for medical and medically-related assistance.

A second $2 million, reprogrammed from residual Italian disaster assistance monies, was also fully disbursed by OFDA. The remaining $4 million was made available in May 1985 from the former Syrian A.I.D. program. Of this amount, all but $307,000 has been obligated and the balance, which has been programmed, is scheduled to be obligated in early May.

Principal recipients of the money are PVOs and the ICRC. Grants are typically made to U.S. and European PVOs working in Pakistan and to U.S.-based PVOs who transfer the funds to non-American PVOs working in Afghanistan. Two U.S. PVOs, the International Medical Corps and Freedom Medicine, have been funded by A.I.D., and are providing medical training to Afghans.

The Congress acted again this year to authorize in the Foreign Assistance bill not less than $15 million annually in humanitarian assistance for the Afghans commencing in FY 1986.

Short-Term Humanitarian Aid

Of the 28 grants, subgrants contracts made to date, 21 have gone to non-American groups and 7 to U.S. organizations. The $7.7 million of short-term humantiarian aid obligated to date has been broadly allocated as follows:

--	Eight grants for support of medical clinics inside Afghanistan and medical facilities which treat sick and wounded Afghans:	$2,328,150
--	Seven grants for food to be provided to deficit areas inside Afghanistan:	$2,659,000
--	Five grants for medical training of Afghans to serve inside Afghanistan:	$1,942,182
--	Five grants in education, transportation and others:	$510,000
--	Three grants/contracts for long-term design activities (health, education commodity support):	$251,393

Through this program, we have significantly met the important objectives of supporting those organizations needing our assistance who are actively providing medical assistance to Afghans inside Afghanistan or on its frontier. We have initiated medical training programs which should this year augment the number of Afghans with useful medical skills. Our initiative has evoked substantial matching contributions from European sources.

Evidence of Effectiveness

In providing our humanitarian assistance we have attempted to develop means to monitor our projects and to assure that our assistance is reaching intended beneficiaries. We recognize the inherent uncertainty of working under wartime conditions and that in a less than perfect situation, security conditions do not permit optimal monitoring.

We have confirmed, for example, that humanitarian funds provided to ICRC have enabled them to transport 718 Afghan wounded in 1984 from the frontier to hospitals in Peshawar and Quetta and that these wounded constituted 23 percent and 40 percent of admissions that year to Peshawar and Quetta hospitals. Similarly, we can report that a PVO recipient of an A.I.D. grant has delivered nearly 50 tons of medicines and medical supplies inside Afghanistan.

Long-Term Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance

Achievements of our short-term program are significant, but are only a start on the broader, longer-term program authorized by Congress. Significant progress has been achieved in developing our long-term program of cross-border humanitarian assistance. A well-defined strategy, developed in the spring of 1985, established the goal of alleviating the suffering of the people in resistance-controlled areas. In developing our humanitarian assistance, we are being guided, too, by: the need to be sensitive to the concerns of Pakistan; the desirability of working through the Afghan resistance alliance; respecting Afghan sensitivities and cultural traditions; the need to avoid placing Americans inside Afghanistan; and by striving for simplicity and flexibility.

Sectors of Emphasis

Two project appraisal and design teams in the education and health sectors have completed their preliminary exploration of ways to expand support of medical care of Afghans by Afghans in as many areas as possible, and to support education activities that may forestall the possibility of a completely illiterate generation of rural Afghans. They will be completing their work and will be followed soon by another team which will examine our livestock and commodity support project concepts. We continue to value the experience of PVOs and intend to continue to fund their activities when warranted.

The new program is still evolving and the details of the activities we eventually fund will be known only after the design teams complete their work. We are planning for the following:

Health - We intend to develop extensive curative health services for war-related injuries, as well as normal medical needs and preventive services for basic public health, including maternal and child care. This would include support for health units in Afghanistan, including commodities required for emergency health interventions, immunization equipment, medicine and bandages. Public health measures for Afghans remaining in Afghanistan will address respiratory infections, tuberculosis, malaria, parasitic diseases and oral rehydration therapy for children. Para-medical training will continue to be furnished.

Education - We intend to support, improve and expand existing lower schools in resistance-controlled areas of Afghanistan. Activities may include basic training of teachers; provision of textbooks, slates, and other school supplies; limited funding of teacher stipends; and, if necessary, funding of modest school construction and repair costs. This effort is essential given the Soviet Union's continued attempt to indoctrinate young Afghans.

Agriculture - We will seek to increase basic agricultural self-sufficiency through the provision of agricultural extension and technical assistance. To increase the availability and accessibility of food and animal transport within Afghanistan, we intend to improve livestock management.

We will do this by replenishing livestock and through effective veterinary coverage, making available proper feed and procuring pack animals to transport humanitarian supplies.

Commodity Support - In response to widespread destruction of the basic means of production in rural Afghanistan, we intend to make available food and a wide range of humanitarian goods that will allow some forms of production to continue. Commodities to be procured may include agricultural inputs and commodities (seeds, pesticides, fertilizer, and farm implements), food, pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, clothing, blankets, and other goods.

Program Funding

Since this is a new, rapidly evolving program, the eventual cost is still unknown. We have decided to focus on the highest priority activities with short-run impact, recognizing that the scope of our planned effort still exceeds the amount of funds presently available. Seeking increased funds at present, in view of current budget constraints and before we and the Pakistanis have worked out the details of program administration, is not feasible. We plan to concentrate now on building on the base already established by the PVOs and forging workable institutional linkages with the resistance alliance. We also intend to encourage other international donors to contribute significantly greater amounts for cross-border humanitarian aid.

Other Donors

Opposition to the Soviet invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan has received widespread international support. Governments and organizations traditionally reluctant to appear supportive of U.S. policies have participated in the effort to assist the refugees. A key element of our response to the international Afghanistan problem is the encouragement of continued and expanding humanitarian assistance for the Afghans by European and other western and non-aligned donors.

Europeans believe that Soviet troops are in Afghanistan to prop up an oppressive pro-Soviet government. We believe the initiation of a new, expanded U.S. humanitarian program can contribute to an expanded humanitarian aid response by the international community.

Implementation by A.I.D.

An office of the A.I.D. Representative for Afghan Affairs in the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad was established in September 1985 to administer the program. A senior career A.I.D. Foreign Service Officer, who is working in close concert with Ambassador Hinton, directs the office. Four other career A.I.D. personnel with experience working overseas in humanitarian and development assistance complete the staff.

The A.I.D. Representative has been intensively discussing a number of issues related to the conception and implementation of our cross-border humanitarian assistance with the Pakistan government. The new constitutional government in Pakistan is reviewing our proposals and deciding what its relationship to the program should be. We are confident the Government of Pakistan will maintain its strong opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

A.I.D. is committed to providing humanitarian assistance to the Afghans and to encourage other countries to do the same. A.I.D. has worked closely with the Department of State to help provide an integrated U.S. Government response to the Afghan situation.

As additional details of our cross-border humanitarian assistance projects become available and the program evolves, we will keep Congress informed. We are confident of the continuing support of Congress and the American people.

The United States remains committed to support a negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan question which will produce a free, independent, non-aligned Afghanistan; governed by Afghans themselves and no longer occupied by foreign troops; an Afghanistan to which the millions of refugees may return in safety. We look forward to helping the Afghans in their hour of need and in helping them rebuild their country.

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss this important issue today. I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. Solarz. Thank you very much.

Mr. Peck, do we support the U.N.-sponsored negotiations?

Mr. Peck. Yes, sir; we do.

Mr. Solarz. Do we believe that the mujahedin should be represented in those talks?

Mr. Peck. Our view is that it would be desirable to have the resistance represented in these talks.

Mr. Solarz. Why aren't they at the talks?

Mr. Peck. These negotiations were at the initiative of the personal representative for Afghanistan of the U.N. Secretary General. It began in 1982. They flow from the mandate contained in the U.N. resolutions and the United Nation's personal representative, currently Mr. Cordovez, has chosen to organize them in this fashion; that is with representatives from the Kabul regime which we would, frankly, prefer not to have, given this fig leaf of legitimacy which flows from their participation in these talks and the Government of Pakistan

Mr. Solarz. And the Soviet Union.

Mr. Peck. No, the Soviet Union is not directly a party to these negotiations.

Mr. Solarz. But these negotiations are I guess what is characterized as proximity talks.

Mr. Peck. Yes, sir.

Mr. Solarz. Would it be consistent with Mr. Cordovez' mandate to invite mujahedin to participate?

Mr. Peck. That certainly would not be in our view excluded from his mandate, no.

Mr. Solarz. Have we suggested to him that we should extend an invitation to the mujahedin?

Mr. Peck. We have made clear our view that the resistance should certainly be consulted, and there has been, we understand, considerable discussion over the years of a mechanism for consultation.

Mr. Solarz. Have we specifically urged that representatives of the mujahedin be included on the same basis that representatives of the Babrak regime are included?

Mr. Peck. Not to my knowledge, no.

Mr. Solarz. Why not?

Mr. Peck. These discussions are—first of all, let me just say we are, of course, as you have noted, not parties to these negotiations. Therefore, our standing is perhaps not as firm as it would be if we were direct participants. Second, it is our view that this would not be a proposal which would succeed at this particular point in time.

We have to go back a ways into history, Mr. Chairman, when we consider this issue. In 1982 when these discussions began, the resistance was fragmented. There was no one single spokesman for the resistance. As a practical matter, there was probably at that time no way in which the resistance could have been included in any kind of organized discussions.

Mr. Solarz. Is there a sufficient degree of unity among the various elements in the resistance to overcome that particular obstacle at this point?

Mr. Peck. One of the major elements of our policy in recent years has been to encourage the resistance to move in this direction. It is our view that the resistance needs to begin to cooperate together and to achieve a measure of unity which would allow them to have——

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes, the question was, Mr. Peck, have they achieved that degree of unity already? We heard, for example, from Congressman Lagomarsino and Senator Humphrey the suggestion that this alliance should be invited to represent the mujahedin. Would that be the appropriate organization to represent them or not? Would some other organization be better?

Mr. PECK. No, if the resistance were to be represented directly in the talks, it would certainly be the Afghan alliance, which was formed in the last year.

Mr. SOLARZ. As a practical matter, if Cordovez invited the alliance to participate in the talks, would the Babrak regime refuse to continue participating?

Mr. PECK. I think that is a reasonable judgment, yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. So are you saying that such an invitation would result in the effective end of these negotiations?

Mr. PECK. I think we would see a very different negotiating situation, and the current process would not be able to continue.

Mr. SOLARZ. And is it your view that while it would be desirable if the alliance were permitted to participate in the talks, that it is better to have these talks than no talks at all?

Mr. PECK. We supported this process in part because it is the only game in town.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is the President aware of what we are doing?

Mr. PECK. Yes, sir, fully aware.

Mr. SOLARZ. The President knows that the mujahedin are not represented in the talks.

Mr. PECK. Yes, sir, he does.

Mr. SOLARZ. But he approves of our supporting the talks, nonetheless.

Mr. PECK. Yes, Mr. Chairman. My assumption, though I have not talked directly with the President about this issue, is that he approves of our policy in this area.

Mr. SOLARZ. Has the President approved of our willingness to be a guarantor of an agreement in principle if there is an agreement?

Mr. PECK. That decision, which was reached last November, was fully vetted within the administration, and it is an administration position. It is not a State Department position.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, when you say it is the administration's position, are you also saying it is the President's position?

Mr. PECK. Every administration position is the President's position.

Mr. SOLARZ. So we won't read in his memoirs that the State Department put something over on him and he only discovered later that the administration had been committed to a course of action of which he did not personally approve.

Mr. PECK. I believe he would have been very ill-served by his staff if he could say that. I don't believe that that is the case.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now, could you tell us what is the position of Benazir Bhutto and the PPP and Pakistan on the question of the resistance in Afghanistan and whether it should be helped and assisted, and if she were to come to power—if the PPP were to come to power in Pakistan, would you anticipate fundamental or significant change in Pakistan policy toward the resistance?

Mr. PECK. That is a speculative question that is hard for me to answer. I have discussed the issue of Afghanistan directly with Ms. Bhutto. I don't want to put words in her mouth. Nonetheless, she has refrained from direct criticism of the Government of Afghanistan. I think that she has a realistic view of the realities here, which is that for Pakistan the war is not over until the refugees go home, and the refugees won't go home until the Soviet troops leave Afghanistan.

Mr. SOLARZ. How does the Government of Pakistan feel about our overt aid program for the refugees? Have they expressed any concerns about that? Do they support it?

Mr. PECK. These proposals were developed in consultation with the Government of Pakistan. I think we need to keep in perspective the commitment of the Government of Pakistan to support the Afghanistan cause. They were there first. Their sacrifices for the Afghan people have been impressive, and they have agreed in principle that there is a tremendous need to find a mechanism and means to provide greater support for the people left behind in Afghanistan for whom there aren't these kinds of governmental services.

Mr. SOLARZ. So they have no qualms or concerns or criticisms about our overt aid program for the refugees.

Mr. PECK. The Government of Pakistan has wanted to look very carefully at everything that goes on on their soil, and that includes these kinds of proposals.

Mr. SOLARZ. But they support them.

Mr. PECK. They support them in principle.

Mr. SOLARZ. They haven't asked us to refrain from doing this because it might upset the Soviet Union or expose them to greater threats from Moscow or the like.

Mr. PECK. No; certainly not.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now, as I understand it, under the terms of the agreement that is being negotiated, we would presumably be obligated to guarantee the agreement which would give a commitment not to provide any assistance to resistance forces fighting within Afghanistan. Then the Soviets, of course, as part of this would agree to withdraw their forces by a certain date. Let's say it was 6 months to 1 year, and the refugees would be given the right to return.

Are we prepared in principle to guarantee an agreement which would prohibit us from providing any assistance at all to the resistance forces assuming we decided to do that from day 1 of the agreement, even though the Soviets would not be obligated to withdraw all of their forces until, say, day 365 of the agreement? Or is it our position that any obligations that are imposed on us and other countries not to assist the mujahedin should be phased in simultaneously with the actual withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan?

Mr. PECK. Let me say first, Mr. Chairman, that we are not obligated to do anything. We have agreed in principle that we could act as a guarantor of an agreement as long as it meets our criteria.

Mr. Solarz. Yes; I understand that we are not obligated right now. What I am asking is, what is our policy toward such an agreement?

Mr. Peck. Yes; we have agreed that as long as an agreement which meets our criteria emerges from these talks, that we would be prepared to act as a guarantor. Now that phrase may be a little bit of a misnomer, a bit ambitious. What we have essentially agreed to do is to lend our support to an agreement——

Mr. Solarz. Which meets our criteria.

Mr. Peck [continuing]. Which meets our criteria.

Mr. Solarz. Right, and what I am asking you about is the criteria. Would an agreement be compatible with our criteria which required us to commit ourselves not to provide any aid to the resistance movement on day 1, while the Soviet Union was not obligated to withdraw all of its forces until day 365, or day 183, or would an agreement, in order to be compatible with our criteria, require that all Soviet forces be withdrawn on the same day that we face an obligation not to provide any assistance to the mujahedin.

Mr. Peck. Mr. Chairman, I am a little uncomfortable with this line of questioning, because the shape of the agreement which is under negotiation at Geneva is one which is still in flux. It is not wrapped up. We are not a party to those accords, and in any event, our knowledge of those negotiations is privileged.

I would be delighted to brief you in full on those negotiations.

Mr. Solarz. I don't want you to disclose highly classified information, but let me take one more crack at it, because I am really looking at it more in terms of our principle position. I mean an argument has been advanced by Senator Humphrey, that any agreement which requires us and other countries to refrain from providing help to the resistance forces, but which doesn't require the Soviets to withdraw all of their forces until some period beyond that date, even if it's a fixed date, stacks the deck in favor of the Soviets and is an unfair and unequitable agreement and one fraught with peril.

I had been under the impression that in fact we were prepared in principle for precisely that; if we could get a firm, binding, written commitment from the Soviets to withdraw all of their forces within what we considered to be a reasonable period of time and to permit the refugees to return with honor, we would, under those circumstances, be prepared to sign some ancillary agreement which committed us, as of the moment we signed it, to refrain from providing support to the resistance movement.

Is my understanding of the position inaccurate?

Mr. Peck. Your understanding is essentially correct, but if I could, let me phrase it in my own words.

The United States—our basic objective from the beginning of these discussions, indeed from the beginning of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan has been to bring about the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops. Our feeling is that any agreement which is to be successful must indeed call for a prompt withdrawal, and we must be assured that there are elements built into this agreement which will assure us and the other parties that the Soviets, indeed, will withdraw according to whatever timetable is agreed.

AVAILABLE

Under those circumstances, the United States is prepared to lend its support to an agreement. The current agreement does call for noninterference and nonintervention, and therefore in lending our support, we would take into account the undertakings of the other parties.

Mr. SOLARZ. So far as you know, did the mujahedin want to participate in these proximity talks? Have they made this an issue? Have they expressed concern about their absence from the talks?

Mr. PECK. The resistance views on this subject may be diverse, as they are on many subjects. They certainly view the current negotiations with considerable reservations, and I think it is fair to say that they are not comfortable with having a negotiation taking place which they are not participating in.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you think that most of them would prefer no negotiations at all to negotiations without their participation?

Mr. PECK. I really can't answer that question. I just don't know.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you think it is conceivable that Pakistan would agree to a settlement which would not be compatible with a self-determination of the Afghan people and a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan?

Mr. PECK. No; I certainly don't.

Mr. SOLARZ. I gather there is some evidence or some reason to believe that Babrak Karmal might be in the process of being dumped by the Soviets even as we speak. Could you share with us any information you have on his current status and whether we believe that he is in the process of being eased out.

Mr. PECK. Well, actually he just arrived back in Kabul a short time ago, according to the information I received just before I arrived in this hearing. Nonetheless, there is a considerable amount of evidence in reading the tea leaves of Soviet policy to indicate that they are very displeased with his performance, and there is also evidence which might indicate that they are grooming or looking for a possible successor to Karmal.

Babrak Karmal is not, after all, a significant figure. Our assumption is that when the Soviets find it tactically helpful they will brush him aside with no thought to the matter at all.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would it be fair to say that Babrak Karmal is about as popular in Kabul as General Sherman is in Atlanta?

Mr. PECK. Yes, sir, I'd say about that popular.

Mr. SOLARZ. Finally, we heard both Senator Humphrey and Congressman Lagomarsino suggest that we should close down our Embassy in Kabul. They feel it lends a certain degree of unwanted legitimacy to the regime there. The administration, I gather, has felt, at least until now, that the advantages of keeping the Embassy open in terms of information, intelligence and analysis, justify our presence there.

Senator Humphrey counters by saying that he has spoken to people in the intelligence community, and they tell them that what we get from the Embassy from an intelligence point of view really doesn't add that much, if anything, to what we get from other sources. My very good friend from Iowa, Mr. Leach, suggested that if there is no significant intelligence benefit, then the moral arguments for closing the Embassy down, particularly since we really don't recognize the legitimacy of the government, would be quite compelling.

I would appreciate it if you could respond to this. Why exactly do we maintain an Embassy in Kabul, and how significant is the information and intelligence we get from our post there in comparison to other sources of information, both human and technical, that are available to us?

Mr. PECK. Well, we consider this basically to be a practical matter. We have made a judgment that the intelligence that we obtain from our presence in Kabul is extremely valuable. We recently went to the trouble to look at this matter again in depth with the participation of all agencies, and the judgment from the intelligence communities was that what we learned from that listening post was in fact unique and important to us.

Let me just expand to say that no political significance should be ascribed to the fact that we have an embassy presence in Kabul. We consider the government in Kabul to be illegitimate. We do not consider that it represents the Afghan people. Surely no one is in any doubt on which side the United States stands in this struggle. The fact that we maintain a small presence in Kabul, which has no political relations at all or contact with that regime, is not fooling anyone.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much. Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. I appreciate what you have just said although in my own mind governments are credited to governments and the philosophical issue stands.

Earlier today—I think you were present—I read the summary of what Professor Rubin assumes is the outline of a potential agreement. Did you hear that summary?

Mr. PECK. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. LEACH. Does that strike you as a valid summary of what you are dealing with?

Mr. PECK. Well, I, like you, had a little bit of trouble understanding some of what Professor Rubin meant by that one particular passage about the resistance. He assures us that he will explain it later.

Mr. LEACH. Fair enough. Let me just ask you about it in one sense. Can you conceive of an agreement that would be opposed by the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedin, the coalition of the seven major Sunni Muslim resistance parties?

Mr. PECK. Clearly there will be no agreement over Afghanistan or regarding Afghanistan that does not enjoy the broad support of the Afghanistan people. Second, we will very much consider the views of the resistance on that matter. They are legitimate representatives of a broad measure of Afghanistan public opinion.

Whether all of the political parties who are represented in the alliance sign on to an agreement or not is a question that we can only speculate on at this time. I can certainly, from my knowledge of the resistance and their views on the possibilities of the political settlement, I can certainly imagine that one or two of the parties might hold out against any negotiated settlement, any settlement that was not won simply by a unilateral Soviet surrender or withdrawal.

Mr. LEACH. Well, I was a bit surprised that the United States hadn't made an effort to at least suggest to the U.N. negotiating team that the direct parties be authorized. I can see where they would be turned down, but I think a request is something that ought to be considered.

Let me ask, just because I think by perspective it is important in terms of what might be acceptable or not in terms of phrasing such a request. Do you have any doubt whatsoever that if the Soviet military leaves Afghanistan that a puppet regime cannot be maintained in power?

Mr. PECK. Certainly not. The Babrak government wouldn't last until nightfall after the last Soviet troop left Kabul airport.

Mr. LEACH. As we look at these Geneva talks, have you sensed any progress to date, and could you stipulate what it is if there is progress?

Mr. PECK. Mr. Leach, there has been, I take it, a good deal of progress in defining these what I have called secondary issues regarding an agreement on noninterference and nonintervention, on the terms for the return of the refugees, and defining the international guarantees which would be entered into by the Soviet Union and the United States, but the central issue remains: the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and the terms for that withdrawal, and the relationship of that withdrawal to the undertakings of the other parties. To my knowledge, that issue has not been effectively addressed.

You know, one of our wise ambassadors, when told that 90 percent of this agreement had been wrapped up, remarked, "Yes, I'm sure that's true, but 90 percent of the substance is in the last 10 percent."

Mr. LEACH. Well, it sounds like your comprehensive test ban that has been written for 20 years. It takes a little bit of a will to make the commitment.

Can you summarize what you think has been the cost to the Soviets of their involvement in Afghanistan, first in terms of troops lost; second, in terms of whatever other losses you might suspect.

Mr. PECK. Well, the loss in terms of Soviet personnel has been approximately 30,000 casualties, of those perhaps 10,000 have been killed. That is obviously an estimate on our part since they don't publish these kinds of figures. The loss in material. I'm sorry I don't have a figure. I could get one and insert it in the record as to our estimate of the total value of Soviet equipment which has been lost, but it runs into the many billions of rubles.

Mr. LEACH. Well, historically we have never had a very good capacity to assess the thinking in the Politburo, but are you seeing anything that leads one to think that they might be willing to move on that last 10 percent, which is 90 percent of the issue?

Mr. PECK. When speculating on the inner thinking of the Soviet leadership, one also has to be very modest. There is clear evidence that the Afghan issue is a salient one within the Soviet Union and increasingly so within those elite groups who are politically significant. We know from a variety of sources and a variety of means that this is an issue which has deeply troubled many Soviet citizens. It is an issue which finally has had to be brought out from under the wraps in Soviet media, and they are dealing with the issue in somewhat more realistic terms than has been true in the past.

I'm not prepared to say that that means that they are ready to get out. It is consistent with that information to say that perhaps they are preparing their people for a long struggle, so I think at this point I just think we are not equipped to speculate as to whether they are serious about seeking a negotiated solution.

Mr. LEACH. Are you prepared to comment on your concerns about the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan? Is there any evidence that they have been used in let's say the last 6 or 9 months?

Mr. PECK. Well, as you know there was very compelling evidence in the early years of this conflict up through 1982 of Soviet use of a variety of chemical and toxic agents in Afghanistan. There have been continuing reports since then, but they are of a more sporadic nature and perhaps of a lower credibility. The possibility still exists of some continued use of banned chemical and toxic agents, but, as I say, the reports are fewer and farther between.

Mr. LEACH. Well, let me just conclude with one question relating to historical analogy. People have suggested that maybe the Soviets have an option of using the Baltic State route, and in that analogy, of course, many people in the Baltic States were actually moved forcefully into the hinterlands of the Soviet Union. Has there been any effort, other than for education purposes to move Afghans into the Soviet Union on a semipermanent basis, or do you think that would cause a cost to Soviet society that would be very large and very dangerous?

Mr. PECK. Well, as you say, other than education, where there has been a very substantial effort to bring large numbers of young Afghans to the Soviet Union for indoctrination and education, I know of no significant scale effort in that regard, and indeed I think it would be a rather difficult undertaking for the Soviet Union.

We have a variety of reports that Afghan students in the Soviet Union have faced considerable hostility from the Soviet public because of their awareness of the intensity of the fighting and the fact that the Soviet troops face a very difficult and tough foe in the Afghan people.

Mr. LEACH. So your personal guess is that the option of assimilation is not a likely one, and the Soviets have to deal with this either by giving up or maintaining a very costly involvement. Is that a fair appraisal?

Mr. PECK. Yes, it certainly is.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you very much.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Most of the questions I had in mind have been asked and answered.

You say that our Embassy in Kabul has no contact with the regime there.

Mr. PECK. No political contact, sir, no. We do have to from time to time have some contact on essential administrative or consular matters. We do that at a very low level, only with the protocol department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

AVAILABLE

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. You said earlier that the Karmal regime would not meet with the alliance. Would the alliance meet with the Karmal regime?

Mr. **Peck**. No, sir; I don't think they would.

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. In your statement on page 10 you say, "Since the war began the U.S. policy has followed a steady and consistent course. We seek a negotiated settlement based on the four points of the U.N.'s annual resolution to wit withdrawal * * * self-determination for the Afghan people." Does that mean that we feel any agreement should speak to the issue of self-determination?

Mr. **Peck**. We certainly believe very strongly that any agreement must result in self-determination.

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. I agree with what you said about the Pakistani Government at least not knowingly entering into any kind of agreement that would sell out the resistance. Why do you feel that way? Why do you think they would not? I know the reason, but I want to have you say it for the record.

Mr. **Peck**. Well, I guess I could put forward two reasons. One certainly is that we have stayed in the closest possible touch with the Pakistan Government and the leadership. We think we know their mind very well, and we're convinced by that contact that they are going to stay the course and that they are taking a principled stand and going to stick with it. They are not going to be bamboozled or outmaneuvered in these negotiations.

Second and more broadly, I'd say, this is not a conflict for which there can be an artificial solution. The conflict in Afghanistan is caused by the presence of foreign troops. The regional dimensions are caused by the fact that large numbers of Afghans have fled the fighting in Afghanistan into neighboring Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan is deeply involved in this in large part because they are a host unwillingly to this large refugee presence.

Now you can work up a variety of scenarios. You can put a variety of things down on paper which might involve a settlement, but if it doesn't involve the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the creation of a government which is supported by the Afghan in people in Kabul, the refugees aren't going to go home and the war for Pakistan isn't over until those refugees go home. So there is no easy solution for Pakistan

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. Just before we got to Islamabad in late January of this year, there was an all day foreign policy debate in the new parliament, and I gather from the reports about it, and the people he talked to that there was pretty generally strong support for the Pakistan Government's policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Am I accurate in that assessment, or was I accurate?

Mr. **Peck**. Yes, you certainly are. It was an impressive debate. There had been a good deal of speculation during the martial law period that perhaps this was a policy which didn't enjoy the support of the Pakistani people. Now that the wraps have been taken off, there was a full debate in this elected parliament. We have discovered that in fact this policy won the support of these elected representatives.

Mr. **Lagomarsino**. Is that still the situation as far as you know?

Mr. **Peck**. Yes, it certainly is.

Mr. Lagomarsino. And the visit by Ms. Bhutto the other day has not changed that in any way as far as you know.

Mr. Peck. No, no, it certainly hasn't. In fact in her own public remarks, she has not directly criticized the government on Afghanistan policy. It is not a key issue for her.

Mr. Lagomarsino. When we were there, members of the new government particularly did express some concern, reservation about some of planned over humanitarian programs. I gather from what you said earlier that that reservation, if it existed at that time, is not there anymore, or are we still having a problem with it?

Mr. Peck. Well, there still questions about mechanisms and about procedures which remain to be ironed out. We do have an agreement in principle on the importance of this and an agreement in principle that this type of activity is desirable and should go ahead, but there are some modalities which remain to be worked out with the Pakistan authorities.

Mr. Lagomarsino. I gather also that that has not prevented us from going ahead with pretty a substantial program that can be carried out.

Mr. Peck. That's true. In some areas we are moving ahead rapidly, in other areas we are moving ahead more slowly, but the program is proceeding.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Do we know how many Afghan refugees are in Iran?

Mr. Peck. Well, I have been given a figure by our intelligence authorities of 800,000 Afghan refugees in Iran. I personally think that is quite low. There were large numbers of Afghans in Iran at the time of the original coup and the Soviet intervention who remain there. I think the numbers of Afghans in Iran is substantially higher than 800,000. I have seen figures of 1½ million.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Is Iran doing anything to help the mujahedin?

Mr. Peck. I just have been told, by the way, that Iran has officially said that there are 1½ million Afghan refugees in Iran.

The Iranian role in support of the Afghan cause this has been an episodic one. I must say that from the point of view of those who support the Afghan cause this has been something of a disappointment. We do know that there has been substantial support provided to the Shia groups in the central part of the country, the Hazaras, who have of course an affinity with Iran, but beyond that there has not been a substantial amount of Iranian assistance to the Afghan resistance.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Thank you.

Mr. Solarz. Senator, did you want to ask any questions?

Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, is the State Department aware—this is a rhetorical question, of course. Is the State Department aware of President Reagan's criteria laid down in his U.N. speech regarding the settlement of regional crisis; namely that direct negotiations between the warring parties is a starting point?

Mr. Peck. Yes, sir, of course we are aware.

Senator Humphrey. I know that. I just wanted to start that way.

Mr. **Peck**. In fact the full text of that passage does take into account the situation which we are discussing today. It reads as follows:

> The form of these talks may and should vary. It is not a substitute for existing peacekeeping efforts. It complements them.

You see, the Afghan talks began, as I said, in 1982 and the President's initiative was in November 1985. In formulating that initiative and that formula, account was taken that these were continuing ongoing talks which the United States had in principle supported, and so by the President's own words he has taken that into account.

Senator **Humphrey**. Well, I don't know if the President necessarily meant that, but I am not in a position to argue that he was talking against your contention that he was making an exception for these Afghan negotiations. In any event, things have changed, and one of the principle changes, important changes in recent years is that the political factions which in effect direct the war in Afghanistan have unified substantially, relatively. Inasmuch as that is now the case, what have we done since this unification came about to seek the inclusion of the mujahedin, the unity, in the U.N. talks? What have we done since this important change took place?

Mr. **Peck**. Senator, we have welcomed the movement toward unity on the part of the resistance, from our own governmental point of view, we have certainly given them due recognition. We recognize them for what they are—a significant political movement which represents broadly the will of the Afghan people at this time and we keep in touch with them as such on the part of our own Government. It is our judgment, however, that in these continuing negotiations, it simply is not a practical proposition to put forward the participation of the resistance alliance.

As we noted in our previous line of questioning, this would basically require us to begin from the start once again, and that is not the desire of the Government of Pakistan

Senator **Humphrey**. OK, so the answer is since the unity came into being, we haven't done anything to try to include them. Am I correct in that?

Mr. **Peck**. Yes.

Senator **Humphrey**. Now you were quite laudatory of the unity, and I can't remember all that you said, but you said something on the other, "* * * and we treat them as such," implying that you treat them as a significant entity. Does that mean what I understand was the longstanding instruction to the Embassy in Islamabad not to deal directly with mujahedin has been lifted? Has that instruction been lifted?

Mr. **Peck**. I don't know.

Senator **Humphrey**. Was it ever in place?

Mr. **Peck**. I don't believe it was ever in place, Senator. I know of no such instruction. We have maintained contact with a variety of resistance leaders from the beginning of this struggle. I personally met with most, if not all——

Senator **Humphrey**. You have, but what about the Embassy in Islamabad, are Embassy officials meeting regularly with the representatives of the mujahedin?

Mr. **Peck**. Yes, sir, they certainly are.

Senator **Humphrey**. I'm glad to hear that, but it contravenes other information that I have heard. But you are an official witness, so I am prepared to believe what you are saying, and I know you to be an honorable man on top of it.

Now, you also said, "We have made clear our view that the mujahedin should be consulted." This is in connection——

Mr. **Peck**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Humphrey** [continuing]. With the talks. In what way have we made clear our view that the mujahedin should be consulted?

Mr. **Peck**. We have made that view known both to U.N.'s personal representative and to the Pakistani authorities. We have also told the Soviet Government that that is our view; that any—in fact we have gone further with the Soviets, and it is clear to them that in our view any agreement that is going to have a chance of success must take into account the views of the Afghan resistance.

Senator **Humphrey**. So we have made it clear that the mujahedin should be consulted. Now earlier you said that the negotiations were in a state of flux. Is the press not correct in its assertion that three of the four anticipated agreements have already been initialed—have been accepted? I'm not sure of the diplomatic terminology, but they have pretty largely jelled, have they not?

Mr. **Peck**. That is our impression that they are largely jelled, yes.

Senator **Humphrey**. So three of the four have been jelled. Now to what degree were the mujahedin consulted in the process of arriving at a jelling of these three of the four anticipated agreements.

Mr. **Peck**. My understanding is that they have been kept informed, but I must admit in our view inadequately.

Senator **Humphrey**. They have been informed. Do you equate informing with consulting?

Mr. **Peck**. Not necessarily. I think there is a difference between informing and consulting, yes.

Senator **Humphrey**. I think there is a big difference. So in fact while we have made it clear, you say, that they should be consulted, they haven't been consulted so far.

Mr. **Peck**. Well, Senator, this is a negotiation which has been taking place for several years now, and the basic three instruments that you referred to have largely been finished for some time now. As I noted earlier, the resistance alliance has only come into being about 1 year ago, and before this time there was not, in our view, a spokesman for the resistance which could play the kind of role which we would like to see them play in determining the future of their country.

Senator **Humphrey**. Well, of course, you are quite correct that the alliance came into being only a year ago. Have we made clear since the alliance came into being a year ago that in our view they should be consulted?

Mr. **Peck**. Yes, sir, we have.

Senator HUMPHREY. And have they been consulted in the last year.

Mr. PECK. Yes, they have.

Senator HUMPHREY. But not in connection with these three agreements.

Mr. PECK. They have been consulted in connection with the continuing negotiations.

Senator HUMPHREY. You said they had been informed, but not consulted.

Mr. PECK. I was speaking in a historical sense previously. They have been informed during the course of these negotiations from the beginning. Since the alliance has come into being, we have made a point of urging that they be consulted, and they have been consulted.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, it seems to me you are changing your testimony. Now you are saying that during the last year they have been consulted.

Mr. PECK. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. But not in connection with these three agreements.

Mr. PECK. As I said, Senator, these agreements have largely emerged from the early stages of these negotiations, which have been going on since 1982. They have been consulted in the past year on the basis of the continuing negotiations.

Senator HUMPHREY. How were these consultations carried out? Can you tell us?

Mr. PECK. The Pakistan Government has been in consultation with the resistance. We have also urged that the United Nations consult the resistance, and the U.S. Government has also consulted the resistance.

Mr. SOLARZ. Senator, I don't want to preempt your time, and I am delighted to have you——

Senator HUMPHREY. Why not? They preempted yours.

Mr. SOLARZ. Please feel free to complete your questioning, but I do want you to know we do have some other witnesses.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand. You are very very courteous to let me even sit here, much less ask questions.

Well, I have real doubts, frankly, that there has been any meaningful consultation, either historically or in the last year, and I think that our claim that we are adequately pursuing a consulting role—not that that is nearly enough anyway for the mujahedin, it is just a lot of smoke.

Let's look at the guaranty, Mr. Secretary. Can you tell us the wiring diagram—I mean the management structure that arrived at this decision to change course. It had been until prior to December a State Department position that we would not propose to act as a guarantor until all of the terms were nailed down. Am I not correct in that? That was previously the State department's position?

Mr. PECK. The State Department's position previously, and I have to check the exact language on this, was that it was premature to make that kind of judgment.

Senator HUMPHREY. Premature. All right, that is the same thing as saying we aren't going to do it until certain things happen.

Mr. PECK. That is still our position, Senator.

Senator Humphrey. In December we offered to act as a guarantor, did we not?

Mr. Peck. That is still our position that we are not going to do it until certain things happen.

Senator Humphrey. But in December we made an announcement that heretofore we had chosen not to make; that we would act as a guarantor under certain circumstances; is that right?

Mr. Peck. We hadn't spoken to that issue, Senator. We had not addressed that issue previously. Our position, though, remains as you have stated it; that we will not act as a guarantor until we are fully satisfied.

Senator Humphrey. I want to talk about those conditions in just a moment. Was this decision to communicate with U.N. Under Secretary Cordovez approved by the Secretary of State, to communicate with him and tell him that we are prepared to act as a guarantor under certain circumstances. Was that approved by the Secretary?

Mr. Peck. Senator, I don't think I know where your questioning is leading and——

Senator Humphrey. No, I just want to know. Was it approved by the Secretary or not?

Mr. Peck [continuing]. All I would like to say to that is that this is an approved administration decision. It was fully vetted within the administration and was done on that basis.

Senator Humphrey. It has been alleged to me by a party that this was a middle level kind of thing that somehow escaped the notice of the White House. Was it approved by the Secretary?

Mr. Peck. This decision was an administration decision which was considered fully up and down the line. You know that in fact it was——

Senator Humphrey. Why don't you just say whether it was or it wasn't?

Mr. Peck. You know that it was——

Senator Humphrey. Was not?

Mr. Peck. It was approved by the Secretary.

Senator Humphrey. It was approved by the Secretary.

Mr. Peck. And it was fully vetted within the administration.

Senator Humphrey. That is another one of those delightful diplomatic terms. Was it approved by the President or not, yes or no?

Mr. Peck. It was a decision which was fully vetted within the administration.

Senator Humphrey. Is there an echo in here? OK. All right, so what are these conditions that we have stipulated with respect to ultimately guaranteeing an agreement? What are the conditions?

Mr. Peck. We need to be satisfied that the agreement will meet the conditions laid down in the U.N. resolutions on Afghanistan, and in particular that it will bring about the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Senator Humphrey. What are those conditions laid down in the U.N. resolution?

Mr. Peck. The conditions are self-determination, return of the refugees, noninterference and nonintervention, an independent and nonaligned state, and withdrawal of troops.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. Do any of the three documents that have been agreed to—what terminology should we be using with respect to these three? They are contingent to agreement on the fourth, is that it?

Mr. **PECK**. Essentially that is our understanding.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. Well, we will just assume that. Now, how do any of these three that are agreed to contingent upon agreement to the fourth, address the question of self-determination?

Mr. **PECK**. Senator, the issue of self-determination has not been explicitly addressed in these negotiations. It has been our view as we have looked at this process as it developed that the withdrawal of Soviet troops, if accomplished in a reasonably short period of time, would in fact result in Afghan self-determination. So from our point of view, we felt that the issue of self-determination would be satisfied by the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. Well, we have said that we would act as a guarantor if certain conditions were met. Those conditions include self-determination. But you are saying now that the agreements do not anticipate including a mechanism for self-determination therefore how can we act as a guarantor.

Mr **PECK**. Senator, if we are satisfied that Soviet troops will leave Afghanistan, then the other issues that we are concerned about will flow from that. The central problem in Afghanistan is the presence of Soviet troops. When they leave, the Afghans will take care of their political future and freedom. The refugees will return, and the regional aspects of this conflict will disappear.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. You are implying, then, that when Soviet troops leave—if they leave, but assuming they leave, the Afghan people will take matters unto themselves and determine their own future, to put it in diplomatic terms.

Mr. **PECK**. I'm confident of that.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. Aren't you equally confident that at that point the DRA government, having been granted legitimacy by the official recognition of Pakistan, which is part of this whole process—aren't you equally convinced that the DRA regime now legitimized will invite the Soviet troops remaining to stay on inasmuch as what you fully expect to happen; namely, continued uprising will take place?

Mr. **PECK**. I would hope that whatever agreement emerges would not permit that kind of a contingency. Second, I think you have to recognize that there is a law of reciprocal obligations in international affairs which relates to agreements of this sort. If there is a material breach by one side, such as the Soviet Union not abiding by a withdrawal timetable, then all bets are off. Certainly that would be the view of the U.S. Government.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. I have been asked to stand down, and I certainly will. Let me just observe that on the one hand we say that we insist upon the U.N. conditions, one of which is self-determination. On the other hand, there is no mechanism in these agreements to which we have offered to act as a guarantor for self-determination. We are instead relying upon the Afghan people to rise up and take matters into their own hands, and yet it is a certainty in my mind that when that occurs the Soviet troops will be invited by the now legitimized DRA government to remain, and we will see the throwing away of 6 years of struggle and sacrifice, and Afghanistan will be absorbed into the Soviet Empire. That is an editorial.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I must say I don't quite follow the logic of that analysis. I mean even if the Soviets were to reneg on their commitments under the terms of the agreement and send their troops back in, I would assume under those circumstances that the other parties to the agreement would be relieved of their commitments. From everything I know of the Afghan people, they would immediately resume their resistance and I would imagine that their friends around the world would resume, with renewed vigor and determination, their efforts to help the resistance in a variety of different ways.

I think that whatever recognition had been accorded to the regime in Afghanistan would be promptly removed. I don't see how they would benefit much from that scenario, nor do I see how we would be crippled by it. Indeed, I think the existing consensus in the Congress and the country in favor of American support for the mujahedin would be deepened by an additional sense of outrage over the extent to which the Soviets had disregarded their commitments. I rather doubt we are ever going to get an agreement where the Soviets are going to agree to pull out.

I don't see that they would conclude that the benefits of getting us to guarantee a settlement which they promptly intend to violate are particularly beneficial on their part. I think the benefits would last 5 minutes, and they would be gone if they broke the agreement.

Senator HUMPHREY. I promise if you let me respond, I won't say another thing. I won't ask to say another thing. Let me just say this: as I understand it from press accounts, there is a severability clause in some of these agreements or all of them, such that if one party violates one or more provisions, I guess, of the agreements, that does not relieve the other parties from upholding their responsibilities. That's what I understand about severability.

And further more—just let me say this finally, that once we stop this aid program, it is going to be hard as hell to start it up again, and for Pakistan politically impossible.

Mr. SOLARZ. I guess reasonable people can disagree, Senator. I think the same imperatives that drove Pakistan to take the position it has taken for the last several years and the same imperatives which have led us to take the positions we have taken would be reactivated if the Soviets sent their forces in. But you do raise a good question.

Let me ask Mr. Peck about this. If you got all four agreements signed—the Soviets agreed to withdraw by a certain date, say, within 6 months, we agreed not to interfere in any way, and the refugees were permitted to return—then it turned out that on the 7th month or on the 4th month, the Soviets sent back all the troops they had taken out, would we feel obligated to respect the commitments we had made under those circumstances? Or would we consider ourselves to have been relieved of those obligations by virtue of Soviet decision to reneg on their obligations?

Mr. PECK. As I said, Mr. Chairman, there is a generally acknowledged understanding in international law, that is, of reciprocal obligations that if there is a material breach, and certainly a Soviet refusal to carry through with the withdrawal or to reenter Afghanistan would by all counts be a material breach, then the obligations on the other parties would cease.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me just ask you, a few other questions. We do have other witnesses.

Is it your assumption that any agreement acceptable to Pakistan and the Soviets would also be acceptable to us and the mujahedin?

Mr. PECK. We are frankly going to make an independent assessment. We have strongly supported Pakistan. We have great confidence in Pakistan in conducting these negotiations, but we will make an independent assessment.

Mr. SOLARZ. But we haven't given Pakistan a veto. I gather our assumption is the chances are that anything Pakistan agrees to will in fact be acceptable to the mujahedin because if it isn't, then Pakistan presumably won't agree to it.

Mr. PECK. And we are staying in very close touch with the Pakistanis as well to insure that there aren't substantial differences between us.

Mr. SOLARZ. Are there any other issues outstanding that haven't been resolved besides the question of the date on which the Soviet forces are supposed to be withdrawing?

Mr. PECK. Well, I think the whole issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops really hasn't been seriously addressed to our knowledge, and it isn't just a date certain for the withdrawal, but one has to be concerned about the legal relationship between the Soviet obligation to withdraw and the undertakings of the other parties.

Mr. SOLARZ. The withdrawal applies to Soviet combat forces. Does it also apply to Soviet advisers?

Mr. PECK. That's an issue which really gets into the kind of details which I am not able to address in this forum.

Mr. SOLARZ. Our position until now has been that we want all Soviet combat forces withdrawn?

Mr. PECK. We haven't been that specific, Mr. Chairman. We have said that we would like to see the Soviet troops withdrawn, and we really haven't——

Mr. SOLARZ. Soviet troops.

Mr. PECK. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Not civilian advisers.

Mr. PECK. Troops.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now what is India's position on these negotiations? Do they support them?

Mr. PECK. Yes, yes, they do.

Mr. SOLARZ. And Iran's position?

Mr. PECK. The Iranians have remained aloof from the negotiations.

Mr. SOLARZ. Have they indicated whether they would be prepared to accept the results of a negotiation if they were acceptable to the mujahedin, or have they said nothing?

Mr. PECK. Yes, the Iranian position has basically been a fairly simply one; that is, that they demand the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and they haven't really spoken to the issue of the negotiations.

Mr. SOLARZ. I gather Mr. Gorbachev made some statement recently in which he indicated that he Soviets had reached an agreement with Babrak regime on a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. How significant was that, and what are we thinking he meant by that statement?

Mr. **Peck**. Well, from our own contacts with the Soviets, we remain doubtful that that is a particular significant statement, but it can be measured when the Geneva negotiations open again on May 5 in Geneva. If the Babrak regime is allowed to put forward some significant proposal, then we will know that Mr. Gorbachev had something worth looking at, but at this point we are dubious.

Mr. **Solarz**. I gather that General Zia seemed to feel that the Soviets were taking a more flexible and forthcoming position on the issue of the withdrawal of their forces. What led him to that conclusion?

Mr. **Peck**. Well, I think I would probably be speculating if I tried to put some reasons behind that statement. I noted his statement, of course.

Mr. **Solarz**. Well, I am sure we asked him about it. So what did he tell us?

Mr. **Peck**. He seems to have put some importance behind the willingness of the Kabul authorities to continue to conduct the negotiations in the proximity format. When they had taken the position at the last Geneva round that they would not continue to conduct the negotiations, they were demanding direct talks.

Mr. **Solarz**. Does the alliance speak for the resistance forces inside Afghanistan?

Mr. **Peck**. Yes, I think substantially so.

Mr. **Solarz**. Does it control the resistance forces inside Afghanistan?

Mr. **Peck**. I wouldn't use that exact word. There is obviously a close relationship between the alliance and the parties which make up the alliance with the resistance forces in Afghanistan, but it is a shifting one. Many of the internal resistance leaders are figures of considerable substance in their own right.

Mr. **Solarz**. Well, how much of the resistance movement does the alliance speak for? How much of the resistance movement forces identify with it?

Mr. **Peck**. That is a very difficult question to answer because the relationship between the parties in Peshawar and the forces inside the country is, as I say, a shifting one, the parties inside the country and the parties outside the country, as well. So I can't really put a percentage on that. But I think the alliance in the largest terms speaks for the Afghan people.

Mr. **Solarz**. Mr. Greenleaf, have we disbursed all of the money of the Refugee Aid Program?

Mr. **Greenleaf**. For the Refugee Aid Program or for the cross-border?

Mr. **Solarz**. For the Afghan people.

Mr. **Greenleaf**. Cross border assistance has been $8 million prior to this fiscal year, and has all been obligated with the exception of $300,000. The money for this fiscal year has just begun to be obligated. This was the money we received in December. We are moving much more quickly, Mr. Chairman, than usual in terms of mounting of the projects.

Mr. SOLARZ. Have the Paks refused to approve any of those programs?

Mr. GREENLEAF. As Mr. Peck pointed out, we are having discussions with he Pakistanis about the exact arrangements, but they have approved all the projects that we have put forward, most of which have gone through the private and voluntary organizations.

Mr. SOLARZ. You say we are disbursing them faster this year than we did last year?

Mr. GREENLEAF. I am saying we are obligating and disbursing these funds faster than is normally the case in other aid projects in other places in spite of the difficulty because we know of the priorities. We have moved quickly.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me thank you both very much for coming today. I think you have helped to shed some light on these questions. We appreciate your presence and participation.

Mr. SOLARZ. We will now here from our two patient and long-suffering witnesses from the private sector who were good enough to join us today, Mr. Rubin and Mr. Dupree. Gentlemen, your statements will be included in the record as you have prepared them. I think in the interest of time it would be helpful if you could briefly summarize your statements.

Mr. Rubin, why don't you go first?

STATEMENT OF BARNETT RUBIN, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, YALE UNIVERSITY

Mr. RUBIN. Again, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings. As you know, for a number of years I have worked for several human rights organizations in order to document the unfortunately largely unknown, nearly genocidal atrocities committed by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The results of this research are available in two reports put out by Helsinki Watch and Asia Watch, which have been distributed to all Members of Congress.

Today, however, I would like to focus on how we might promote a negotiated solution which would at least partially put an end to these atrocities, and particularly on the U.N.-mediated talks we have been talking about. It is a somewhat difficult topic for me personally, and I think for many of us who have been involved with the Afghan cause, because it lacks the moral clarity that we have when we denounce atrocities. Negotiations mean concessions, and any concessions to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan cannot be justified on their merits, but only by the brute facts of Soviet power.

In thinking about this issue, I have tried, although it has sometimes been difficult, to bear in mind two aphorisms about statesmanship. One of them is that war is the pursuit of politics by other means, and the other is that politics is the art of the possible.

The background to the negotiations in the situation in Afghanistan in the region, as I see it, is as follows:

First, the resistance, while it is a long way from being defeated, is very gradually losing ground inside Afghanistan militarily and politically, mainly because of the overwhelmingly strong Soviet forces. Second, the Kabul regime is also equally slowly, or perhaps even more slowly, becoming stronger and more consolidated, but it is far from able to survive without Soviet troops; I would agree with Senator Humphrey's assessment of that earlier.

Third, the only possible military solution is a Soviet victory, but the Soviets appear perhaps to be increasingly reluctant to pay the cost of such a victory. As it was noted, President Zia has recently said that he is receiving signals that the Soviets wish to withdraw. Fourth, and this is something that we have, fortunately, discussed earlier today, although it wasn't addressed in the questions sent to us by the committee, we have to take into account the internal political situation in Pakistan. All aid to the Afghan resistance goes through Pakistan. The Government and people of Pakistan very badly want the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the return of the refugees, and they support, very strongly, the Geneva talks as the only available way to reach these objectives.

If we block these talks or seem to block them—and I agree there are some compelling reasons to try to do so—but if we do so, I believe that it may become impossible for us to aid the Afghan resistance because of the resentment this would cause in Pakistan.

So let me turn briefly to the Geneva talks. I have discussed them in some detail in the paper that I have submitted for the record. There was some question raised by Senator Humphrey earlier about how I know what I claim to know. Unfortunately, I am unable to tell you that. All I can say is that it is not secondhand information.

Now, as noted, the draft agreement contains four instruments. We have already discussed the first, on nonintervention and noninterference. The second deals with the consultation and voluntary return of the refugees. The third is on the international guarantees, and the fourth, which is the one that remains to be negotiated, is on what is called interrelationships, but in fact deals with Soviet withdrawal.

Now this fourth one on "interrelationships," in fact on Soviet withdrawal, will be the main subject of the upcoming seventh round and was the subject of a longstanding procedural deadlock which now appears to have been broken, possibly opening the way to a substantive breakthrough. As we know, up until now there have been only indirect talks at Pakistani insistence. The Pakistanis refused both to meet with any representatives of Babrak Karmal, who was installed by Soviet tanks, or to meet with any DRA representative without the production of a timetable for Soviet withdrawal.

On the other hand, the Soviet-Afghan side insisted that they would only discuss this fourth instrument and produce a timetable in direct talks. Through a process the details of which are described in my written testimony, this procedural deadlock has been broken. Pakistan has withstood very intense domestic and international pressure, maintained its stance, and, after the congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviets agreed that the fourth instrument could be discussed in indirect talks provided that, if the indirect talks were successful, the negotiations would conclude in direct talks.

The Soviets are also reported to have provided a timetable for withdrawal. In my paper I said it was a 12-month timetable, which I now believe to be in error. I don't know how long it is. My interlocutors do not believe that this is the real timetable, but that it is something to get negotiations started, and, as noted, the Soviets appear to have removed Babrak Karmal, which would remove one of the major obstacles to concluding the talks and to direct talks with Pakistan. So it is possible that this agreement, in some form, or an agreement which has yet to be worked out in its most important part, will be signed by the end of May.

It would be an agreement between Pakistan and the so-called DRA, under which there would be an exchange of complete Soviet withdrawal for guarantees of nonintervention by the United States and the Soviet Union. It would be conditional on consultation with the refugees. I will address, if you want, the question about the unclear sentence in my written testimony.

Essentially, what that meant was that the alliance would not be the subjects of consultation; that is, the Soviet-Afghan side has agreed to consultation with the refugees, but they refuse a consultation that would take the form of formally introducing the alliance of the resistance parties into the process. Therefore some other process of consultation had to be worked out.

Obviously, if the 3 million refugees in Pakistan are consulted or if there is a jirga, a council of their maliks, that is, of their traditional representatives, many of those refugees have affiliations with the parties so the parties would be informally involved. But their formal leadership will not be involved because that has been vetoed by the Soviet side, as I understand it.

Now, there are two main criticisms of this proposed agreement. I should say they are criticisms which I have made myself, and after some long discussion, I have, with some remaining doubts, accepted the arguments that were made to me. The first is that it does not really guarantee Soviet withdrawal and nonintervention. I believe the text of the agreement is considerably stronger on this than most people would credit without having seen it.

The second, which I think is the essential problem, addressed by a number of the witnesses, is that the agreement does not solve the problem effectively by providing for Afghan self-determination. This is a shortcoming of the agreement of which I should say the authors are fully aware.

First, we should note that no negotiated solution in any form can provide an absolute guarantee of nonintervention under any condition so long as the relationship of size, strength, and location between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan exists. But the agreement does contain a number of concrete arrangements to deal with some scenarios that have been suggested.

First of all, there is the scenario that the Soviets could claim in the course of carrying out the agreement that aid to the resistance had not been stopped, or, depending on how this fourth instrument is phrased, that in some way the fourth instrument was not being carried out properly, and therefore would cease their withdrawal unilaterally. This would be, as I understand it, a violation of the agreement, which does not allow for unilateral cessation on the basis of claims of material violations of the agreement. These claims have to be referred to some kind of commission, otherwise the obligations stand.

Second, and this is a scenario which Professor Dupree has evoked in a number of occasions and which Senator Humphrey mentioned, there is the idea that the Soviets will withdraw and then reintervene under cover of a legality, invoking the Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty. Again, this also would be in violation of the agreement, because the Soviets would have to give a public undertaking unconditionally not to intervene in Afghanistan again.

Now, the second problem is, I think, the most serious one. The agreement doesn't guarantee the stability of the Kabul regime, but it also contains no mechanism to replace it. However, if the regime does not change or changes only cosmetically as it has thus far, the agreement will not work, because the refugees will not return, may not approve the agreement, and the Afghan mujahedin will clearly continue their struggle. The Pakistanis know this, and furthermore, I am told, the Soviets know this, and they have made some statements in this direction even in Pravda where they have noted, for instance, that the mujahedin are supported—they didn't use this language, of course—by large segments of the working population of Afghanistan.

Now, therefore in their own interests, the Soviets—if they want this agreement, and we don't know if they really want it yet, that remains to be seen in the negotiations—but if they do want this agreement, which would enable them to get their troops out of Afghanistan, they must promote the emergence of some solution in Afghanistan which will be acceptable to large sections of the Afghan people, and in fact to sections of the resistance.

There will have to be a different type of coalition in Kabul, and there will have to be some kind of agreements with local commanders in Afghanistan. I might mention that during an earlier period when there was an attempt at a negotiated solution, the Soviets did sign a much publicized agreement with the best known resistance commander in Afghanistan, Commander Massoud, which led to a truce in the Panjsher Valley throughout most of 1983, and that this can be viewed as a precedent for what might happen if they agree, as we don't know they will, to withdraw their troops.

In the view of some negotiators—and I believe this is the view that was expressed by the representatives of the State Department, as well—the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops would allow self-determination to take place, because the main obstacle to self-determination in Afghanistan is the presence of Soviet troops. This agreement does comport some risk. It does not guarantee a just solution of the Afghan conflict. It is not difficult—and I have done so myself on a number of occasions—to point out the shortcomings of the agreement and the process by which it was arrived at.

What is more difficult, and what I find myself unable to do, is to suggest a realistic alternative that would produce a superior outcome. I don't believe that more military pressure will force the Soviets to abandon all of their stands and make what they would see as humiliating concessions to the Afghanistan resistance. I believe the alternative would more likely be a continuation of their vicious war and be an effective depopulation of Afghanistan and its permanent incorporation, with a much reduced population, into the Soviet Empire. That is still a risk with the agreement. It is also a risk, but I think it is a more likely outcome, if we were to block the agreement.

I think it is also safe to say that, if the Soviets do completely withdraw from Afghanistan with the present political situation as it is, it will have to be seen—it will be seen, whatever the Soviets may say about it, as a victory for the Afghan resistance. I think most of the world will also perceive it that way.

[Mr. Rubin's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BARNETT R. RUBIN, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, YALE UNIVERSITY

Midway through the seventh year of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the near-genocidal war continues with undiminished ferocity. Shielded from the eyes of the world by censorship and intimidation of journalists, the Soviets and their Afghan clients have driven a third of the population into foreign exile and killed at least several hundred thousand people. Large areas of once fertile agricultural land are desolate and abandoned, the flocks slaughtered, the fruit trees burned, the irrigation tunnels bombed.

In Kabul the Soviet client regime continues to consolidate total control over all areas of life. It meets opposition with arrest, torture, imprisonment, and execution by a KGB-controlled security apparatus, the importance of which was recently upgraded when KHAD, the State Information Services, became the Ministry of National Security. The Soviet-Afghan regime is sending thousands of first graders, some of them separated forcibly from their parents, to the Soviet Union every year for ten years of education in order to turn them into a new Sovietized elite. This brief statement can hardly do justice to the brutality of the occupation regime, which I have documented, together with collaborators, for Helsinki Watch and Asia Watch in reports that have been circulated to all members of Congress.

The resistance is under heavy military pressure. In areas where its commanders have not learned to counter the new Soviet tactics, it is in disarray and has lost the offensive. Travellers from Logar Province and elsewhere describe the increased consolidation of Soviet positions, rendering travel more dangerous. In other regions, young resistance commanders are mastering the politics as well as the military tactics and strategy of protracted guerrilla war. Their equipment has improved, thanks in part to the efforts of the U.S. Congress, and morale and civilian support are still high. But the increased pressure from Soviet air attacks and commando units has made it ever more difficult for them to consolidate administration of civilian areas or even to hold secure military bases. Both sides are better equipped, and both have learned much from experience. Neither is on the verge of defeat, but the advantage is gradually shifting to the Soviets, as indicated by their recent overrunning of Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani's well defended base in Paktia province.

It is an illusion to think that supplying better air defenses, or any other equipment, can change the military balance in favor of the resistance. The only military "solution" possible in Afghanistan is a Soviet "victory." Yet such a victory, which would mean the near annihilation of the people of Afghanistan, would also be costly to the Soviets. Thus far they have not committed the forces needed to achieve such a victory in a few years time. According to some reports, after the recent Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which seems to have diminished the political influence of the Soviet military, Chairman Gorbachev turned down a request from the high command for an increase of troops in Afghanistan. Instead there are many indications that he is seeking a negotiated solution through the U.N. mediated talks in Geneva between Pakistan and the Kabul government.

The search for such a political solution is made even more urgent by a factor ignored by most of those writing on the Afghan conflict and ignored by this committee in the questions it submitted to witnesses before this hearing: the political situation in Pakistan. All aid to the resistance in landlocked Afghanistan must pass through either Iran or Pakistan; practically speaking, through Pakistan. Neither the United States nor any other power such as China or Saudi Arabia can pursue any policy in Afghanistan except in cooperation with Pakistan. The United States cannot supply Stinger missiles to the Afghan resistance except with the consent and cooperation of Pakistan. We cannot send humanitarian assistance inside Afghanistan except with the consent and cooperation of Pakistan. And we cannot pursue or prevent a negotiated solution unless we do so in close collaboration with Pakistan. Furthermore, any policy choice the United States makes with respect to Afghanistan has repercussions on our interests in Pakistan, and therefore in India, which we must also take into account.

Although most of those concerned with Afghanistan in the West, including myself until recently, have ignored or dismissed the U.N. sponsored negotiations as a "smokescreen" for the consolidation of the Soviet occupation (see, for instance, "Negotiations: un rideau de fumee," by Bernard Dupaigne in Les Nouvelles d'Afghanistan 27 (March-April 1986), p. 2), public opinion in Pakistan has regarded them as the only hope of resolving a problem that is creating increasing burdens for their society and endangering their nation. And as the political system of Pakistan opens up, a development we should encourage, public opinion becomes more influential.

Pakistan, a politically unstable and economically impoverished country, has accepted 3 million refugees mostly belonging to ethnic groups that have organized separatist movements in the past with some Afghan and Soviet support. These refugees have formed officially recognized political parties in Pakistan during a period when Pakistani political parties were banned by the military government. The parties linked to the struggle in Afghanistan have also formed militias in Pakistan, and Pakistani fundamentalist groups have at times used these armed Afghans to threaten and even attack left and secular political forces. Although the Afghans generally wish to stay out of Pakistani politics, they are, of course, refugees, vulnerable to many pressures.

The refugees are also competing economically with local people, at a time when the fall in oil prices is sending many Pakistani workers home from the Gulf countries. Pakistan's support for the Afghan mujahedin has also attracted a rising level of cross-border reprisals, including both attacks by Afghan aircraft and covert operations such as bombings and assassinations. It is certain that failure of the negotiations and an increase in the supply of traceable American equipment such as Stinger missiles would lead to a significant escalation of Soviet-Afghan attacks on Pakistan.

Public opinion polls in Pakistan showed that support for the mujahedin remained high in Pakistan for several years. Starting in 1983, however, the polls, as well as public statements by opposition political leaders, showed an erosion in such support. Part of the explanation is the increase in economic friction between the refugees and the local population; but another reason was that in 1983 what seemed to be a promising beginning of a negotiated solution under Andropov dissolved after a visit by the Pakistani foreign minister to Washington. Rightly or wrongly, growing numbers of Pakistanis began to view the war in Afghanistan as advantageous to the Pakistani military, which used it to strengthen itself through increased military aid, and the United States government, which wanted to strengthen the Pakistani military as the eastern pillar of Western defenses in the Gulf, a role that most sectors of opinion in Pakistan are not eager to play.

Pakistani opinion thus strongly wants the Soviets to get out of Afghanistan and the refugees to return, but virtually no one in Pakistan, from the most extreme opposition to President Zia himself, wants a radical increase in the level of military aid to the resistance. They are afraid of the consequences for Pakistan of a prolonged war and do not believe that such a war will be successful. In an interview with the Washington Post (March 23, 1986) Zia said:

> To expect that the greater the insurgency, the less time the Soviets will spend in Afghanistan is wrong. You've got to

> find a political solution to the problem. The insurgency is a tactic. It will help find a political solution, but it will not bring about a solution. So, if anybody's thinking that the greater the heat of the insurgency, the easier the solution, he is wrong.

President Zia, the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, and all the Pakistani opposition leaders, as well as the Government of India, and the United Nations, support the U.N. negotiations as a framework for resolving the Afghan conflict. Despite the ambivalence of some officials, the position of the U.S. government as expressed in a letter of December 11, 1985, to the Secretary General of the United Nations also supports the negotiations: the United States has formally stated its willingness to act as guarantor of an agreement providing for complete withdrawal of Soviet troops within a fixed and reasonable time frame. The resistance objects to the talks because the two major parties to the conflict, the Soviets and the mujahedin, are not represented there. But they also agree that:

> There is no military solution to the problem of Afghanistan. The final solution must be diplomatic and political. While we continue the armed struggle, we are still trying to find political means to solve the problem. The key to the solution is the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the guarantee of non-interference in Afghan affairs, the people's choice of the future form of the government and the restoration of a non-aligned and Islamic status for Afghanistan. (Jamiat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan, Afghan News, December 17, 1985.)

I agree with the resistance that the most appropriate forum for such a solution would be direct talks between the Soviets and the resistance. Thus far, however, the Soviets have not agreed to such a format, and it is difficult to envisage what conceivable pressure could make them change their minds. They have, however, agreed to discuss their withdrawal from

Afghanistan in the context of the Geneva talks, and they view this as a considerable concession on their part. These talks offer the only actually existing framework for negotiating a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and they deserve serious attention and analysis.

There have thus far been six rounds of these "proximity" talks, in which delegations from the Government of Pakistan and the so-called Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (D.R.A.) communicate without actually meeting through the intermediation of United Nations Under Secretary General Diego Cordovez, an Ecuadorian diplomat. These talks have produced a draft agreement which is almost complete and several accessory documents.

The draft agreement has four instruments. The first deals with non-interference and non-intervention. In very specific, watertight terms this instrument would prohibit Pakistan and the D.R.A. from permitting arms or armed persons to cross the Durand Line (the frontier between the two countries, which no government of Afghanistan has ever accepted as an international border) or otherwise encouraging rebellion in each other's territory. Obviously the Soviets gain the most from this provision, which prohibits international aid to the Afghan mujahedin, but Pakistan also stands to gain immunity it has long sought from Soviet-Afghan support for separatist movements among the Baluch and Pathan ethnic groups. This provision would also forbid the infiltration of KHAD terror squads that have wreaked considerable damage in the border region.

The second instrument provides for the consultation and voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan under international supervision. The exact method of consultation remains to be worked out at the current round of talks. The two alternatives mentioned are a referendum or, more likely, a *jirga* (council) of refugee *maliks* (traditional intermediaries between the village and the state). Despite attempts by the Afghan Communist negotiators to limit the category of those who could return to so-called "*bona fide*" refugees (a term without juridical meaning) the final text allows all Afghans to return to their homes and provides for an amnesty for all acts committed before the entry into force of the agreement. While the latter provision has the unfortunate effect of amnestying war criminals, it also protects the resistance. No refugee, of course, may be forcibly repatriated.

The third agreement defines the role of the international guarantors of the agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union. Both will undertake publicly and unconditionally not to intervene or interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and will oversee the implementation of the agreement. In separate letters addressed to the United Nations, both superpowers have accepted the role of guarantor of an appropriate agreement.

The fourth instrument is called the instrument on "interrelationships," but in fact it deals with the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Soviets are unwilling to admit openly that Pakistan and the D.R.A. are negotiating about the withdrawal of Soviet troops, since it is conceivably humiliating for a superpower to allow two Third World countries to negotiate about its sovereign right of withdrawal, even if one of the countries is represented by a puppet regime. Formally, the text of the fourth instrument obligates the D.R.A. to ask the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops.

This instrument also deals with the relationship (hence the title) of the troop withdrawal to other elements of the agreement, in particular the cut off of international aid to the Afghan resistance required by the first instrument. The Soviet-Kabul position has been that the assistance should stop, after which the pullout can begin. This is obviously unacceptable, as it gives the Soviets time to try to wipe out a resistance that cannot replenish its supplies. The American-Pakistani position has been that the Soviets should withdraw, after which they will stop aiding the resistance. The Soviets reject this, which would allow the resistance to escalate attacks on them as they leave. The seventh round of Geneva talks will probably reach some compromise on this issue.

There is a blank spot in the draft text of the fourth instrument, and that is the place specifying the length of time within which the Soviets will complete their troop pullout. Until recently the Soviet refusal to provide a timetable for troop withdrawal supported the analysis according to which the Soviets were using the Geneva talks to legitimate the Kabul regime but had no intention of withdrawing. For the past year the Soviet-Afghan interlocutors have insisted that they would only discuss the fourth instrument, including the timetable for troop withdrawal, in direct talks between Pakistan and the D.R.A. Pakistan, with American backing, refused to deal directly with the government of Babrak Karmal, who was installed by Soviet troops. It is important to note that Pakistan dealt directly with Karmal's Communist predecessors, Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, because, although they were Communists, they were not directly installed by the Soviets. Pakistan's objection is to dealing with Karmal, not with the D.R.A.

The process of breaking this deadlock began at the November summit. Secretary Gorbachev reportedly argued forcefully that the Soviet Union wanted a negotiated settlement and was not determined to occupy Afghanistan indefinitely in order to outflank Iran or reach the warm waters of the Arabian Sea. In response to what one State Department official called "the positive tone of the summit" the U.S. sent the December 11 letter agreeing to act as guarantor.

The following week at the sixth round in Geneva, Kabul Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost again insisted on direct talks as a precondition for placing on the table a piece of paper he claimed was a timetable for Soviet withdrawal. A State Department leak to the New York *Times* on January 1 claimed, falsely, that the D.R.A. had presented a twelve-month timetable for withdrawal, perhaps in order to signal that twelve months would be an acceptable duration.

The Soviets continued to insist on direct talks, and political pressure increased on the government in Pakistan to engage in direct talks with Kabul, despite the disapproval of the United States. The Government of Pakistan stood firm, however, apparently bolstered in this stance by the decision of Pakistan People's Party leader Benazir Bhutto to defy other leaders in her party and support the government's refusal to enter direct talks, an issue on which she had previously (as in an earlier interview with me) refused to take a position. She reportedly reiterated this position during a visit to Moscow.

During this same period both sides continued to press forward with their military options. The United States government reportedly decided for the first time to supply Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the Afghan resistance, although it is unclear whether Pakistan will permit the transfer to go through. The Soviet Union began a large offensive against bases guarding key resistance supply routes in Paktia Province. Despite propaganda claims by both sides, these actions do not mean that the parties are not interested in negotiations; the military actions are meant to strengthen bargaining positions and to assure the possibility of continuing the military option if negotiations fail.

The negotiations may not fail, however, because the Soviets themselves, perhaps convinced that they had exhausted the possibilities of their previous stance, and encouraged by the U.S. promise to guarantee the agreement, have unilaterally broken the deadlock. After the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at which Secretary Gorbachev consolidated his position, the Soviets agreed that the fourth instrument could be discussed in indirect talks, provided that the delegations will bring the meeting to a successful conclusion only in direct talks. Furthermore, according to press reports not denied by diplomatic sources involved in the negotiations, the Soviets presented a twelve-month four-stage timetable for withdrawal. The sources consider such a timetable artificial and believe that the "real" timetable will appear only "on the day before the agreement is signed," if such a day should come.

The advent of that day has been made yet more likely by the most recent news from Kabul and Moscow. As noted above, the government of President Zia ul-Haq has always stated it would not meet with representatives of Babrak Karmal, and Foreign Minister Yaqub Sahibzada Khan devoted a considerable portion of a recent major address to the Pakistan National Assembly on foreign policy to justifying this stance. Since 1982 Soviet negotiators are reported to have told the Pakistanis that, when the time came, Karmal "would not be a problem." Now he has disappeared; he was absent from the celebrations of the eighth anniversary of the so-called "Saur Revolution" (the military coup of April 27, 1978, that brought the Communists to power), the symbolic equivalent of a Soviet leader failing to appear on Red Square on the anniversary of the October Revolution. If the agreement is signed, we may expect to hear either that Karmal's health has deteriorated or that he was personally responsible for all the crimes of the last six and a half years and has been replaced by a more "moderate" figure.

We can summarize the terms of the agreement as follows: Pakistan, the United States, and other powers will cease all aid to the Afghan mujahedin, as the Soviet Union withdraws all of its troops (not advisers) from Afghanistan. This agreement will go into force only if approved by the three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan or their representatives, but these representatives will not be the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedin, the coalition of the seven major Sunni Muslim resistance parties. The refugees will be free to return to their homes voluntarily without reprisals. Both the United States and the Soviet Union will publicly commit themselves not to intervene or interfere in Afghanistan and will guarantee respect for the agreement. The agreement aims at reducing the level of external involvement in Afghanistan. It does not resolve the domestic conflict that originally led to the war.

In considering whether the United States should support such an agreement, we must first take into account the fact that the United States government has already stated that it would not only support but act as an official guarantor of such an agreement. First, however, let us examine the shortcomings of the proposed agreement, some real, some feared by those who have not yet had the opportunity to learn of its content in detail.

There are two main criticisms of the agreement: that it does not really guarantee against Soviet intervention and that it provides only a cosmetic facade for obtaining recognition for the Kabul regime, without solving the central problem of self-determination for Afghanistan. The first objection can be largely (although not entirely) dissipated by an examination of the text, when it is published. The second, however, is real, and the authors of the agreement are fully aware of it.

No agreement, not even a formal agreement between the Soviet Union and the coalition of Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedin, can provide an absolute guarantee against Soviet intervention. As long as the Soviet Union is a large, powerful country and Afghanistan a landlocked, impoverished, weak country on its border, the Soviets will be able to intervene if they are willing to pay the costs. All an agreement can do is to reduce the likelihood of intervention by providing some guarantees of Soviet security interests and raising the political costs of intervention.

Underlying the suspicion that the Soviets will somehow escape the requirement of withdrawal is the belief that they really would like to have their troops in Afghanistan, which many signals indicate is not the case, as noted by President Zia himself in the Washington Post interview quoted above. Furthermore, the Soviets have insisted, as then Foreign Minister Gromyko is reported to have told Pakistan Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, that what they want is an agreement that will enable them to leave and never come back. One can at least trust the Soviet Union to pursue Soviet interests, and the Afghan mujahedin may well have convinced the Soviets that invading Afghanistan is not worth the cost.

If true, such considerations would be the best guarantee against future Soviet intervention, but one can hardly rely only on such intangibles. The agreement contains provisions that deal concretely with several possibilities for Soviet evasion of the requirement of non-intervention. One scenario for Soviet deceit is that the Soviets, after getting the Pakistanis to meet with the representatives of their puppet regime and to dismantle bases and training facilities for the resistance, will use some incident as the basis of a claim that Pakistan and the U.S. are still aiding the resistance and then stop the troop withdrawal. For the Soviets to do so, however, would be to violate the agreement, which provides that claims of non-compliance are to be referred to a commission and may not constitute grounds for non-compliance by the complaining side.

Another scenario, mentioned on several occasions by Professor Louis Dupree, among others, is that the Soviets might in fact complete their withdrawal, but subsequently intervene again under cover of legality. Their client regime might find itself weakened by internal resistance, and, strengthened by its newly won international legitimacy, make use of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty to summon Soviet assistance. Since, however, the Soviet Union would be required by the third instrument of the agreement to give an unconditional public committment not to intervene in Afghanistan's internal affairs, such an intervention would violate the agreement. The United States should use its contacts with Pakistan and the U.N. negotiators to assure before the agreement is signed that this is explicit and clear.

Although the agreement does have a formal way of dealing with the latter scenario, that scenario points to the central insufficiency of the agreement: its failure to deal with the type of government Afghanistan will have. The agreement contains no guarantees of the stability of the Kabul government, but neither does it provide for its replacement. Initially, the Kabul regime, probably without Babrak Karmal, but with its Soviet advisers, its torture chambers, its Soviet-dominated educational system, and its program for deporting Afghan children by force to the Soviet Union, would remain in place. It is unlikely that many refugees will agree to return to Afghanistan if they will have to live under such a government.

Furthermore, the war would continue, as the Afghan mujahedin continue their struggle. It is obvious that the Kabul regime could not maintain itself in power without Soviet troops. Even though the Soviets would continue to maintain thousands of advisers and could send all the arms they wanted to, the Kabul regime could never furnish an adequate supply of willing advisees and of committed troops to fire the weapons. Despite some successes in building Afghan army commando units, the loyalty of much of the Afghan military is best symbolized by the destruction of about one third of the Afghan Air Force at Shindand Air Base by Afghan officers last fall and the recent arrest of four generals whom the Soviets accused of providing information to Panjsher Valley Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. The United States learned in Iran the limits of aid to a client regime without local support. The political configuration within Afghanistan is such that, without the presence of Soviet troops, even massive Soviet aid and the cutoff of foreign assistance to the mujahedin will probably, on balance, favor the mujahedin.

Sources close to the negotiations claim that the Soviets are aware that the agreement cannot work without some participation by the resistance. After the agreement is signed, according to these sources, the Soviets will promote a process of "Finlandisation," that is, the emergence of a largely non-Communist coalition in Kabul which may include elements of the resistance and will certainly enter into local agreements with resistance groups inside Afghanistan. One such source said:

> This agreement is no longer a problem. These negotiations will promote parallel developments [changes in Kabul and negotations with resistance groups inside Afghanistan] without which there can be no settlement. The agreement is just a piece of paper that promotes these parallel effects.

In the view of at least some of those involved with the agreement, it does indirectly provide for self-determination in Afghanistan. It does not provide for a change of government, but, they argue, the government of Afghanistan should not be determined by Pakistan, the Soviet Union, the D.R.A., the United States, and the United Nations. It should be decided by the Afghans. Under the agreement, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Pakistan would be required more or less to let the Afghans "sort it out themselves," in a phrase I have often heard. The Soviets, of course, would maintain a considerable presence there, as they have for years, but, short of moving Afghanistan, there is no realistic way to remove Soviet influence completely. The process of conflict, negotiation, and accomodation in Afghanistan would undoubtedly be bloody, although certainly less bloody than the current near-genocidal war. Its outcome would be unpredictable, and it could draw the superpowers in again.

The Geneva agreement falls short of a just solution of the Afghan conflict, and it contains certain elements of risk. Although some corrupt adventurers and profiteers (not all of them Afghan) have taken advantage of the program of aid to the Afghan resistance, and although some of its leaders advocate extreme versions of Islamicist political ideology, it remains a genuine popular movement, a true people's war, and it has produced

[illegible] COPY AVAILABLE

leaders of great stature and heroism. To cut off aid to these people would be a painful decision, especially to those of us who know them personally and have worked with them. I hope that the United States and Pakistan will keep them fully informed of the progress of the negotiations and will consult with them adequately about the implementation of the agreement, if it is signed.

Given the risks of the Geneva agreement, we must consider whether the United States should try to block it in order to continue aid to the Afghan resistance. In considering this position, however, one should bear in mind two profound aphorisms about statesmanship: war is the pursuit of politics by other means; and politics is the art of the possible. Those who argue for bypassing the negotiations in favor of a protracted war must, first of all, produce arguments so convincing that they justify the United States government going back on its word. They must explain just how they will pursue a protracted war in such a way as to produce the possibility of a better political settlement in the future. And they must explain, as none of them has, to my knowledge, even attempted to do, how we will sustain such a strategy given the opposition to it of virtually all the political forces in Pakistan.

The one argument worth considering is that the deteriorating military position of the Afghan resistance is due, above all, to their lack of defenses against the overwhelming Soviet superiority in the air. According to this argument, supplying the shoulder-carried portable laser-guided Stinger anti-aircraft guns to the Afghan mujahedin will ultimately shift the military balance, especially by threatening the heliborne Soviet commando, or Spetsnaz forces, one fourth of which are already said to be committed to Afghanistan. As the Soviets begin to lose planes and elite troops, and as the mujahedin are thus able to consolidate control of more territory and population, the Soviets may consider direct negotiations with the Afghan mujahedin.

This argument is flawed in many respects. First of all, it completely ignores the people of Pakistan, virtually all of whom fear the consequences of and therefore oppose such escalation. The proponents of this argument do not explain how they intend to supply enough of these weapons and train enough of the mujahedin in their use in the face of strong, and accelerating, Pakistani opposition. It also seems unlikely, even in the best of circumstances, that the Soviet Union would allow itself to be forced into a humiliating concession simply because the Afghan resistance obtains a new weapon system. It would increase their costs, but they are already deploying planes in new formations to defend against the resistance's improved anti-aircraft equipment. They would undoubtedly find other ways to defend themselves against Stingers.

There is no doubt that, if these negotiations fail to produce a solution allowing for "Finlandisation," the Soviets are prepared to pursue what they call "Mongolisation." This is a policy of fighting for the long haul, as they did in Central Asia, reducing Afghanistan to what some of their personnel in the country already call it, the sixteenth Soviet Republic in all but name, but a Soviet Republic with a greatly reduced population.

Indeed, this was clearly the policy during the Chernenko period, and all the infrastructure for such a policy remains in place. Millions more refugees would flood into Pakistan and Iran, further destabilizing these two countries and providing breeding grounds for a bitter generation, prey to all sorts of extremism, that will continue the Afghan struggle through all possible means, including terrorism.

On balance, the Geneva talks are the only realistic alternative to a destructive war in which there will be few real winners, but one certain loser -- the people of Afghanistan. If the talks fail, it must be, and be seen to be, only because of Soviet intransigence. If, at the last moment, the Soviets refuse to withdraw, then we must expend every effort, in conjunction with the government and people of Pakistan, to aid the Afghans in their struggle. But if the Soviets are willing to withdraw, we must help them to do so. It is not an easy decision, especially for one who has devoted much time and effort to documenting the massive -- and, alas, largely unknown -- crimes against humanity committed by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Justice demands the defeat and punishment of the criminals responsible. But if justice is not within our power, prudence demands that we try to moderate conflict and reduce violence. The Geneva negotiations may provide a means to do just that, which is the task of statesmanship. If the Soviets do indeed leave Afghanistan, they may portray the withdrawal as a victory against foreign interference. But the people of the world and the Afghans will know whose victory it is.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much for some very thoughtful testimony. Mr. Dupree.

STATEMENT OF LOUIS DUPREE, VISITING PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF ISLAMIC AND ARABIAN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, DUKE UNIVERSITY

Mr. DUPREE. I, too, wish to thank the chairman and the subcommittee for allowing me an audience here to speak for my people, the Afghans. I would like to make an administrative announcement. It says on the little piece that I have prepared here, "Not for publication without permission." You have my permission for the congressional quarterly. I mean I didn't really mean it that way, and it can be quoted by anyone.

An academic nitpick, the people are not afghanis. Afghanis are money. Afghans is the way you refer to people, because the afghani is the currency which is still used in Afghanistan. So they are not money really, they are just the Afghans. Also I would like to emphasize that I am not a diplomat. You can ask me a yes or no answer, and I will probably say, yes, or no.

We have to remember several important things about what is happening in Afghanistan. First, it is the first Soviet aggression, direct aggression, military aggression, on a nonaligned independent nation since World War II. That's an entirely new ball game. Let's don't forget that. I don't have to go into the human rights atrocities which have occurred. I was in jail myself for a short time, and I could tell you some stories about that, but not now.

These atrocities have been adequately listed in the Amnesty International Reports, the Helsinki Watch Report and the United Nations Report of Dr. Ermacora. There have been Afghanistan food shortages, as well. I would like to mention that.

The Afghan Army is a conscript army, and the army in 1978 consisted of about 105,000 men. It now consists probably of no more than 20,000 to 30,000, and that is probably an overestimation. It is also a revolving door. Men go into the army drafted, and they leave as quickly as possible, quite often shooting their officers.

This past summer when I was in Afghanistan, I witnessed this process. The men with whom I talked, most of them, had been drafted at least twice, and one had been drafted three times. What they do is in their home region they go to the bazaar to pick up certain things, and there is a vacuum cleaner called the Soviet MP's going through these bazaars. Any able-bodied young many is immediately asked where are his identification papers, and if his identification papers indicate that he has served in the military, the MP's destroy them in front of him and redraft him. So he goes back into the army, spends one week possibly in training, is sent to the front and then deserts again bringing his weapon with him. So this is not a reliable army.

They are not too many people who really support this regime in Afghanistan. You do find some, of course. Most of them are the detribalized, urban types. They have lost their kinship ties, really, their cultural ties with the countryside. And do not assume that because the ministries in the capital city are still full of Afghan bureaucrats that all of these people support the regime. We could not during the Second World War assume that all of the French bureaucrats working in their ministries were Nazi supporters. Many of them worked with the Maquis at night. And many of the people in the ministries in Afghanistan are the same way. They are working with the mujahedin. We know this because they are constantly coming across the border when threatened with arrest, and then they tell us the entire story of how they have been working within the mujahedin.

Also quite a number of the leftist in both the Khalq and Parcham parties have deserted Afghanistan and gone to Pakistan or Iran, and some of them have even gone into the field to serve as mujahedin, because although they say, "We are leftist. You can even call us Marxist." I call them Marxist sometimes, but they are more Groucho than Karl, I can assure you. "We are leftists of the finest type, but we do not want anyone dominating our country from the outside. We can be local Communists. We can be local socialists, but we are not going to be Soviet Communists." This has been breaking down as well.

Afghanistan consists of two major areas: The capital and the rest of the country. Soviet tactics have evolved during the war, but they still follow two major patterns which began quite early on; what I call the rubbleization of Afghanistan with those MI-24's and the SU-25's and other aircraft rubbleizing the villages and forcing the villagers to leave, to go to Pakistan or Iran, migratory genocide.

If you force someone from their homes, from their hearth and from where they have worked all their lives, this is virtually the same as killing them. The Soviets realize that a dead Afghan in Afghanistan is no good to them. A live Afghan in potentially volatile Pakistan and Iran will possibly become a strategic plus over the years. The Soviets realize they made a tactical mistake by going into Afghanistan, but looking at the strategic long run they might, just might, by the year 2010 A.D. I use that date because I'll be dead and I won't give a damn.

But by the year, 2010 A.D., the Soviets could possibly be the major foreign economic and political force in the Middle East and South Asia without moving a single Soviet footprint across the border.

About unity, we all worry about the lack of unity among the mujahedin and among the political parties in Pakistan. Well, I worry also about the American relief committees and the way they are split up into so many different units, and I wish they would get together. I guess it is an Afghan syndrome. As has been related, we have no unity. But if all the Afghan fighting forces, about 116 inside Afghanistan did get together all at once and become unified, I would get worried. That is not the Afghan way. It has never been unified nationally but the groups have unified within the region. You do have regional growing unity.

People who have been blood enemies for years have now come together to fight against the invader within their region, so what you find is your regional unity, not a national liberation movement yet, but regional unity, and I think that is important. Another linguistic pattern has been occurring. The Afghans on the whole, no matter what tribe or ethnic group they belong to, are now talking about "my country," driving the Soviets out of "my country," not just out of my region. There is a little bit of incipient nationalism coming in because the Soviets are there.

The May 1985 unity formed in Peshawar by the seven major political parties is still holding, and it is holding very well. They are the representatives of most of the people in Afghanistan. A few other odd organizations may also have to be brought in, now, however, every third month a new leader takes over the unity and represents all of these seven groups at international forums.

Two months ago, I was in Bonn at the Bundestag. The West German Parliament was holding hearings on Afghanistan, and the man who represented the unity was Ahmad Gailani. Before Galani, Gulbuedin Hekmatyar was chairman. Now, Professor Rabbani is in the chair. How long the unity will last, I don't know, but I certainly hope it lasts a long time. These people may not really like each other but they don't have to like each other to cooperate in the resistance.

The nearest analog that I can find is the Yugoslav partisan movement of the Second World War. When the Germans and Italians came in, the eight major ethnic groups in Yugoslavia initially responded within their own region. Over the period of the war we witnessed two major political and military units evolving: commanded by Tito on the left; Mihajlorie on the right. Of course, the Titoists won out, and Tito felt so confident that he was able to create a federation of Yugoslavia based on the major ethnolinguistic groups. They don't like each other either, but they are able to hold together if an outsider comes and threatens their country. Tito felt so strong he could tell Stalin to bugger off, and Stalin did. He didn't really relish going to Yugoslavia with all of those Yugoslav mountaineers ready to fight once again.

Soviet escalations over the past two years have been interesting. The Afghan KHAD—the Afghan KGB—has increased its activities and gone into Pakistan with plans to assassinate resistance leaders on leave and to spread disinformation. Disinformation sometimes reaches a comic turn. I just saw some recent propaganda put out by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan which accused the Americans of spreading toy bombs all over Afghanistan, and also bombs which look like toothpaste tubes and boot polish. I am assured that most of the Afghans don't need boot polish at this time, and they wouldn't be picking up these things if the Americans had really left them behind, which I doubt.

The resistance has been doing reasonably well given the amount of equipment it has received. I witnessed the Khost offensive this past summer the mujahedin used the new multibarrel rocket launchers which had been delivered to them quite effectively, they took about half of the 60 outposts around Khost, and shelled the airfield at Khost constantly. The offensive began on the 22d of June. It finally ended toward the end of August because the mujahedin ran out of ammunition. If you are on the offensive you have to have much more ammunition than if you are on the defensive, and this is what the resistance fighters found out now the hard way.

What happens outside of Afghanistan is more important at this time than what happens inside Afghanistan. We must continue to aid both the refugees and, of course, the mujahedin. Chemical warfare—you asked a question about that. I personally know of several types that exist. There are two types of tear gas used. One is a very virulent tear gas which excudes a yellow cloud when the canister explodes. This might have been what some people have mistaken for microtoxins, but of course, I'm not sure about that.

I have a here a photograph which indicates the results of chemical attacks which occurred this past summer in the area I visited. This is a photograph of Mr. John Crawford who is here in the audience. I didn't bring mine, but he brought one of his. These are itching blister-type burns, the gentleman you see in this photograph had his 3-year-old daughter killed when this canister exploded near them, and he is in Norway now undergoing treatment.

Not only the itching blister gas, but they have used in the past a laughing gas, and a nausea gas in which causes all orifices to go. This is an incapacitating gas, not meant to kill, but if you are near the point of explosion, you will possibly die from the concentration.

I think we have to realize that time is not necessarily on the side of the Soviet Union. I think that attrition over time can make the Soviets consider leaving in peace with honor. I don't conceive of it happening now. Given the current Soviet system, I cannot perceive the mothers of Leningrad banning together "to bring our boys home from Afghanistan." I can't perceive of Soviet draft dodgers in Stockholm forming peace committees. But given time, this type of thing might happen.

Several factors: we still tend to look at the Soviet Union through Stalinized-tinted glasses. But there have been a lot of changes in the Soviet Union. A communications revolution has taken place. I'm not picturing it as a worker's paradise yet, but over time, over time changes in attitude may occur. We have to remember that at this point in time about 500,000 Soviet veterans of the Afghan war have gone home, and we get reports that all of them are not telling stories about fighting for the glorious motherland. They are telling stories of atrocities. They are talking about the hardships in the war, and and many of them, I feel sure, are somewhat against this war. Five hundred thousand now, who knows how many in 10 years will be back. This may change some of the attitudes of the Soviet masses.

The Geneva talks—we have been talking a lot about the Geneva talks today. I am in favor of them. One thing is that they constitute a door which can be opened at any time. The peace process has been institutionalized. I would hate to see it stop. I don't care if they reach Geneva 69, if they are still talking, I would like to see representatives of the mujahedin, there, of course, but the choreograph of diplomacy must be played as it flows along.

I also feel that the Soviets are quite capable of agreeing to leave the country knowing that there will be probably be at least a short bloody civil war after they leave the country. Then whatever government is in power in Kabul can turn to the Soviets, and using the treaty of friendship of December 1978, officially come back into the country this time. Now they still claim they were invited in, I think most of us realize that is absolutely a fallacy, which even the Soviets realize is a facade.

What can the United States do? In my opinion, I think that we can continue diplomatic, and political offenses to try to help the

Afghan situation be presented to the entire world. We can exert pressure in the U.N. General Assembly each time the annual vote comes around and to get an even higher number condemn the invasion. I would like to see the Embassy in Kabul remain, because it doesn't mean we recognize the regime. We recognize Afghanistan, yes, but the regime is not Afghanistan. At least men in the Embassy and women in the Embassy can count the number of explosions per night and they will have access to the public documents which would be difficult to procure if we did not have an embassy in Kabul. And there is a lot of precedence for this. India and China fought a war in the Himalayas in 1962, and they maintained their embassies in New Delhi and Beijing all through this "genuine" war.

Another important feature which I think should be pursued and encouraged is the SAARC, created just recently. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation includes the seven countries in South Asia, but mainly India and Pakistan. Others are: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives. If this can hold, it will be the greatest thing that has happened, in my opinion, since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The Soviets will not like SAARC, because they prefer to deal one-on-one, and not deal with groups regionally oriented.

We still have problems of media coverage. The media does what it can in this country. We have to continue to have accurate media coverage come out of Afghanistan, and the amendment sponsored by Senator Humphrey last year should soon have an impact—the sooner the better.

We should get involved with any number of groups among the Afghans who are actually trying to put out information. There is a group called the Writers Union of Free Afghanistan [WUFA] publishing now in Pashtu, Persian, and English.

A former Afghan professor who escaped from Afghanistan is now publishing a small journal which takes articles from West Germany, France, the Arab world, the United States of America, et cetera, and translates them into Persian and Pashto, and sends the journals across the border into Afghanistan, so that the mujahedin will know how people feel about them and what they are writing about them, and to let them know they are not deserted.

Hand-locked Afghanistan deserves all the attention that we can give it, and I agree with Senator Humphrey that there should be a full-time member of the executive branch to deal with nothing but Afghanistan, and to maintain contact with others in government who are working on Afghanistan.

I also want to say that we owe Pakistan quite a lot. The refugees owe Pakistan for asylum. The mujahedin owe Pakistan for sanctuary. Therefore, the free world owes Pakistan for its courage, and we should remember this as we criticize Pakistan's efforts to move toward a type of representative government within its own cultural patterns.

Thank you.

[Mr. Dupree's prepared statement follows:]

AVAILABLE

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LOUIS DUPREE, VISITING SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, ISLAMIC AND ARABIAN DEVLOPMENT STUDIES, DUKE UNIVERSITY

RESISTANCE

1) How would you describe the conditions and treatment of the Afghan people under the Soviet dominated regime?

The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 represents the first direct Soviet aggression on a non-aligned, independent country since World War II. Therefore, it established a new ball game. It placed a puppet regime at the helm in Kabul, the capital, but the Soviets retained control of all ministries and divided the country into military occupation zones. The puppet regime continues the fiction that it is basically socialist and Islamic, with a born-again Muslim, Babrak Karmal, as leader of the Parcham Party and, therefore, the country. (Incidentally, Babrak is currently in the USSR for "medical treatment," and was not present in Afghanistan for the celebration of the 8th anniversary of the leftist seizure of power.)

The previous regime, under the Khalqi chiefs, Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, attempted to launch a number of reform programs, most of which struck directly at traditional Afghan cultural patterns.

Indiscriminate arrests and executions bloodied the reputation of the Khalqi period (April 1978-December 1979), and these practices continued into the Parchami period. Mistreatment of political prisoners and captured resistance fighters have been adequately reported by Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch (Afghanistan Branch), and the United Nations reports of Professor Dr. Felix Ermacora.

Food shortages periodically plague both the urban and rural scenes. Urban power shortages caused by the activities of resistance fighters make life unpleasant in the cities.

The Afghan army is a conscript army, and also a revolving door. Draftees desert as quickly as possible, often shooting their officers and bringing their weapons to the mujahidin (resistance fighters). Some Afghan deserters have been drafted three times. The Afghan and Soviet MPs roam the bazaars of towns under government control and use the vacuum-cleaner approach to select conscripts. Any able-bodied young man is stopped and his identification papers demanded. If his papers indicate he has completed his military service, the MPs often rip up the papers and redraft him.

2) How widespread is support for the puppet regime? How widespread would support be for the resistance forces? Or would you say the bulk of the people don't care to become involved?

A very small percentage of the Afghans support the puppet regime. In fact, many who have joined the Party actually support the resistance fighters and supply them with information. We know this because many people working in the ministries have fled to Pakistan to avoid arrest because of their cooperation with the resistance.

Those Afghans genuinely supporting the regime are usually de-tribalized urban types, with no strong kinship ties in the countryside. (I have always said there are two Afghanistans: Kabul and the rest of the country.)

With the Soviet invasion, support for the resistance fighters became virtually universal. The mujahidin have been able to swim in Chairman Mao's "friendly sea," so necessary for successful guerrilla operations.

The widespread support in the countryside for the resistance fighters caused the Soviets to adopt the policies of rubbleization and migratory genocide. They do not necessarily want to kill off the civilian population, but rather drive them out of the country, away from their homes and fields - the equivalent of "living" genocide. The Soviets realize that a dead Afghan in Afghanistan is of no use to them, but a live Afghan across the border in Pakistan or Iran among linguistic and cultural cousins may be a strategic plus - if demands for regional autonomy within these two nations intensify.

The bulk of the people in Afghanistan have become actively involved in one way or another.

3) What is the current state of the resistance?

5) Is there a unified leadership among the resistance fighters? Or do they operate more as tribal/family armies?

In spite of recent set backs, particularly in Jawar, south Afghanistan, because of major Soviet offensives, the resistance movement is steadily improving. Most people deplore the lack of unity among the various groups, but I beg to differ. Regional unity has been growing inside Afghanistan, and the seven major political parties in Pakistan formed a union in May 1985, which, as of this date, holds together, a great accomplishment. This does not mean that the different groups love one another. The only thing that matters is that they cooperate, however imperfectly. The unity will grow as the war progresses.

The nearest analogy in modern times is the Yugoslav Partisan Movement during World War II. When the Germans and Italians first invaded Yugoslavia, the eight different ethnolinguistic groups responded independently. Before the war ended, however, the Yugoslavs had evolved into two major political-military organizations: the leftists under Tito, the rightists (royalists) under Mihajlović. But the various ethnolinguistic groups retained their cultural and regional identities, so that Marshal Tito was able to create a federation of Yugoslavia after World War II. Marshal Tito felt so strong that he could declare his independence of Marshal Stalin and get away with it. Although the individual ethnic groups still do not like each other internally, any external threat will be met with unified actions.

The same evolution is occurring in Afghanistan. Regional unity must precede a national liberation movement, and regional unity is the major pattern today. Tribal groups which are normally blood enemies have joined together to fight the Soviets and the puppet regime. Cooperation is spreading. For example, in the summer of 1985, four groups cooperated in a major offensive in the area of Khost in southern Afghanistan.

The process will be long and painful. But the seeds of national unity have been planted.

6) How would you describe the effectiveness and capabilities of the resistance? Short range? Long range?

The effectiveness can be measured four ways:

a) the amount of territory controlled by the resistance: virtually all the countryside outside the main cities; and the cities are vulnerable to attack, even in the day time, with the new multibarrel-rocket launchers which the resistance fighters have received;

b) the assistance rendered to the resistance by the local population: virtually universal;

c) the increased cooperation between groups in both offensive and defensive operations;

d) the fact that the Soviets are now publicizing the war in their government-controlled media in order to gain support from their own people. The Soviet media publicity emphasizes their "glorious fight" along side their Afghan allies against reactionary counterrevolutionaries and outside interventionists.

Over the long range, the effectiveness and capabilities of the resistance will depend on what happens outside Afghanistan. If all nations interested in Afghanistan continue to supply the resistance fighters with weapons in quality and quantity. The key to long range victory is attrition, so that the Soviets will ultimately leave with "honor," i.e., announce they have won and go home. But this will not occur in the near future.

7) What kind of casualties have been suffered on both sides? Have there been any more instances of chemical or biological weapon use by the Soviets?

Statistics concerning the Afghan war diverge considerably. Soviet casualties have been variously estimated from 10,000 to 40,000. Casualties among the Afghans, including civilians as well as resistance fighters, range from 500,000 to one million. In this closed war, however, it is impossible to test the accuracy of any of these figures.

The question pertaining to the use of chemical or biological weapons is for elaboration by specialists, but I can verify the use of several types of chemicals. Two types of tear gas have been used, one a particularly virulent type rises like a yellow mist after explosion. (Could this have been mistaken by some as "yellow rain" - the mycotoxin?) Other types of gases: itching-blistering gas, and a laughing gas. All the above are seldom lethal, but are incapacitating. To my knowledge, the use of these chemicals have not been widespread, but appear to have been used experimentally. But, I must emphasize that this outside my area of expertise.

PEACE PROCESS

- How would you describe the current prospects for a peace settlement? Have there been any major breakthroughs in the recent round of negotiations?

The so-called "proximity talks" being held in Geneva have accomplished nothing substantive as yet. Geneva VII should begin 5 May 1986. Everyone agrees that the "interventionists" (whomever they may be) should leave Afghanistan, that the neutrality of Afghanistan be guaranteed, and that the refugees be permitted to return home, but the Soviets have not yet agreed to a time table for withdrawal. They insist on direct talks between Pakistan and the DRA and they want assistance to the resistance fighters stopped, and a government favorable to the USSR placed in power - and guaranteed to remain in power -terms unacceptable to all non-regime Afghans.

But all this does not negate the value of the Geneva talks. They have institutionalized the peace process. They are a door, which anyone can open when and if the major partners (USSR and the puppet regime) are genuinely interested in peace. This is in direct contrast to the peace talks which ended the Vietnam War. Over a year was spent in Paris while the antagonists argued about who would represent whom, what the size and shape of the table (or tables) would be, who would sit where, etc. The war ground on. But with the Geneva talks, institutionalization has set in. As long as the puppet government wants to dance, I think the Pakistanis and the United Nations will oblige. The choreography of diplomacy should continue until the Soviets (via their puppet government) decide to break it off.

- Do you think there is any conceivable basis for a peace settlement that would be acceptable to the Soviets, Pakistan, and the Afghan people?

No. At this point in time the Soviets have nothing to gain and much to lose if they leave Afghanistan. Most of the world would look on them as another "Paper Tiger." Any government they left behind would be doomed and they would probably have to intervene again. Only time, attrition and a change in Soviet attitudes can force their withdrawal.

Many Westerners look at the Soviet Union through Stalinist-tinted glasses. But the USSR of 1986 is not the USSR of 1946. The communication explosion has obviously had an impact on the Soviet people and leadership, in spite of the continued state control of media and art. Transistor radios have blanketed the earth, and the Soviet government cannot continually jam all Western radio broadcasts. Hundreds of thousands of tourists have visited the USSR, and Soviet citizens, albeit in limited numbers, have visited the outside world. Scholarly and student exchanges have taken place. More important, about 500,000 Soviet veterans of the First Russo-Afghan War (as I call it) have returned home and to civilian life. Their war stories and their problems parallel those of the American veterans of the Vietnam War.

However, given the current status of the Soviet system, I cannot conceive of the mothers of Leningrad banding together to "Bring our boys home from Afghanistan," nor can I perceive thousands of Soviet draft dodgers forming peace committees in Stockholm. But attrition and time can open new wounds. Time is not necessarily on the side of the Soviets. More important is how the outside responds to the needs of the Afghans, both inside and outside the country.

- Is there any way that the United States could help to break the current deadlock in the negotiations?

Stand firm beside Pakistan, a nation to be widely applauded and recognized for its steadfastness in a difficult situation. Pakistan has accepted about three million Afghan refugees within its borders, the world's largest single refugee problem - which grows larger with each passing day. ("Migratory genocide," as previously discussed, continues.)

Economic and military assistance to Pakistan should be continued on a long-term basis, and not end when the current crisis ends. We should cease being a fair weather friend.

The U.S. Government has already agreed to be a co-guarantor of peace, if and when the negotiations succeed. Whether the U.S. jumped into this can of worms too soon remains for the future.

The most positive step the U.S. can take is to wholeheartedly support the new seven nation South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan). If SAARC succeeds it will be the greatest boon to regional peace since World War II. The Soviets will not like it, for they like to deal with nations one-on-one, and not as regional groupings.

- What changes, if any, would you make in current US policy towards Afghanistan? And in the aid provided by the United States to the resistance forces?

U.S. policy should be focused in several directions: diplomatic, political, refugee assistance, non-military assistance inside Afghanistan, military assistance to the resistance, support for Pakistan.

Support for United Nations diplomatic efforts for a political settlement should not diminish, and support for the annual UN resolutions condemning the invasion should continue. In addition, all U.S. embassies should have at least one person designated to keep news about Afghanistan before the diplomatic community wherever the U.S. has embassies. Also, efforts should be made to assist U.S. media in obtaining accurate information on the Afghan issues. I understand that such efforts are being currently undertaken. I only hope the efforts are moving in the right direction.

The U.S. has been most generous in its contribution to refugee assistance, but should not succumb to donor fatigue because the refugees will be with us for a long time to come.

One major problem is the educational component. Afghanistan has lost at least one generation to education, and another soon unless crash programs are institutionalized. Also, a majority of Afghan professionals and intelligentsia are either dead or have fled the country, probably never to return. But captive classrooms exist in both refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran and in the resistance camps inside Afghanistan. Some efforts are being made to establish schools in the refugee camps, but coordination is necessary, both for curricula, textbooks and teaching quality.

Such simple teaching tools as filmstrips should be developed to acquaint the children with their own country. It must be remembered that some refugees have been outside Afghanistan for *eight years*, and thousands upon thousands of children have been born who have never seen their homeland. Filmstrips could not only show the geography and ecology of their country, but teach them history, basic health care, improved agricultural techniques, herding practices, etc.

Across the border, the *mujahidin* usually live in groups of 30, more or less, the perfect size for a classroom. Educational specialists (teachers) could be trained to teach basic literacy, as well as such topics as history, Islamiyat (Islamic studies), basic economics, etc. If and when the Soviets leave, there will be a great need for literate administrators at all levels.

As discussed earlier, weapons in quantity and quality should be supplied to the *mujahidin* so that a gradual impact on Soviet forces can be made.

However, one thing the U.S. should *not* do is to withdraw its embassy from Kabul. As a listening post, it is invaluable - even if only to count the number of explosions daily, report the rumors, and have access to all Afghan government publications.

Lastly, everything the U.S. does to assist the Afghans should consider the interests of Pakistan, a nation which is sacrificing much for the joint interests of the U.S.A. and Pakistan in the region.

Mr. **Solarz**. Thank you very much. That was very interesting and illuminating testimony.

I would like to ask both of you whether you think mujahedin, broadly speaking, would find an agreement acceptable in which the four instruments that have already been accepted by Pakistan and the Babrak regime were fleshed out with the fourth document which included a timeframe for the withdrawal of all Soviet forces, say, within 6 months to a year. If they are able to get Soviet agreement for that, what would be their view of such a settlement?

Mr. **Rubin**. Well, first I have a quotation here from a statement issued by the Jamiat-i-Islami, which is possibly the largest resistance party, one of the Islamacist or so-called fundamentalist parties. They say:

> The key to the solution is the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the guarantee of noninterference in Afghan affairs, the people's choice of the future form of the government, and the restoration of a non-aligned and Islamic status for Afghanistan.

The first two things they mention, withdrawal and noninterference, would be provided for by the agreement if it were to take place—if it were to be agreed upon. The final two, the people's choice of the government, restoration of nonaligned and Islamic status, in the view of some of the negotiators would be things that could take place as a result of the negotiations.

Now, the resistance parties, at least the Jamiat-i-Islami, whose statements I receive regularly, have stated that the current interlocutors in these talks have no right to decide the future of Afghanistan, and that they should be decided in direct talks between the Soviet Union and the mujahedin. And I am sure they will maintain their stance, that they are the legitimate representatives of the people of Afghanistan and will not openly accept an agreement that formally excludes them.

Whether they try to sabotage it or not, I would estimate—this is my own estimation—will depend on whether in fact the agreement will allow the conditions they mentioned to be realized.

Mr. **Solarz**. My impression is that these agreements would not require the resistance forces to lay down their arms.

Mr. **Rubin**. Since the resistance forces are not a party to the agreements, it cannot require anything of them.

Mr. **Solarz**. Nor does anybody expect them to cease fighting.

Mr. **Rubin**. Quite the contrary.

Mr. **Solarz**. What would it mean for them to accept the agreement, and what would it mean for them to reject it, assuming they were in an agreement which included a Soviet commitment to withdraw within a reasonable period of time.

Mr. **Rubin**. I would say that the resistance would be in a position to effectively make it very, very difficult for the Soviets to carry out their withdrawal in the manner they would like to do; that is, the Soviets do not envision themselves leaving from the roof of their embassy on helicopters.

Mr. **Solarz**. Well, if the mujahedin saw the Soviets withdrawing, why would they want to obstruct the withdrawal?

Mr. **Rubin**. I would presume that if they were confident that the Soviets actually were withdrawing, they would not obstruct the withdrawal.

Mr. **Solarz**. Let's say the Soviets said they would withdraw within 6 months, and let's say they begin to see that this is taking place. Do they have enough discipline to control themselves while the Soviets withdraw and wait for them to withdraw before settling scores with Babrak and his people?

Mr. **Rubin**. Well, I think no one realistically expects that there will be total nonviolence in Afghanistan during the period of withdrawal. I think that——

Mr. **Solarz**. There won't be total absence of violence after the withdrawal either.

Mr. **Rubin**. Right, but you are asking me about the period of withdrawal. I think that there are methods of communication through which most of the resistance groups in Afghanistan could be made aware of what is taking place. For instance, many of them listen to BBC.

Mr. **Solarz**. Would it be fair to say that the only hope for a withdrawal of Soviet forces and self-determination of the Afghan people lies in the context of some kind of negotiated settlement pursuant to which the Soviets would withdraw?

Mr. **Rubin**. Well, yes, that is the position of the Afghan mujahedin as well.

Mr. **Solarz**. I mean nobody expects the Soviets just to one day pick up and leave.

Mr. **Rubin**. No.

Mr. **Solarz**. So whether or not these negotiations produce an agreement, or whether or not these negotiations are designed in such a way as to create a reasonable prospect for an agreement, if there is going to be a satisfactory outcome, it will have to be some kind of negotiated agreement. Do you both accept that?

Mr. **Dupree**. After enough attrition so the Soviets agree. My Chinese colleagues at Princeton have used that one word, that the only way to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan is attrition. That means a long-term thing. We like to think in the short-term in the United States.

Mr. **Solarz**. So you don't think, then, there is any real possibility the current negotiations could result in an agreement?

Mr. **Dupree**. What do the Soviets gain?

Mr. **Solarz**. I'm not asking you what they gain and what they don't gain. I am asking whether you agree that there is no way the Soviets will agree to withdraw all of their forces at the present time according to the framework of the existing negotiations.

Mr. **Dupree**. Right. I just can't see the Soviets agreeing to leave Afghanistan unless there is some good reason for them to leave Afghanistan. Now that reason over the next 20 years will be attrition.

Mr. **Solarz**. How great do you think their losses will have to be before they are prepared to actually withdraw?

Mr. **Dupree**. I couldn't make any estimates on that. I just use a generalization. You have to get a military man to talk about that. In my opinion the Soviets have nothing to gain by leaving Afghanistan at this point in time no matter what anyone says. They have established themselves in the country, but they do not dominate the country. The countryside is dominated by the mujahedin. Even in the urban scene, they are very strong there. The Soviets, however, have constructed concrete jungles all over Afghanistan, including the fire-bases. We did the same in Vietnam, the Soviets have improved the airfields. They have built new airfields.

Mr. Solarz. Are you therefore opposed to the present negotiations?

Mr. Dupree. No, I said I am all for them. I think that everything should be attached at the same time, diplomatically, politically, that we should have people in our embassies who are constantly passing on information to the local population and press. The Geneva talks should be encouraged.

Mr. Solarz. So you favor the continuation of the existing negotiations even without the participation of the mujahedin, although presumably you would like to see them there.

Mr. Dupree. I would like to see them there, but I would like to see the talks continued because they have now been institutionalized.

Mr. Solarz. Actually if Mr. Peck was correct in saying that the mujahedin would not negotiate with the Babrak regime, in effect the participation of the mujahedin in negotiations means a very different negotiation. It would mean a negotiation between the mujahedin and the Soviet Union, rather than a negotiation between Pakistan and the Babrak regime, because even if the Babrak regime was prepared to have the mujahedin participate in the negotiations, the mujahedin wouldn't negotiate with them. So the only negotiation in which they would participate would presumably be one with the Soviet Union. Is that correct?

Mr. Dupree. I can conceive of the Geneva talks evolving into direct talks between the mujahedin leadership and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Solarz. But you would still favor the continuation of the current talks.

Mr. Dupree. Definitely, because I think they are going to evolve into other types of talks. They have already. They started out as indirect talks with the participants in different buildings. Now at least they are in the same building for proximity talks. Now the talks can evolve toward direct talks.

Mr. Solarz. How significant is this alliance?

Mr. Dupree. If it holds together, it is extremely significant, and it has held together now longer than any other attempt at alliance of these groups. I used to call attempts to unify the parties in Peshawar the Peshawar merry-go-round, because one would jump off, and one would jump on, and two would jump off, and three would jump on, and so forth. But now all seven parties have gotten together because of pressure from the outside and pressure from inside Afghanistan.

Many of the commanders came down to Peshawar—came down May of last year, and told the seven leaders, "Look we cooperate inside the country. We fight together." I have seen them fight together. They said, "Why can't you cooperate outside? You are our face to the outside world. You cooperate. You don't have to like each other, but cooperate, because we do it inside the country."

Mr. Rubin. I would say the alliance is significant in a couple of ways. First, because it is very good for the morale of the Afghans themselves to know about it, and second, because it makes the Afghan resistance a more viable partner for negotiations, and the

Afghan resistance itself says that it wants to participate in such negotiations.

Mr. **Solarz**. What do you think the attitude of the democratic opposition in Pakistan is to the whole question of the resistance in Afghanistan, and how likely would it be, to cooperate in a way the present government if it came to power, has in facilitating and fostering Afghan resistance within Pakistan?

Mr. **Rubin**. In order to find out about this, I managed to meet Benazir Bhutto and talk to her about it a while ago, but the main result of that was that she refused to talk about it, saying that she didn't have enough information because she wasn't in the government.

I would say, first of all, in trying to guess, and this is all we are talking about—guess what they would do, we cannot judge what they would do solely by what they say when they are out of office. When they get into office they will find out a lot of things that they don't know right now, and they will be subjected to a lot of pressures that they are not subjected to now.

I would say the predominant position in the People's Party, a position which, however, has not been shared by Benazir Bhutto, but has been the dominant position among leaders within the country, has been to favor direct talks; that is, they were putting as much pressure as they could on President Zia to enter into direct talks with the Karmal regime mainly on the grounds that it wasn't Pakistan's business what kind of regime there was in Afghanistan. They just had to get rid of the refugees, which I think is quite naive on their part and shows their failure to confront reality about what would make the refugees go back, something they would have to confront if they actually went into office.

Mr. **Solarz**. Mr. Dupree.

Mr. **Dupree**. Well, the opposition in Pakistan has always been opposed to almost anything form the beginning in 1947. Many of the religious leaders in the Pakistani political parties opposed the creation of Pakistan, and they have been opposing everyone who sat in Rawalpindi or Islamabad—or earlier in Karachi—they have been opposing them simply because I think they believe that a British viceroy still sits in the presidential palace.

I feel, as does Dr. Rubin, that I would not really put too much faith in what the opposition keeps saying. They are now trying to develop a viable opposition which can win any elections in the future. I think that, too, they will take a much more serious view of what is happening north of the border once they do come to power, if they ever do.

Mr. **Solarz**. You indicated in your testimony that you personally witnessed chemical attack in Afghanistan. Could you tell us when and under what circumstances?

Mr. **Dupree**. I didn't witness the attack. I have the evidence. I was in an area in which the Soviets dropped some itching blister-type gas the next day after the attack occurred. I took some pictures of my own then. We were trying to get the wounded back to Peshawar for treatment. And this was in the Khost region this past summer—1985.

Mr. **Solarz**. Senator, do you have a question?

Senator **Humphrey**. Yes; just very briefly if I may.

Mr. **Solarz**. Certainly.

Senator **Humphrey**. I guess we can all agree that the matter of self-determination is of the utmost importance. So my question is this: is it sufficient—in addressing the matter of self-determination, is it sufficient to rely for self-determination on continued mujahedin resistance after we cut off the aid, or should we instead be seeking in these agreements, or supplemental agreement, a mechanism to insure self-determination? Dr. Rubin?

Mr. **Rubin**. We first have to make a distinction between what we should be seeking and what we may settle for. And I think that we should be seeking and should have been seeking all along a mechanism to insure self-determination. It may be, however, that rather than openly stating officially that they are going to get rid of the government that they installed in Kabul, the Soviets would prefer to keep fighting. Whereas if they could find a face-saving way to make changes in that government which would enable them to get out and stay out—this is all in the conditional, I am not saying that it will happen, but it is possible—then they would accept that.

The message that is being transmitted by various channels, and I am not prepared to say whether it is true or whether it is disinformation, is that the Soviets would allow what they call a process of finlandization. That is analogous to what happened when they withdrew their troops from Finland, in the course of which there would be a transition to a largely non-Communist coalition which would, nevertheless, accept certain limitations on what its foreign policy and criticisms of the Soviet Union could be.

Obviously Afghanistan is not going to be a Scandinavian democracy whatever government takes power there, but the Soviets would not insist on the realization of what most of us have considered to be their goal in Afghanistan, namely, the imposition of a Communist regime, and accept a different type of regime which would be acceptable to most Afghans and would protect their security interests. So that is the scenario that seems to be being offered by various channels.

Now, it is not the scenario that we should be seeking in my view, but it might be preferable to the realistic alternative.

Senator **Humphrey**. Professor Dupree, how would you have us deal with this very important matter of self-determination?

Mr. **Dupree**. Well, I would rely on an old Afghan institution which exists—this is assuming the Soviets leave and the Afghans are back in their country. Initially, they will probably fight a small civil war, although no civil war should be considered small. I think that the Afghans could use their institution of the loya jirga, that great national assembly of all of the notables in the country—the tribal khans, the various maliks, the religious leaders, leaders in the intelligencia, naturally the military commanders among the mujahedin and so forth. A great national assembly, which is an old tradition in Afghanistan, could come together and try to iron out how they are going to create their country, possibly into a type of federation not unlike the Yugoslav model.

Senator **Humphrey**. Well, Secretary Peck seemed to suggest or imply that the mujahedin, the Afghans, would take things into their own hands. If that were the case, would not this DRA government, legitimized by the official recognition of Pakistan, then reinvite the Soviet troops to come and stay a while? Isn't that a likely scenario?

Mr. **Dupree**. Of course. If I were a Soviet planner, I would count on that. If I agreed to withdraw my troops and if, as the Afghan mujahedin (the refugees) came back into the country and joined the mujahedin, and they began to fight for regional power, *and* to overthrow the regime I had left in Kabul, the first thing I would do, as a Soviet leader, is to call on the treaty mentioned earlier, the treaty of December 1978, which permits the Soviets to come into Afghanistan if the Afghan government in power asked for military assistance, then the Soviets could come return and be in a stronger position legally.

Mr. **Rubin**. May I comment on that? As I mentioned in my testimony, as I understand the agreement, that would be in violation of the agreement, because the Soviets would have to give an undertaking not to intervene. I may be wrong, because I haven't had the opportunity to study the agreement in detail, the draft of it, but my impression is that intervention would include intervention at the request of whatever Afghanistan Government subsequently existed there.

I would also agree with Chairman Solarz' earlier description of why that would be a scenario that would not seem to be of great interest to the Soviets, if what they are trying to do is extricate themselves from a situation where I believe they have already suffered considerable attrition.

Senator **Humphrey**. Well, given the choice which might confront the Soviets under those circumstances of violating the terms of these agreements, or coming to the aid of a fraternal nation, which do you suppose they would do?

Mr. **Rubin**. In my view, the Soviets are aware of the realities on the ground in Afghanistan, and the Soviets do not have an interest in signing an agreement which will force themselves to openly violate it and get themselves back into the situation they were in before, but in a worse political position internationally.

Senator **Humphrey**. No; the situation would then be different, because Pakistan would have recognized the DRA regime. Pakistan, then, could in no way——

Mr. **Rubin**. Pakistan already recognizes the DRA regime and has met——

Senator **Humphrey**. No, that's not so.

Mr. **Rubin**. General Zia met with Taraki.

Senator **Humphrey**. Well, look, but I am saying that part of the agreements now agreed to, in fact, is that Pakistan will officially in the full diplomatic sense of the word, officially recognize the DRA regime. Now if the DRA regime officially recognized by Pakistan invites the Soviets back in, what can Pakistan possibly do?

Mr. **Rubin**. Well, with due respect, Senator, Pakistan recognizes the DRA regime and has specifically said that their quarrel is not with the DRA as such; that they dealt with Taraki, that they dealt with Amin. Their quarrel is with the specific government that was installed by the Soviets. Now, the agreement does not have any clause in it as far as I know that states there is some kind of recognition or legitimation of the Government in Afghanistan, the so-called government.

It is true that the negotiators will have to meet and there will be a type of symbolic legitimization in that the two foreign ministers will meet, and the agreement would be signed, if it actually exists. I don't think that will affect the determination of the Afghan mujahedin. We can just go back to the scenario—it is possible, this is the risk that agreement comports, I would say, but it doesn't seem reasonable for the Soviets, in their own interest, given that they know the weakness of the regime, and you can read about it in Pravda if you want to, that they would agree to something that would get them stuck in that type of situation.

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you sincerely for permitting me to sit in. I don't agree with that analysis. I think the Soviets will see in that situation that a new situation that outside forces can't credibly come to the aid of the mujahedin and will not have any compunctions about moving back in, but that is a matter of opinion.

Mr. Dupree. I agree with that opinion, too.

Senator Humphrey. Only time will tell. Thank you very, very much. I think this has been an enormously useful hearing, and I would encourage you to have more of them.

Mr. Solarz. Thank you very much, Senator. I think your participation has helped to make to make this a productive hearing, and I appreciate your presence.

My own feeling about this is that I don't think the Soviets are going to agree to any settlement that obligates them to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan unless and until they come to the conclusion that it is in fact in their interest to withdraw. I rather doubt that they have yet reached that point, but if they do agree to withdraw, I think it will be because they have decided they want to cut their losses and want to get out.

I don't think they are under any illusions as to what will happen. I don't think for a moment that they believe that if they withdraw, a year from now that Babrak will be able to maintain himself in power. So assuming they were prepared to make that commitment to withdraw, one would have to assume one of two things: either that they were in fact prepared to withdraw even though it would mean the inevitable overthrow of Babrak's regime, which I think they would understand in fact would occur, or the only other conceivable explanation a kind of very cynical—and they are certainly capable of great cynicism—judgment that they had no intention of really withdrawing, but wanted an excuse to get us to pledge that we wouldn't interfere, fully intending to have Babrak or his successor issue a request for the Soviets to come back.

As I consider both of those possibilities, I see the potential benefits from the second scenario to be at best, very minimal and conceivably even leaving them in a worse position. I think they run the real risk of being internationally discredited since this would be seen as a blatantly cynical repudiation of an agreement that they had entered into, which would be greeted at the time it took place with great international approval and approbation.

Senator Humphrey. May I offer one little quick jab?

Mr. Solarz. Yes, sir.

Senator **Humphrey**. The Soviets are obligated by international agreements into which they freely entered to notify nations of nuclear disasters, and they very cynically did not in the last week.

Mr. **Solarz**. I think the Soviets are capable of cynicism, and I think they have violated agreements. I think they probably are violating the ABM Treaty by building the Krasnoyarsk radar. I think that you can argue they are violating SALT II, even though technically it hasn't been signed and ratified, because they are encrypting telemetry that the treaty prohibits them from encrypting, and the like.

In this instance, I think it is a question not of sincerity or cynicism; it is a question of a calculation of where their interests lie. If they believe their interests lie in cutting their losses and getting out, then I think they will get out and they will stay out. If their interests lie in keeping a Communist government in power in Kabul, which is what I think they believe their interests require, then my guess is they are unlikely to begin a process of withdrawal expecting to reverse the withdrawal within a matter of weeks or months. I think under those circumstances, they would prefer to hang tough and remain in Afghanistan.

Of course, time will tell. In any case, one thing we do know that any withdrawal on their part can always be reversed. It doesn't matter whether we cut off our aid to the mujahedin on day 1 or whether we cut off our aid, assuming we are providing aid, on day 365. The Soviets will always have the option of violating the agreement and coming back 6 months or 6 years or 60 years later.

Given that fact, I think that we have to recognize there is always a risk. But assuming they are willing to withdraw, I think it would be a mistake to reject such an agreement on the grounds there is no guarantee the Soviets will respect their commitment. Otherwise the logic of your position is that you have to fight them down to the last Afghan. My impression is that even the mujahedin themselves would be prepared to accept an agreement if in fact it clearly resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet forces, even though they would have to acknowledge a year later that maybe the Soviets would come back in in violation of the agreement.

But the point is if the Soviets were to do that then the other parties are relieved of their obligations, and I don't see what the Soviets would have gained in the process.

Senator **Humphrey**. The fundamental difference, however, is that we, those interested in supporting the mujahedin, would then no longer be in a position to help them.

Mr. **Solarz**. Why?

Senator **Humphrey**. Why? Because it is hard to restart an aid program because Pakistan would have recognized the DRA and will not permit provisioning.

Mr. **Solarz**. Well, that's where I disagree. I don't think the fact that Pakistan does or does not recognize the regime has anything to do with its willingness to help to the resistance. The willingness to help to the resistance is not a function of legal interpretations. It is a function of Pakistan's judgment as to where its political interests are.

For example, we recognize the Government in Nicaragua, yet we provide aid to the Contras. We technically have diplomatic relations with the Babrak regime, although it is at a low level, yet, if I read the press correctly, we seem to be helping the resistance. Pakistan has diplomatic relations with India. They have gone to war with India four times in the last 30 years.

I think Pakistan is aiding the resistance not because it doesn't recognize the regime, but because it deems it in its interest to help the resistance forces drive the Soviet troops out.

I think that is the dominant reality, and if the Soviets don't pull out, or if they leave and return, I think the very same factors that led Pakistan to take the position it has taken thus far, will come back into play.

Nevertheless, I can see this is all speculation. We don't really know. I think, however, it has been a productive hearing, and I very much appreciate the willingness of both of you to stay here for the duration of these discussions. You are obviously both extraordinarily well-informed. You have brought to your presentation, not only a scholarly background, but a passionate commitment to the Afghan people based on your experiences with them.

We very rarely get that combination of passion and precision around here. It is very welcome to see it because these are issues that stir the soul and go to the heart of fundamental values that our Nation is committed to. I think it is impossible for anybody familiar with what has happening not to have a great sense of outrage over what the Soviets have done and are doing, and a great sense of sympathy for the Afghan people, who have suffered so much, as well as admiration for their extraordinary courage. I don't think there are too many other peoples around the world that would have been capable of this kind of sustained resistance.

I think Professor Dupree pointed out that during World War II the only resistance movement comparable to it was probably the one in Yugoslavia. Perhaps something about mountainous nations and mountain people lends itself to this sort of persistence. But, nevertheless, it is admirable and inspiring.

So I want to thank you both very much for coming and for the representatives from the State Department who, on a rare expression of interest in these proceedings, stayed behind even after they were finished with their own testimony.

I would, at this time, ask unanimous consent to enter some supplementary material into the record.[1]

The hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

---

[1] See apps. 2 and 3.

APPENDIX 1

U.N. RESOLUTION 40/137, "QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN AFGHANISTAN"

40/137. *Question of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Afghanistan*

Date: 13 December 1985 Meeting: 116
Vote: 80-22-40 (recorded) Report: A/40/1007

The General Assembly,

Guided by the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 350/ the International Covenants on Human Rights 351/ and the humanitarian rules set out in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 352/

Aware of its responsibility to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and resolved to remain vigilant with regard to violations of human rights wherever they occur,

Emphasizing the obligation of all Governments to respect and protect human rights and to fulfil the responsibilities they have assumed under various international instruments,

---

349/ See A/40/PV.29.

350/ General Assembly resolution 217 A (III).

351/ General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.

352/ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, Nos. 970-973.

Recalling Commission on Human Rights resolution 1984/55 of 15 March 1984, 353/ by which the Commission expressed its concern and anxiety at the continuing presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan, as well as Economic and Social Council resolution 1984/37 of 24 May 1984, by which the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights was requested to appoint a Special Rapporteur to examine the situation of human rights in Afghanistan,

Recalling Commission on Human Rights resolution 1985/38 of 13 March 1985, by which the Commission expressed its profound concern at the grave and massive human rights violations in Afghanistan and urged the authorities in that country to put a stop to these violations, in particular the military repression being conducted against the civilian population of Afghanistan,

Recalling also Economic and Social Council decision 1985/147 of 30 May 1985, by which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur and requested him to report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session and to the Commission on Human Rights at its forty-second session on the human rights situation in Afghanistan, including the human and material losses resulting from the bombardments of the civilian population,

Recalling further Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities resolution 1985/35, 354/ by which the Sub-Commission requested the Commission on Human Rights to ask the Special Rapporteur to look, in particular, into the fate of women and children as a consequence of the conflict in Afghanistan,

Having carefully examined the interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Afghanistan, 355/ which reveals continuing grave and massive violations of fundamental human rights in that country,

Recognizing that a situation of armed conflict continues to exist in Afghanistan, leaving large numbers of victims without protection or assistance,

Deploring the continuing refusal of the Afghan authorities to co-operate with the Special Rapporteur,

1. *Commends* the Special Rapporteur for his report on the question of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Afghanistan; 356/

2. *Expresses its profound concern* that, as revealed in the findings of the Special Rapporteur, disregard for human rights is more widespread, the conflict continues to engender human rights violations on a large scale and, as a result, not only the lives of individuals but the existence of whole groups of persons and tribes are endangered;

3. *Expresses its deep concern* that the Afghan authorities, with heavy support from foreign troops, are acting with great severity against their opponents and suspected opponents without any respect for the international human rights obligations which they have assumed;

4. *Expresses also its deep concern* at the severe consequences for the civilian population of indiscriminate bombardments and military operations primarily targeted on the villages and the agricultural structure;

5. *Shares the conviction* of the Special Rapporteur that the duration of the conflict increases the seriousness of the gross and systematic violations of human rights already existing in the country;

6. *Expresses its profound distress and alarm*, in particular, at the widespread violations of the right to life, liberty and security of person, including the commonplace practice of torture and summary executions of the régime's opponents, as well as increasing evidence of a policy of religious intolerance;

353/ See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1984, Supplement No. 4* (E/1984/14), chap. II

354/ See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1984, Supplement No. 2* (E/1985/22), chap. II.

355/ See E/CN.4/1985/3.

356/ A/40/843, annex.

357/ A/40/843, annex.

7. *Notes with great concern* that such widespread violations of human rights that have already caused millions of people to flee their homes and country are still giving rise to large flows of refugees and displaced persons;

8. *Calls upon* the parties to the conflict to apply fully the principles and rules of international humanitarian law and to admit international humanitarian organizations, in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross, and to facilitate their operations for the alleviation of the suffering of the people in Afghanistan;

9. *Urges* the authorities in Afghanistan to co-operate with the Commission on Human Rights and its Special Rapporteur, in particular by allowing him to visit Afghanistan;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to give all necessary assistance to the Special Rapporteur;

11. *Decides* to keep under consideration, during its forty-first session, the question of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Afghanistan, in order to examine this question anew in the light of additional elements provided by the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council.

RECORDED VOTE ON RESOLUTION 40/137:

In favour: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Grenada, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, St. Christopher and Nevis, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libya, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland, Romania, Syria, Ukraine, USSR, Viet Nam.

Abstaining: Algeria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Congo, Cyprus, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nepal, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Absent: Dominica, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Mozambique, Qatar, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Yemen.

Bolivia and Iran announced that they were not participating in the vote.

APPENDIX 2

"THE SOVIET WAR IN AFGHANISTAN," BY JIM PHILLIPS

The Soviet Union has waged a brutal war of attrition against the Afghan people for more than six years. Optimists, noting that the Soviets have fought the Afghans longer than they fought the Germans in World War II, take comfort in the current military stalemate inside Afghanistan. Optimists perceive the U.N.-sponsored indirect talks in Geneva as a possible face-saving solution for Moscow. Pessimists note that the successful Soviet anti-guerrilla campaign against Islamic nationalists in Central Asia during the Basmachi wars spanned two decades. Pessimists doubt Moscow's willingness to compromise in Afghanistan and question the ability of the Afghans to withstand, without substantial foreign help, the grinding punishment meted out by the Soviets to wear down the Afghan will to resist. In my opinion, the pessimists have been right about Afghanistan more often than the optimists in the past and this is likely to hold true in the future.

The Afghans courageously have battled the Soviets to a standstill. If the outcome of the war was merely a question of firepower, the Soviets would have won long ago due to the vast superiority of their weapons. If the outcome was merely a question of willpower, the Soviets would have little chance to prevail in the face of the Afghans historical refusal to submit to foreign conquerors. But the crux of the struggle is not firepower or willpower but staying power, an amalgam of many factors. The Soviet goal is to crush the Afghan mujahideen in a prolonged campaign to whittle away the political, economic, and psychological underpinnings of armed resistance.

The Soviets cannot hope to land a military knockout blow because their elusive foes present no irreplaceable targets. Moreover, the mujahideen receive advance warning from their many sympathizers in the nominally pro-Soviet Afghan army. When hard-pressed, the mujahideen simply melt into their mountain sanctuaries. The Soviets launch periodic offensives to keep the Afghans off-balance and to interfere with their supply lines but often Soviet military operations are tailored to political, economic or psychological goals rather than purely military ones. For instance, the Soviets target certain resistance groups while sparing others to sow division in the ranks of the mujahideen. Offensives are timed to coincide with the spring planting and fall harvesting seasons in resistance strongholds to cause maximum disruption to the local agriculture economy. Livestock, food supplies, wells and irrigation systems are destroyed to undercut the economic viability of the vast area of the countryside controlled by the resistance and increase dependence on the puppet government in Kabul. Civilans are attacked indiscriminately and terrorized to drive them out of Afghanistan, thereby depriving the mujahideen of local sources of sustenance.

Moscow hopes to strangle the resistance in an extended process of elimination, intimidation and co-optation. It seeks to build a new generation of young, uprooted Afghans infused with Soviet ideology to preside over a Sovietized Afghanistan. Thousands of Afghan children have been placed in indoctrination programs inside the Soviet Union and it is unlikely that Moscow would make such a long term investment unless it expected to reap dividends from it.

In the meantime, the Soviets are following the imperial dictum of divide and rule. They seek to exploit cleavages in the resistance by using the KGB-controlled Afghan secret police -- the KHAD -- to foment frictions between tribes, ethnic groups, resistance organizations and individual commanders. The KHAD is also adept at bribing malcontented tribal leaders to withdraw their support for the resistance. While the KHAD has scored some successes in co-opting dissident tribes, particularly along the Pakistani border, it has discovered to its chagrin that such tribes cannot be bought but only rented for a limited period of time.

An important element in the Soviet strategy for subjugating Afghanistan is the determined effort to intimidate and eventually co-opt Pakistan. The Soviets have stepped up violations of Pakistani airspace, cross-border artillery and air attacks, and terrorist bombings in Peshawar, a sanctuary for thousands of Afghans. Soviet military offensives along the border have grown in size and frequency, often timed to coincide with sessions of the U.N.-sponsored indirect talks to underscore Pakistan's vulnerability to Islamabad.

Moscow uses the U.N. talks as a diplomatic figleaf to defuse international criticism, discourage external aid to the Afghans, demoralize the resistance and buy time to crush it. These talks have been deadlocked since June 1983 by Soviet refusal to propose a timetable for withdrawal of their forces and by Soviet insistance that a "friendly" government remain in power in Kabul. Recently, the Soviets have hinted at greater willingness to negotiate a withdrawal.

Washington should press Moscow to follow through on its hints but should watch what the Soviets do more than what they say. The Soviet peace offensive in Afghanistan, like the Soviet peace offensive in Western Europe, is first and foremost a public relations exercise aimed at driving a wedge between natural allies to preclude an effective countermove to a Soviet buildup. A further Soviet goal is to deprive the Afghans of foreign support by striking a deal over their heads with a nervous Pakistan. Washington should make it clear to Moscow that it will not allow Pakistan to be coerced into a one-sided settlement. The U.S. should reaffirm its commitment to Pakistan's security and privately warn Moscow tht any future military attacks on

Pakistan will be answered with a direct U.S. air supply to the Afghans, among other responses.

While it is true that Mikhail Gorbachev has not foreclosed the option of a negotiated settlement to the war that he inherited, it is also true that he has raised the level of violence of the war since coming to power. Even if Gorbachev is serious about negotiating an end to the war he is unlikely to make a deal until Pakistan's political future has been ascertained, simply because he knows he could get a better deal from Pakistani opposition leader Benazir Bhutto if she should come to power.

Washington should test Soviet intentions but should not compromise its commitment to help the Afghans regain their sovereign rights. The U.S. should not accept any settlement that would allow the Soviets to retain bases or troops in Afghanistan. Nor should it accept any scheme that thwarts Afghan self-determination and the honorable return of almost five million Afghan refugees. Only an agreement that includes the total withdrawal of Soviet forces within a fixed and narrow time frame merits consideration. Moreover, the U.S. must reserve the right to furnish the Afghans with material support as long as Soviet troops remain in occupation of Afghanistan.

Proponents of a negotiated settlement based on the "Finlandization" of Afghanistan forget that the Finns were able to negotiate an acceptable settlement with Moscow only after they had bloodied the Soviet Army in a 1939-1940 war and demonstrated the high costs of Soviet occupation. An agreement acceptable to the Afghans will only be reached once the Soviets have been convinced that the costs of holding Afghanistan outweigh the strategic benefits.

The U.S. should work on several fronts to raise the cost of the Soviet occupation. Washington should increase its coverage of the war in Voice of America and Radio Liberty radio broadcasts to the Soviet people to keep them informed of the casualties their armed forces are suffering in Afghanistan as well as the atrocities they are committing against the Afghan people. The U.S. Information Agency should boost its efforts to disseminate information on the war to the non-communist world. Most important, the U.S. should increase the effectiveness of the aid extended to the Afghans. The mujahideen desperately need man-portable anti-aircraft missiles, mortars and anti-tank mines. Medical supplies, doctors and food supplies are also scarce.

The Soviets believe that time is on their side in Afghanistan. They are not likely to negotiate a political settlement until they are convinced otherwise.

APPENDIX 3

3/17/86

Toward Afghanistan Peace

By Selig S. Harrison

WASHINGTON — The three-year-old United Nations negotiations on a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan made significant progress immediately after the summit meeting. But the negotiations again are stalled and progress appears unlikely unless the United Nations effort is accompanied by superpower talks on related security issues in the Afghanistan region.

Washington should seek to break the deadlock by proposing exchanges with Moscow designed to defuse American-Soviet military tensions relating to Iran, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf. Such an initiative is needed in order to deal with a critical issue not covered in the emerging United Nations withdrawal plan: the future of Soviet bases in Afghanistan.

In return for a credible Soviet commitment to phase out its bases along with the projected withdrawal of its forces, America should be prepared to discuss limitations on one or more of the bases it has developed near Afghanistan since the occupation. One example is the airfield at Masirah Island off Oman, which can handle strategic bombers.

Washington should offer to join Moscow in an agreement not to introduce combat forces or mutually threatening bases or facilities in Iran and Pakistan. In 1980, Cyrus R. Vance, who was Secretary of State, wanted to propose such an accord but was blocked by the national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who later wrote he did not want to "make the Soviet Union in effect the co-guarantor of neutrality in the Persian Gulf region." Immediately after the Soviet occupation, the Brzezinski view prevailed. But such an agreement would serve American interests if it helped get Soviet forces and bases out of Afghanistan.

Both Iran and Pakistan are explosive focal points of American-Soviet distrust. On the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the possibility of a superpower confrontation has been growing especially serious as the Soviet Union increases its forward troop deployments and as the United States, which has a mutual-security agreement with Pakistan, steps up its support for the Afghan resistance.

Until the summit meeting, the Administration was cool to the United Nations withdrawal plan, which orchestrates termination of arms aid to the resistance along with a Soviet pullout. The Administration has insisted that a withdrawal should come first. But in December, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead announced qualified approval of two already negotiated draft agreements — between Pakistan and the Soviet-sponsored Democratic Republic of Afghanistan — that would synchronize a withdrawal with ending aid to the resistance. More important, America accepted the United Nations draft text of projected American and Soviet guarantees that would back up the Islamabad-Kabul agreements.

Mr. Whitehead conditioned the guarantee offer on a satisfactory further agreement defining the length of the withdrawal. Afghanistan then pledged in writing to negotiate the time frame if Pakistan would agree to direct negotiations in place of the United Nations mediation process.

At the Communist Party Congress, Mikhail S. Gorbachev emphasized readiness to withdraw combat forces "in the most immediate future," and avoided previous rhetoric demanding a cutoff of aid before any withdrawal. By calling for a settlement that "dependably guarantees the nonresumption" of aid to the resistance, he made clear that Moscow expected the Kabul regime to stay in place. But American interests would be served by the projected United Nations settlement, regardless of the regime in Kabul, if Moscow agreed to phase out its bases along with its forces.

Spokesmen for Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and other advocates of "bleeding" the Russians are openly criticizing the Whitehead position. Secretary of State George P. Shultz should reaffirm that America accepts the United Nations principle of linkage between a military withdrawal and termination of aid. At the same time, President Reagan should test the professed Soviet readiness for withdrawal by offering to open discussions on related Southwest Asian security issues in preparation for the next summit meeting. ☐

Selig S. Harrison is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This article is adapted from a longer essay in the spring issue of Foreign Policy.